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· INTRODUCTION 
The Commission's competition policy took on a new dimen-
sion during 1972. At a time when the Community is preparing to 
achieve the gradual approximation of the Member States' eco-
nomic policies, it is more than ever necessary that the Com-
mission should see to it that the fundamental rules of the Treaty 
are observed, ana, in particular, that effective competition 
between undertakings is maintained. 
Community competition policy towards undertakings, being 
a basic policy supported by effective national competition poli-
cies, can help considerably to influence the economic conditions 
characterizing this day and age. For the bans imposed by the 
Commission on restrictive practices or abuses .under its com-
petition rules help iIi the fight against inflation, since they elimi~ 
nate the unjustified advantages which some undertakings may 
derive from fragmentation of markets. The Council of Minister~; 
called upon to consider what action should be taken to control 
inflation, has realized what effects a strict competition policy 
could have on prices, even though such effect,s would generally 
make themselves felt only in the medium term. In its resolution 
of October 31st,' 1972, the Council. noted "the determination 
expressed by the Commission to strengthen its action against 
restraints of competition which may derive either from horizontal 
price agreements, concerted practices with regard to' prices or 
price discriminatory measures applied by undertakings in domi-
n~nt positions, or from market-sharing agreements or other 
restrictive practices pursued by undertakings the. purpose of 
which is to maintain the fragmentation of the markets, orfrom 
self limitation agreements,' wherever such agreements hamper 
the Community's commercial policy." '. 
With effect from 1 January 1973 the competition rules of the 
Treaties, as well as the measures to implement them taken by the 
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Council and the Commission, are applicable throughout the 
enlarged Community because of the accession of new members. 
The previous Free-trade agreements also provided for competi-
tion rules comparable to those in the EEC Treaty. But even if the 
Community rules are not directly applicable to the trade covered 
by these agreements, the fact remains that a vast economic area 
has thus been constituted which is subject to a common discipline 
that guarantees an ordered, non-discriminatory development of 
commerce. 
The implementation of the rules of competition applying to 
undertakings led the Commission to adopt a number of measures 
in 1972: Fourteen decisions were taken under Articles 85 and 86 of 
the EEC Treaty and 15 decisions under Articles 65 and 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty. Some of these decisions are of great importance in 
the effort to restore conditions of competition on the Community 
markets and to ensure the maintenance of the unity of the 
Common Market. Heavy fines were imposed in cases of grave 
infringements harming the interests of the consumers. While 
applying the principle that restrictive agreements are prohibited, 
the Commission at the same time availed itself, by adopting 
regulations or individual decisions, of the opportunities provided 
by exemption clauses to encourage cooperation between under-
takings aimed at strengthening their competitive positions. 
Progress was made in the field of patent licensing agreements and 
the communication 'of knowhow, two fields which are essential 
in the transfer of technological knowledge in the modern econ-
omy, by standard decisions adopted in specific cases. 
Available information shows that the general movement 
towards industrial combination is gathering strength in the 
Common Market. International concentration operations in the 
Common Market, which showed a marked jncrease from 1966 
to 1970, were even more numerous in 1971. While the partici-
pation of the undertakings of non-member countries in interna-
tional operations remained substantial, it declined as a ratio of 
the number of concentration operations involving only Common 
Market undertakings. A study of 32 surveys of specific industries 
shows that during the 1962-1969 period there was an increase in 
the number of firms in the industry concerned in only three cases. 
10 REP. COMPo 1972 
In the other cases, the number of firms declined. The degree of 
concentration fell in only four cases, while elsewhere there was an 
increase, which grew faster as time went on. 
The Summit Conference' of Heads of State or of Govern-
ment of the enlarged Community, held from 19 to 21 October 
1972, studied the problem of industrial concentration, and the 
Final Communique called for both" the formulation of measures 
to ensure that mergers involving firms established in the Com-
munity are in harmony with the economic and social aims of the 
Community, and the maintenance of fair competition", it also 
called for the broadest possible use of Article 235 of the EEC 
Treaty, which empowers the Council, acting unanimously on 
Commission proposals, after consulting the Parliament, to take 
any powers not provided for elsewhere necessary to achieve, in 
the working of the Common Market, a specific Community 
objective. This political pronouncement led the Commission to 
advise the Council, on 30 and 31 October 1972, of its intention 
"to submit, independently of the application of Article 86 to 
specific cases, proposals designed to introduce a more systematic 
control of merger operations of a given scale". 
On the question of aids, the Summit Conference stressed the 
need for coordination of the future regional development fund 
with national aids, and acknowledged implicitly the importance 
attaching to coordination among themselves of national aid 
measures having a regional purpose. Coordination of this kind 
is in fact already ensured to a great extent by the principles to 
which the Commission decided to give priority in 1971. These 
principles were being progressively implemented during 1972. 
On the question of aids to specific industries, the Com-
mission continued its efforts to build up Community arrange-
ments with which the Governments will have to comply, in 
respect of certain industries which are generally assisted by the 
Member States: following textiles and shipbuilding, aircraft 
construction is now the industry under scrutiny. 
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Lastly, progress made with regard to regional-aids and aids 
to individual industries led the Commission to consider state 
assistance by other methods (general aids, temporary acquisition 
by the State of holdings in companies). 
In addition, the Commission's efforts to improve consumer 
protection in 1972 were given further encouragement by the 
Summit Conference, which, in its Final Communique, called 
upon the Institutions to seek out ways and means of "strengthen-
ing and coordinating consumer protection". The Commission is 
planning to establish a programme in this area. 
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Part one 
Competition policy with regard to undertakings 
13-14
CHAPTER I 
MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMMUNITY'S POLICY 
1. Continuity of implementation of the Commission's policy 
on restrictive practices and dominant positions 
1. In 1972, as part of its policy with regard to enterprises, the Commission 
continued to give priority to action against restrictive or improper practices 
which hamper the creation of a single market and the maintenance of effective 
competition within this uniform market. The aim is to use Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty, to terminate market-sharing, the fixing of prices and quotas, and other 
devices employed by firms to maintain market fragmentation. Under the Com-
mission's previous practice, such measures obviously cannot escape the general 
ban on agreements. 1 Under Article 86, the practices attacked were improper 
practices by undertakings in dominant positions designed either to curtail the 
commercial freedom of dealers or to cut off supplies to a competitor. 
2. Side by side with application of the banning principle the Commission 
continued its policy of strengthening the competitive position of undertakings 
by exempting the desirable forms of cooperation between them from the ban on 
restrictive agreements via regulations or case-by-case decisions. This line is 
followed with regard to specialization agreements and exclusive-marketing 
agreements, especially as far as small and medium-sized firms are concerned. 
In the distribution field the Commission has still had to combat the tendency 
on the part of certain undertakings to keep the national markets separated by 
prohibiting exports or by concerted price discrimination according to,country 
of destination within the common market. 
3. In two decisions, the Commission pursued its work of making clear its 
position on the application of Article 85 to the contractual exploitation of in-
dustrial property rights and technical knowhow2• The main point made is that 
a rule forbidding exports to countries situated outside the sales territory, im-
posed on the licensee, may be caught by Article 85(1). In addition, where new 
technology could not be made available in the concession territory without an 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 1. 
~ First Report on Competition Policy, sees. 73 to 79. 
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exclusive licence being granted, the agreement can be exempted by the Commis-
sion under Article 85(3). By checking that no commitments have been accepted 
which are not indispensable to appropriate exploitation of the invention and of 
the knowhow, the Commission has thus also come out in favour of greater 
freedom of action for the licensees. 
Henceforward, it will be in an enlarged market that the Commission will 
apply this policy devoted to ensuring maintenance of a competition system free 
from distortion. 
2. Extension of the scope of the competition rules 
4. Through application of the principle whereby the acceding countries 
assume the burden of responsibilities, and enter into enjoyment of the privi-
leges, of the original Community, the competition system of the Community 
of Nine will be that of the Community of Six. In the free-trade agreements con-
cluded with the other member co'untries of EFTA, provision should also be 
made for rules ensuring that trade between the enlarged common market and 
these countries should develop under conditions of competition which are not 
distorted by restrictive or improper practices. The geographical scope of the 
principle of undistorted competition which underlies Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EEC Treaty is thus considerably extended. 
5. From 1 January 1973 onwards, Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty establishing 
the EEC, Articles 65 and 66 of the Treaty establishing the ECSC, and the imple-
menting acts adopted by the Council and the Commission have applied to 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices restraining competition, to the 
abuse of dominant positions and to mergers which, beCause of the accession 
of the new Member States, fall within the scope of the competition rules. 
However, for those agreements caught by Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty 
as a result of accession, but already in existence on 1 January 1973, the firms 
concerned will enjoy a six months' period of grace during which they may either 
discontinue the agreements or adapt them so that they are no longer caught by 
Article 85(1) or so that th ey qualify for exemption under one or other of the 
block exemption regulations, or may notify them to the Commission with a view 
to obtaining exemption under Article 85(3). As for agreements caught by Article 
65 of the ECSC Treaty as a result of accession, but already in existence on 
1 January 1973, the period of grace for firms is three months. 1 
1 Article 2 of the 'Accession Treaty; 
Article 29, Annex I, Chapter V, Competition (EEC) and Annex VII, Chapter IV, Compe-
tition; 
Article 166, Annex II, Chapter V, Competition (ECSC) of the Act concerning the Conditions 
of Accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties, OJ No. L 73, 27 Ma'rch 1972, pp. 7, 30, 
92, and 93, 138, and 45, 126. ' 
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6. The free-trade agreements for manufactures, concluded with Austria, 
Finland, Iceland, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland include competition rules 
applying to restrictive and improper practices liable to affect trade within the 
Community and the countries concerned. Such practices are deemed incompa-
tible with the proper working of these agreements. 1 
The inclusion of competition rules in the agreements is due to the fact that 
the Community's trading partners are mostly highly industrialized countries 
and that the lack of common rules would entail serious risks of distortion of 
'competition liable to jeopardize the harmonious expansion of trade. The rules 
are, as to substance, comparable with those on competition in the EEC Treaty. 
Accordingly, the Community has stated that it would assess restrictive or 
improper practices incompatible with the competition rules of the free-trade 
agreements by referring to the criteria deriving from the application of Articles 
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty and Articles 65 and 66(7) of the ECSC Treaty. 
It should be noted that, as appropriate, the competition rules of the Treaties 
of Rome and Paris and the corresponding clauses in the Agreements could be 
applied together. This does not mean, however, that the competition rules are 
directly applicable to the firms within the free-trade agreement framework. 
The implementing arrangements for the agreements provide that a contracting 
party taking the view that a given practice is incompatible with the competition 
rules will refer to the Joint Committee set up by the agreement with a view to 
achieving, as appropriate, elimination of the practice challenged. It will there 
fore be for the contracting party involved to take, autonomously, appropriate 
measures to ensure termination of the infringement. Each contracting party must 
therefore ensure that it is in a position to bring about in fact the elimination of 
incompatible practices, for it cannot invoke the lack of proper powers in 
order to oppose the implementation of the safeguard clauses. 
In the free-trade agreements with Austria, Iceland, Portugal and Sweden, 
it is stated that Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty (publicity and prohibition of 
discrimination) and the implementing decisions already adopted by the 
Community will be extended to cover the sales of Community firms in these 
four countries. The latter, for their part, have undertaken to ensure, in respect 
of deliveries made both within their countries and in the Common Market by 
firms coming under their jurisdiction, that equivalent principles with regard 
to prices are complied with and to take the necessary action to achieve on a 
continuous basis the same effects as those obtained by the implementing 
decisions the Community is taking in this field. 
1 See, as examples: Agreements between the European Economic Community and the Austrian 
Republic, the Community and the Kingdom of Sweden, the Community and the Swiss 
Confederation; Articles 23 and 27, OJ No. L 300, 31 December 1972, pp. 5, 100 and 192. 
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As at 1 January 1973, the free-trade agreements for the areas coming under 
the EEC entered into force in relations between the Community and Austria, 
the Community and Portugal, the Community and Sweden, and the Community 
and Switzerland. Consequently, the competition rules have applied to trade 
between the Community and each of these countries since that date. On the 
other hand, the Agreements between the European Economic Community 
and Finland have not yet been ratified and consequently the competition rules 
are not yet in force for the relevant trade; nor have the ratification procedures 
been completed for the agreements concerning the ECSC areas. 
3. The Commission's activity in the field of regulations 
Extension of Regulation No. 67j67jEEC 
7. Experience gained on the basis of Regulation No. 67j67jEEC l has shown 
that the arrangements made in this regulation, under which Article 85(1) of 
the Treaty is declared inapplicable to certain classes of exclusive dealing 
agreement in the manner provided for in the Regulation are satisfactory and 
have helped to promote merchandize trade within the Common Market, to 
strengthen cooperation between firms in the area of distribution and to prevent 
the creation of economic barriers by the instrument of absolute territorial 
protection. 
The Regulation was due to expire on 31 December 1972, and the 
Commission therefore decided to extend it for a ten-year period: 2 this' ex-
tension has the advantage of providing certainty as to the law and thus 
enabling managements to make long-term arrangements. It does not hamper 
the Commission's competition policy, since the Commission retains a right 
of supervision of the agreements covered by the Regulation and may at any 
time intervene if any of them show effects incompatible with Article 85(3). 3 
A durable framework has thus been maintained for firms willing to 
organize the distribution of their products in compliance with the Treaty's 
competition rules. 
1 OJ No. 57, 25 March 1967, p. 849. 
2 Regulation No. 2591, 8 December 1972, amending Regulation No. 67/67/EEC, OJ No. 
L 276,9 December 1972, p. IS, see Annex p. 175. 
3 Under Article 7 of Regulation No. 19/65/EEC, read with Article 6 of Regulation No. 67/ 
67/EEC. 
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Block exemption in the area of specialization 
8. The Commission widened the scope for cooperation for smaIl- and 
medium-sized undertakings by adopting, pursuant to the Council's empowering 
Regulation No. 2821/71 of 20 December 19721 , a block exemption regulation 
for certain specialization agreements2 provided the share of the market held 
by the undertakings participating and their turnovers did not exceed specified 
ceilings. The adoption of this regulation is based on the consideration that 
specialization agreements generally contribute to improving the production 
process and that they are particularly suited to strengthening the competitive 
position of small- and medium-sized firms. The favourable economic effects 
of specialization lie in the achievement of economies of scale or, in a wider 
sense, in rationalization measures which enable the firms to cut costs by 
concentrating operations; it can be expected that these measures will lead, 
in conditions of effective competition, to lower prices and will thus benefit 
the user. The conclusion of such agreements should therefore be facilitated 
and encouraged. Block exemption will however benefit small- and medium-
sized firms only if certain clauses in restraint of competition,necessary to the 
achievement of specialization, are also exempted. Such clauses can however 
be allowed only insofar as they are essential for the achievement, for the firms 
and the users, of the advantages sought. In order to ensure that the maintenance 
of effective competition is not jeopardized, the scope of the regulation is 
confined to firms whose overall economic strength, and agreements whose 
influence on the market, remain limited. 
9. The general form of the regulation is comparable to that of Regulation 
No. 66/67/EEC, exempting certain exclusive dealing agreements. 
Only specialization in the manufacture of products is included within the 
scope of the Regulation, to the exclusion of specialization in distribution or 
in the supply of services, for in this field, the danger of market sharing is difficult 
to assess and the Commission's experience insufficient. Such types of speci-
alization must be dealt with by single decisions. 
To make clear which agreements it is intended to encourage, the regulation 
defines the notion of specialization. A commitment to specialization includes 
a reciprocal obligation not to produce certain items with a view to specializing, 
which means that a unilateral decision to refrain from production of a specific 
item does not qualify for block exemption. The commitment can refer only to 
the nature and not to the quantity of the products, and any quantitative 
1 OJ No. L 285, 29 December 1971, p. 46. 
2 Regulation No. 2779l 72/EEC, 21 December 1972, OJNo. L 292, 29 December 1972, p. 23. 
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limitation of production lies outside the scope of the exemption. The wording 
"or to entrust manufacture of such products to other undertakings" also covers 
piece work orders made within the specialization arrangements. 
The clauses in restraint of competition which may be agreed in connection 
with a reciprocal specialization agreement on production because they are 
generally essential to the implementation of such an agreement are the non-
competition clause, the commitment to deliver between the parties, the obliga-
tion on exclusive supply and the concession of exclusive distribution bf the 
specialized products; obligations which are not definitely known to be in 
restraint of competition are also mentioned: these are obligations concerning 
stockage and concerning after-sale service and guarantees. 
As part of the specialization arrangement, mutual exclusive concessions 
between producers are allowed, l but on the condition, in parallel with the 
requirements of Regulation No. 67/67/EEC, that they do not stand in the way 
of parallel imports. On the other hand, commitments with regard to prices and 
firms can entail restraints of competition, so that the conditions of exemption 
must be considered case by case. 
10. The regulation being designed as a means of facilitating the cooperation 
of small- and medium-sized firms, the aim was to ensure that only such firms 
should benefit from it and that at the same time competition should not be 
eliminated in respect of a substantial proportion of the products involved. 
The regulation therefore makes two limitations in respect of the share of the 
market"and of turnover. 
A market share of 10%. The market for the products concerned is the 
market for the specialized products and the like, the definition of which 
is the same as that given in Regulation No. 67/67. For practical reasons 
connected with the difficulties besetting managements in calculating their 
share of the market, the market chosen has been that represented by a 
single Member State. This is not the geographical definition of the market 
but a basis for calculation. A 10% share of such a part of the Common 
Market may well represent an appreciable position, so that it was undesir-
able to go beyond this limit. 
A total turnover not exceeding 150 million u.a. for all the firms involved 
in the specialization agreement, including firms with which they are linked. 
The market share and turnover "threshold" are lower than those set by 
Regulation No. 2822/71 (15% and 200 million u.a. respectively), which dis-
1 Exclusive concession agreements between competing producers are, however, excluded from 
the application of Regulation No. 67/67. See First Report on Competition Policy, sec 52. 
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pensed certain specialization agreements from notification. 1 The two regulations 
are based on the principle that the scope of a regulation having as its purpose 
a formal arrangement, i.e. notification, must be wider than that of the regula-
tion introducing a rule of substance, that is to say exemption from the ban on 
restrictive agreements. 
The rule stating to what extent firms linked economically must be included 
in the calculation of the total turnover is similar to that on communication 
concerning agreements of minor importance not covered by Article 85(1) of the 
Treaty,2 in that both measures are designed to encourage cooperation among 
small- and medium-sized firms. 
11. The duration of the regulation is five years, as for Regulation No. 67/67. 
Block exemption regulations must not be given too long a life, sinc~ the dura-
tions are in fact running-in periods. If the regulations subsequently prove 
satisfactory, they can be extended for a longer time. In addition, specialization 
agreements meeting the conditions set down and concluded before the entry 
into force of the regulation also qualify for block exemption. 
Since circumstances which may necessitate Commission intervention must 
be allowed for, it has been decided that benefit of the exemption regulation 
can be withdrawn, for example if rationalization does not yield appreciable 
results or if harmful effects are. occasioned for the users. Annulment of block 
exemption in an individual case can only take effect from the date it is decided 
on. 
Amendment of decisions on pricing 
(Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty) 
12. In the fields covered by the ECSC Treaty, the Commission3 , having 
consulted the Consultative Committee and the Council, decided to amend 
Decision No. 30/53 relating to discriminatory practices prohibited by Article 
60(1) of the ECSC Treaty.4 
The definition of discriminatory practices given in this Decision is in line 
with the guidance provided by long administrative experience and with the 
rulings of the Court of Justice. The innovation consists in the fact that transac-
tions are in principle comparable only when the purchasers are in the situation 
of competition or where they belong to the same class of user, where they 
manufacture identical or similar products, or where they have the same com-
mercial functions on the market. 
1 OJ No. L 285, 29 December 1971, p. 49. 
2 OJ No. C 64, 2 June 1970, p. 1. 
3 First Report on Competition Policy, sees. 101 to 105. 
4 Decision of 22 December 1972, OJ No. L 297, 30 December 1972, p. 39. 
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The new arrangements define the prohibition independently of the rules 
relating to publication of prices. They enable the firms to adapt their attitudes 
more fully to the market while complying with Article 60 of the Treaty. In the 
case of infringement of the pricing rules, they can no longer argue that the 
exigencies of the market sometimes preclude compliance with these arrange-
ments. On the other hand, a better definition of the prohibition of discrimina-
tion will facilitate the Commission's supervision of the firms' compliance with 
the pricing rules. 
The new decision defining the forbidden practices also entailed amendment 
of Decision No. 4/53 relating to the conditions of publication of price tariffs 
and sales terms. 1 The question arose as to whether, in certain circumstances, 
when prices were differentiated by class of consumer without publication, 
sufficient market transparency between those concerned was always effective. 
In contrast with the arrangements made for steel (see Decision No. 31/53),2 
it was decided that publication of such price discrepancies should be compulsory 
because of the situation on the coal market. 
Similarly, Decision No. 3/583 relating to the alignment of coal sales in 
the Common Market was adapted to the current situation on the coal market 
within the energy market. The danger of disturbances on the market entailed 
by the alignment had diminished, and the Commission therefore eliminated 
some of the present restrictions on the right of alignment. The few restrictions 
still maintained relate solely to the uncertainties which may result from the 
accession of the United Kingdom to the Common Market. Consequently, 
the new decision provides that: apart from amendments rendered necessary 
by the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, the twelve 
sales areas will be reorganized into eight areas; the limitation of the right of 
alignment to 20% of tonnage sold in the preceding year in the Common Market 
has been terminated; the number of firms upon which alignment is authorized 
is increased; the condition that aligned fuels must be practically identical has 
been dropped; an obligation to communicate sea transport freight charge,S has 
been introduced, where the bids taken into consideration for alignment involve 
sea transport. 
Proposed Regulation providing a period of limitation 
13. On 30 December 1971, the Commission laid before the Council a proposed 
Regulation relating to a period of limitation for prosecution and enforcement 
in the fields of European Community transport and competition law.4 
1 OJ No. L 297,30 December 1972, p. 44. 
2 OJ No. L 297,30 December 1972, p. 42. 
3 OJ No. L 297,30 December 1972, p. 45. 
4 OJ No. C 43, 29 April 1972, p. 1. 
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The Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament were 
consulted during 1972. The Economic and Social Committee gave its Opinion 
on 29 April 1972,1 the European Parliament on 30 November 1972.2 Both 
institutions approved the Commission's proposal, subject to a few comments 
designed to amplify the text submitted. In view of the results of the consul-
tation procedure, the Commission amended the original version of its proposed 
Regulation, in accordance with Article 145, subparagraph 2, of the EEC Treaty. 
14. The purpose and the content of the Regulation planned can be summarized 
as follows: 
The aim of the Regulation is to fill a gap in Community law: the EEC's 
transport and competition law confer on the Commission power to impose 
pecuniary penalties on firms or associations of firms in cases of infringement. 3 
The rules include, however, no extinctive period of limitation. 
In judgments handed down on 15 July 19704 and 14 July 19725 the Court 
of Justice stated "that if, as it should, it is to provide certainty as to the law, a 
period of limitation, must be fixed in advance, and the fixing of its length and 
the terms of its application are a matter for the Community legislator". 
The Commission proposes that the principle of a period of limitation 
should be introduced by creating rules applying both to the power to impose 
fines (period of limitation on proceedings) and to that of enforcing the decisions 
inflicting fines or penalty payments (period of limitation on enforcement). 
The rules contemplated include solutions to three types of problem; they 
provide for the fixing of: 
extinctive periods of limitation; 
the starting point for such periods; 
measures interrupting or suspending the period. 
The arrangements worked out in this connection are guided by two 
requirements. In the first place, firms must be sure as to how they stand with 
1 OJ No. C 89, 23 August 1972, p. 21. 
2 See European Parliament, verbatim report of debates, 13 November 1972, p. 18. 
3 See: 
Articles 17 and 18 of Council Regulation No. 11 of 27 June 1960, concerning the abolition 
of discrimination in transport rates and conditions, in implementation of Article 79(3) of 
the EEC Treaty (OJ No. 52, 16 August 1960, p. 1121); 
Articles 15 and 16 of Council Regulation No. 17 of 6 February 1962-first Regulation 
implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty (OJ No. 13, 21.February 1962, p. 204); 
Articles 22 and 23 of the Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1017/68 of 19 July 1968 on appli-
cation of rules of competition to transport by rail, road and inland waterway (OJ No. L 175, 
23 July 1968, p. 1). 
4 Cases 41, 44 and 45/69-0J No. C 130, 27 October 1970, p. 3. 
Recueill970, 6, pp. 661, 733 and 769. 
5 Cases 48, 49 and 51 to 57/69-0J No. C 125, 12 December 1972, p. 17 et seq. 
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regard to the law; secondly, nothing must be done to jeopardize the effectiveness 
of the Commission's action by introducing a period of limitation which would 
extinguish offences too easily. 
For period of limitation on proceedings, the solutions are as follows: 
the time limit would be three years for infringements with regard to 
information and checking, and five years with regard to infringements 
of the substantive rules. 
However, with regard to infringements which are continuous or persist-
ent, the period would start only on the date on which the infringement 
was terminated. 
The period is interrupted by any measure taken by the Commission or by 
a Member State at the request of the Commission with the object of 
recording the existence of an infringement, provided the measure has been 
notified to the firm or association of firms concerned. 
For the period of limitation on enforcement, similar rules have been 
worked out, taking account of Article 192 of the EEC Treaty concerning the 
enforcement of decisions entailing a pecuniary obligation against persons 
other than States. 
The period of limitation is five years. 
The period of limitation starts from the day on which the Commission 
decision has acquired force of res judicata. 
The period is interrupted 
by any Commission decision amending the original amount of the fine or 
penalty payment or dismissing an application to this effect; 
by any measure adopted by the Commission or by a Member State at the 
request of the Commission for the forced recovery of the fine or penalty 
payment. 
It is suspended 
for any period during which payment facilities are granted; 
for any period for which forced enforcement is suspended pursuant to a 
decision by the European Court of Justice. 
This proposed regulation refers solely to the fields of transport and 
competition, for so far it is only in these fields covered by the Treaty of Rome 
that the Community legislator has given the Commission powers to impose 
fines and penalty payments. 
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4. Competition policy and current problems 
15. The Commission has already stressed the importance it attaches to 
competition policy in the context of general economic policy as an instrument 
for fighting inflation, especially now. 1 Furthermore, the difficulties which have 
arisen as a result of the development of the conditions for certain imports from 
non-member countries have caused concern on grounds not only of commercial 
policy but also of competition policy. Difficulties which have been encountered 
in some sectors and attributed to structural factors may be solved as a result 
of agreements concerning investments, and this solution must also be con-
sidered, in the context ofthe Community industrial policy, with reference to the 
competition rules of the Treaties. 
Competition and inflation 
16. The Commission's measures against restraints of competition liable to 
maintain prices artificially high are part of the policy which must be pursued 
both by the countries and at Community level to combat infiati.on. 2 Seen from 
this angle, the competition policy is a tool that must be used to create condi-
tions under which the monetary and budgetary policies can have their full 
effect. Its first objective is to ensure that the markets within the Community 
are opened up so that purchasers can operate throughout the Common Market. 
The effects of competition policy measures applying to agreements between 
undertakings and to the behaviour of undertakings enjoying dominant posi-
tions are normally felt only in the medium term; some of them may, however, 
produce short-term effects if they are implemented with great care. This is why 
the Commission has expressed its determination-noted by the Council-"to 
strengthen its action against restraints of competition which may derive either 
from horizontal price agreements, concerted practices with regard to prices 
and price discriminatory measures applied by undertakings in dominant posi-
tions or from market-sharing agreements or other restrictive practices pursued 
by undertakings the purpose of which is to maintain fragmentation of the 
markets, or from self-limitation agreements, wherever such agreements hamper 
the Community'S commercial policy". 
Self-limitation agreeme~ts 
17. The self-limitation agreements deserve special mention here: arrange-
ments between undertakings or associations of undertakings curtailing imports 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, p. 12. 
2 Council Resolution of 5 December 1972 on inflation control, item VIII. OJ No. C 133, 
23 December 1972, p. 14. 
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on the Community market of items from non-member countries, or controlling 
these imports, for example in terms of quantity or price, are liable to jeopardize 
the unity of the market, the competition system, and the Community's com-
mercial policy. 
The Commission has published an opinion giving a statement of principle, 
formulated within the framework of the Treaty of Rome, with regard to 
practices restraining imports of Japanese products into the Community.1 
From the point of view of competition law, the Opinion recalls that this 
is prohibited under Article 85(1), even where some or all of the member under-
takings have their principal place of business outside of the Community, if the 
effects extend to the Common Market territory. The Opinion also draws the 
attention of those concerned to the desirability of notifying in good time any 
agreements concluded or concerted practices pursued. Only on the basis of 
notification can it be decided whether, in certain cases, exemption can be 
granted under Article 85(3). 
The Commission believes that any import curtailment measures should 
be part of the commercial policy, a field which must remain in the hands of the 
public authorities. Hence it feels that in cases where certain imports from non-
member countries are causing or are liable to cause grave difficulties to European 
manufacturers, such problems should be tackled by the implementation of 
appropriate commercial policy measures. 2 
Agreements concerning investments 
18. It is also true that in certain sectors the requirements of technical develop-
ment as to the size of production plants, in addition to the difficulty of accu-
rately predicting demand trends, raise serious problems when investors are 
working out investment projects and plans to increase production capacity. 
At the competition policy level it is necessary to know under what condi-
tions these difficulties can be resolved by an agreement between undertakings 
in a manner compatible with the Treaty's competition rules. This problem 
is too delicate to afford grounds for hoping that it can be solved by a general 
approach. The method of case-by-case examination is unavoidable. No solution 
could be arrived at in the case that recently came to the Commission's attention 
because the agreement notified covered a wider field and extended to the pro-
duction and marketing policies of the firms concerned. 3 
1 Commission Opinion relating to imports into the Community of Japanese products coming 
under the Treaty of Rome, OJ No. C 111, 21 October 1972, p. 13 .. 
2 See in particular written questions No. 192/72 (OJ No. C 122,24 November 1972, p. 6) and 
No. 299/72 (OJ No. C 138, 31 December 1972, p. 54). 
3 Sec. 29. 
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Accordingly the question remains open as to whether an agreement 
simply instituting a system of exchanges of information designed to avoid or 
to reduce surplus production capacity in specific situations can qualify for 
exemption. 
5. Merger control 
19. The scale of the industrial combination movement in the Common Market 
raises the problem of deciding what are the most appropriate facilities for 
monitoring the trend at Community level. 
In this connection the Commission wishes to stress the importance of 
the judgment handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties in the Continental Can Company case on 21 February 1973. 1 The contro-
versial question of the applicability of Article 86 to combinations effected 
within the common market by firms in a dominant position has thus been 
clarified. Although, in the above case, the Court of Justice annulled the Com-
mission's decision because the Commission failed adequately to define the 
market concerned, the Court confirmed the soundness of the interpretation of 
Article 86 which the Commission had developed in its decision. 
20. The Commission is now examining the conclusions regarding combina-
tions which have to be drawn from this judgment for the purposes of its com-
petition policy. However, in view of the fact that the problem of controlling 
excessive concentration presents itself on a more general level and cannot be 
considered as wholly settled following the Court's judgment, the Commission, 
as it has already said, intends to submit proposals to the Council as, for that 
matter, it was invited to do in the Final Communique of the Summit Conference. 
Stressing the need to provide a single industrial base for the Community, the 
Summit Conference found that the relevant work should include both: 
"The formulation of measures to ensure that mergers involving firms 
established in the Community are in harmony with the economic and 
social aims of the Community and the maintenance of fair competition 
as much within the Common Market as in external markets in conformity 
with the rules laid down by the Treaties."2 
The Commission therefore already informed the Council on 30 and 31 
October 1972 of its intention "to submit, independently of the application of 
! Judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 February 1973 in Case No. 6/72 (Europemballage 
Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. Commission). 
2 Final Communique of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Member 
States or States joining the European Communities, sec. 7. 
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Article 86 to specific cases, proposals for the introduction of more systematic 
supervision arrangements for mergers reaching a certain scale".1 The Council 
noted this statement. The Commission is supported in its viewpoint by the 
Final Communique of the Summit Conference, which mentions the desirability 
of using Article 235 of the EEC Treaty "as fully as possible". The Treaty could 
well be used as the basis for proposals based on the same considerations as those 
incorporated by the European Parliament in its resolution on the rules of 
competition of 7 June 1971.2 
6. Case law of the Court of Justice 
The concept of concerted practice 
21. The implementation of the ban on restrictive agreements is, however, 
getting more and more difficult because restraints of competition conflicting 
directly with this principle are being embodied, increasingly, in discreet forms 
of concerted behaviour on the market. The Commission has therefore had to 
show increased vigilance in its supervision of the markets, and firmer evidence 
has been needed of actual infringements. The guidance given by the Court of 
Justice in its judgment in the dyestuffs case3 is therefore of fundamental impor-
tance in the Community's pursuit of its policy with regard to restrictive agree-
ments: the policy presupposes that the Commission can apply Article 85(1) 
to a form of coordination between undertakings "which, without having been 
1 Council Resolution of 5 December 1972, quoted above. 
2 European Parliament, Resolution on the rules of competition and the position of European 
undertakings in the Common Market and in the world economy, OJNo. C 66, I July 1971, 
p.19. 
3 In nine judgments ,handed down on 14 July 1972, the Court gave rulings on the appeals 
brought against the Commission's decision of 24 July 1969 (OJ No. L 195, 7 August 1969, 
p. 11) by nine dyestuff manufacturers. In its decision, the Commission had imposed fines of 
50 000 units of account on each of the undertakings concerned-except one of them, the 
ACNA company, which was fined only 40 000 u.a.-for infringements of Article 85(1) of 
the EEC Treaty through concerted price increases in 1964, 1965 and 1967. The Court 
dismissed all the appeals and awarded costs against the appellants. However, it reduced to 
30000 u.a. the fine on the ACNA company, which had participated in the concerted practice 
only in 1964. 
See judgments of the Court of Justice of 14 July 1972 in Cases 
Nos. 48/69 (Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission) 
49/69 (Badische AniIin- und Soda-Fabrik v. Commission) 
51/69 (Farbenfabriken Bayer AG v. Commission) 
52/69 (J.R. Geigy AG v. Commission) 
53,69 (Sandoz AG v. Commission) 
54/69 (Societe fram;:aise des matieres colorantes SA v. Commission) 
55/69 (Cassella Farbwerke Mainkur AG v. Commission) 
56/69 (Farbwerke Hoechst AG v. Commission) 
57/69 (Azienda Colori Nazionali e Affini-ACNA v. Commission) 
OJ No. C 125, 12 December 1972, p. 17, Recueil, 1972,5, pp 619 et seq. 
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taken as far as the establishment of an actual agreement, knowingly substitutes 
practical cooperation between the undertakings for the hazards of competition". 
22. Interpreting for the first time the concept of "concerted practices" men-
tioned in Article 85(1), the Court broadly endorsed the Commission's argu-
ment. In its opinion, while parallel behaviour cannot by itself be labelled a 
concerted practice, 'it is nevertheless liable to constitute strong circumstantial 
evidence when it leads to conditions of competition which do not match the 
normal conditions of the market, having due regard to the nature of the products 
marketed, the size and number of the undertakings in the industry and the size 
of the market itself. This will be the case, for example, when parallel behaviour 
may enable the undertakings concerned to seek out a balance of prices at a 
level different from that which would have derived from competition, and to 
establish inflexible situations hampering the free movement of products in the 
Common Market and the free choice by consumers of their suppliers. 
In the case at issue, the problem was to determine, whether there was a 
concerted practice underlying the general and virtually uniform price increases 
decided upon simultaneously and made public by the leading dyestuff pro-
ducers, or whether in fact these were autonomous price increases. The question 
could be reduced essentially to that of deciding whether, having due regard to 
the nature of the dyestuffs' market, manufacturers acting independently could 
in fact have taken the risk of introducing a general across-the-board price 
increase in their products. 
The Court held that with a group of manufacturers as powerful and 
numerous as this one, the risk that in times of price increases some of them 
might deviate from the general movement and endeavour to increase their 
relative shares of the market by individual pricing was more than negligible. 
Moreover, the fragmentation of the Common Market into six national markets 
having differing price levels and structures made a spontaneous and equal 
price increase on all the national markets unlikely; at the very least, the increases 
should differ in relation with the differing conditions on each domestic market. 
Consequently, parallel pricing in different countries over the same range of 
items, in the same time-period, could hardly be coincidental. 
The Court found that the practice adopted by managements of consecutive 
price increases was evidence of progressive cooperation between them. Each 
manufacturer prices his own products and for this purpose, can take into 
account the current or foreseeable behaviour of competitors. However, the 
Treaty's competition rules do not allow a producer to cooperate with his 
competitors-in any way whatever-to work out a coordinated price-increase 
policy and to ensure the success of the increase by the prior elimination of any 
uncertainty as to reciprocal behaviour concerning essential aspects such as 
rates, purpose, timing and location. 
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The notion of a concerted practice must be considered as sufficiently 
clearly defined to enable the Commission to apply Article 85(1) of the EEC 
Treaty effectively. 
National agreements to protect markets 
23. In a subsequent ruling! concerning the appeal against the Commission's 
decision on the Netherlands cement dealers' agreement, 2 the Court confirmed 
that the basis of action adopted by the Commission with regard to national 
market protection agreements was sound. 
It held, in the first place, that an agreement among a large number of 
dealers established in a given market and supplying this market through 
imported products affects trade between Member States. The Court felt that 
an agreement covering the whole of the territory of a Member State has, by 
its very nature, the effect of consolidating fragmentation coinciding with 
national frontiers, thus hampering the economic interpenetration aimed at by 
the Treaty and ensuring protection of domestic production. As to the contents 
of the agreement itself-in the case at issue, the dealers were operating inter alia 
a target price system-the Court felt that even the fixing of a price which is 
merely a target price affects competition since it enables all the participants to 
predict fairly accurately their competitors' price policies. 
Application of the competition rules to firms from non-member countries 
24. In connection with the judgments it handed down on 14 July 1972 in the 
"Dyestuffs" cases,3 the Court of Justice commented on the arguments presented 
by three appellant firms whose head offices were outside the Community and 
which had asserted that the Commission could not fine them for acts which 
they had committed outside the Community. The Court held, firstly, that the 
price increases made in the market related to competition between producers 
operating in the Common Market, and secondly that the appellants had com-
pulsorily determined prices and other sales conditions for their subsidiaries 
in the Community. The Court therefore found that the three appellants had in 
fact been engaged in the concerted practices challenged, within the Common 
Market. 
1 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 17 October 1972 in Case No. 8-72 (Vereniging van 
Cementhandelaren v. Commission), OJ No. C 15, 30 March 1973, p. 13, Recueil, 1972, 6, 
p.977. 
2 Commission Decision of 16 December 1971, OJ No. L 13, 17 January 1972, p. 34, see First 
Report on Competition Policy, sec. 9. 
3 Judgments of the Court of Justice of 14July 1972, in Cases Nos. 48, 49 and 51 to 57/69, 
OJNo. C 125,12 December 1972, p. 17; Recueil, 1972, 5, pp. 619 to 933. 
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The Court's judgment of 25 November 1971 1 is relevant in this context: 
"The fact, for one of the undertakings involved in the agreement, that it is 
located in a non-member country, is no obstacle to the application of Article 85 
where the agreement has effects within the Common Market". 
Similarly, the Commission has stated, in commenting as to principle on 
restrictive practices relating to imports of Japanese products into the Com-
munity liable to be caught by Article 85, that "the fact that several or all the 
undertakings involved have their principal head offices outside the Community 
is no obstacle to the application of this rule in so far as the agreements, deci-
sions or concerted practices have effects extending to the Common Market". 2 
25. The Commission's jurisdiction is of great importance in connection with 
any implementation of the rules of competition to "multinational" under-
takings. 
In the actual application of the rules of competition, the Commission has 
so far had no specific difficulties to solve arising from the multinational status 
of an undertaking when it has acted in connection with infringements committed 
within the Common Market. Even if undertakings from non-member countries 
act in the Community through legally separate subsidiaries, the legal separate-
ness of such companies cannot be adduced as evidence that their behaviour 
on the market, for the purposes of the application of the rules of competition, 
is not uniform. 3 
However, the multinational undertakings operate on a world scale, and 
the Commission, like the Member States, has associated itself with the work 
undertaken within the OECD, which is studying ways and means of drafting 
a code of good conduct in matters of competition for these companies and of 
building up fuller international cooperation to control their behaviour. 
1 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 25 November 1971 in Case 22/71 (Beguelin Import Co), 
OJ No. C 9, 3 February 1972, p. 7. Recueill971, p. 959. 
2 Opinion relating to imports into the Community of Japanese products covered by the Treaty 
of Rome, OJ No. C III, 21 November 1972, p. 13. See also sec. 17. 
3 Judgments of the Court of Justice of 14 July 1972 in Cases Nos. 48, 49 and 51 to 57/69 
(dyestuffs). In another case, the Commission found that an American company and its 
Italian subsidiary constituted the same corporate enterprise for the purposes of Article 86 
(see sec. 47). 
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Double penalization 
26. In its Decision of 25 November 1971 in the Boehringer case,! the Com-
mission had declined to offset the enforcement of American anti-trust legis-
lation against a penalty resulting from the application of Community law. 
The Court of Justice, to which the firm of Boehringer appealed, 2 confirmed 
the Commission's decision because the matters in the Commission's case 
against the appellant were not the same as those complained of by the American 
authorities: the Court found that whilst the facts underlying the two judgments 
both originated in the same group of agreements, they were distinguishable, in 
essence, both in respect of purpose and of territorial location. The Court's 
judgment is therefore based on the argument that the actions objected to by 
each of the legislations had not been proved to be the same. 
7. Relationships between the competition rules 
of Community law and national law 
27. The problems arising in connection with any simultaneous application of 
EEC competition rules and the Member States' law relating to the protection 
of competition have already been touched on in the previous report. 3 Restric-
tive agreements, mergers and the abuse of dominant positions in the coal and 
steel field must only be assessed in the light of Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC 
Treaty, and are therefore solely a matter for the Community'S jurisdiction, 
but similar practices pursued by firms in other industries come under both 
Community law and the laws of the Member States. 
The simultaneous applicability of the competition rules of the Treaty of 
Rome and of national law is liable to engender conflict between the municipal 
law of the Member States and Community law. This danger will become 
apparent, for example, in cases where a set of circumstances are the subject of 
two parallel proceedings, one before the Community authorities under Articles 
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, the ·other before the national authorities under 
municipal law. Two examples highlight the problem: 
In a decision handed down on 28 November 1967, the Bundeskartellamt 
fined the German parties to a European dyestuffs agreement under para-
graphs 1 and 38, subparagraph 1, of the law against restraints of com-
petition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen).4 
1 Decision of the Commission of25 November 1971, OJNo. L 282,23 December 1971, p. 46. 
2 Judgment of the Court of Justice, 14 December 1972 in Case 7/72 (Boehringer v. Com-
mission), OJ No. C 3, 5 February 1973, p. 7, Recueil, 1972, p. 1281. 
3 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 129. 
4 Case B3-442100-A-232/67 (Farbenhersteller) published in WuW/E BkartA No. 1179-
WuW 1968, p. 407. 
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In the same case, the Commission had already opened proceedings with 
a view to the declaration of infringements of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. 
In a decision handed down on 24 July 1969, the Commission fined all the 
firms involved in the infringement i , pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regula-
tion No. 17; the decision has since been upheld by the Court of Justice.:I 
However, it has not proved necessary to solve any conflict between the 
Community rules and the national rules on restrictive agreements, the 
Bundeskartellamt decision having been quashed on appeal. 3 
In decisions handed down on 15 March 1972, the Bundeskartellamt fined 
several firms whose head offices were in the Federal Republic, pursuant 
to paragraphs 1 and 38, subparagraph 1 (sec. 1) and subparagraph 4 of 
the same law.4 In one of these decisions (Polyamid)5 the Bundeskartellamt 
found that the firms involved had built up a complex network of restraints 
of competition under which: 
1. European manufactures of Polyamid fibres, acting as a group, had 
marked out, in agreement with the Japanese manufacturers, areas of 
interest so as to prevent imports of Japanese fibres into Europe; 
2. The European producers had shared out among themselves the areas 
of interest so that their national markets were protected against 
deliveries from other countries" whilst for deliveries into extra-
European markets agreed prices and quotas were to be complied with. 
3. The members of the various national groups are alleged to have under-
taken to comply, within their respective markets, with their various 
agreements covering sales-territory-sharing, prices and rebates, and 
distribution channels. 
Before the Bundeskartellamt decision was taken, the Commission had 
opened proceedings for an infringement of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. In 
this case, as well, therefore, two procedures-a Community procedure and a 
national procedure-were being conducted against the same restrictive agree-
ment. 
The case was also the occasion of contacts between the Commission and 
the Bundeskartellamt, with a view to a fuller supply of information to the 
Community authorities from the national authorities. 
1 OJ No. L 195, 7 August 1969, p. 11. 
2 Judgments of 14 July 1972 in Cases 48,49 and 51 to 57/69, OJNo. C 125,12 December 1972, 
p. 17 et seq. 
3 Judgments of the Kammergericht of 28 August 1969, published in the WuW/E OLG 1015-
Wu W 1969, p. 763; judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof of 17 December 1970, published in 
WuW BCH 1147 - WuW 1971, p. 187. 
4 Published in WuW/E BkartA No. 1383 et seq. - WuW 1972, p. 525. 
, Case B 3-49S100-A-21/72. 
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Although no specific legal difficulties have yet arisen, and the general 
principles of the rulings handed down by the Court of Justice1 already offer 
sound opportunities for solving conflicts between Community rules and national 
law on competition, the Commission is at present considering whether there is 
a need for dealing with cases of simultaneous application of Community and 
national law by introducing a regulation or a directive under Article 87(2) (e) 
of the EEC Treaty. 
1 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 13 February 1969 in Case 14/68 (Walt Wilhelm and 
others v. Bundeskartellamt), OJ No. C 30, 7 March 1969, p. 2; Recueill969, I, p. 1. 
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CHAPTER II 
MAIN DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE COMMISSION 
1. Elimination of agreements prohibited under Article 85 
Market-sharing agreements, price- and quota-jixing 
28. In an important decision, the Commission was compelled to intervene to 
order the Community's main sugar producers and distributors to discontinue 
the concerted practices they had engaged in since 1 July 1968. These consisted, 
under the principle of respective market sharing, in making deliveries in the 
EEC importing countries only with the assent of the main producers in these 
countries, so as to considerably weaken the competitive pressure which untram-
melled sugar imports could have engendered.1 Market fragmentation along 
national lines is not only a result of the complete separation of the market but 
also of protection arrangements designed to ward off any disturbance of the 
producers' commercial strategies on their respective markets.2 
For many years EEC sugar was produced within national market organi-
zations established by the authorities in close cooperation with the home indus-
tries. The main result of these arrangements made at official level with the 
business community was to cut off each of the six Community markets from 
the others almost completely. On 1 July 1968, national market organizations 
were replaced by a common market organization3 designed to allow the common 
sugar market to operate and develop as provided for in Article 38(4) of the 
Treaty. The market stabilization machinery established by Community regu-
lations in order to guarantee a certain level of income to beet and sugar cane 
1 Commission decision of 2 January 1973, OJ No. L 140,26 May 1973, p. 17. The aspects 
of the case coming under Article 86 are described below. See also sec. 77. 
2 Similar arrangements for the protection of national markets were previously dealt with by 
Commission decisions in the Quinine case (implementation of a price agreement and rebates 
on deliveries exceptionally authorized in the territories of the partners, as a supplementary 
guarantee of the reservation of the national markets), and in the Flat glass and Sheet glass 
cases (conclusion of delivery agreements between producers implicitly excluding any direct 
export, reciprocal adaptation of national producers' groups to the prices and terms in force 
on their partners' market). See First Report on Competition Policy, secs. 3, 4, and 6. 
3 For fuller information concerning relations between this case and the objectives of the 
common agricultural policy, see sec. 77. 
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producers while avoiding the emergence of tendencies either to overproduction 
or to a sugar shortage exert, however, no influence on the free movement of 
sugar between the Member States or on the free formation of prices between 
the intervention price and the threshold price. 
The various measures taken under the concerted practices engaged in by 
the sugar producers and their sales organizations in the Community were 
designed to control sugar trade within the Member States so as to ensure the 
protection of their respective markets. The deficit situation in certain areas in 
sugar for human consumption, however, necessitated a number of deliveries 
between Member States. In order to avoid as far as possible the competitive 
effects of such intra-Community trade: 
sugar deliveries were made, in general, only from producer to producer or 
under the producers' direct or indirect control, in order to enable them to 
resell the imported sugar at the same prices and on the same terms as 
home-produced sugar (in addition, in Italy, the suppliers, on the one hand, 
and the purchasers-Italian sugar producers, on the other hand, formed 
a grouping; imports into this country were subject to a tendering system 
organized by the Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero); 
deliveries to dealers and customers of the country of destination were 
refused, or bids were made only at higher prices, adapted to those being 
charged on the market of the destinee country; 
restrictive clauses were written into the contracts concluded with the 
national dealers and customers, so as to prevent the latter from disturbing 
the sales policy pursued by the producers concerned; 
the bids made by the producers-especially the French and Belgian 
producers-submitted for the auctions organized by the Commission with 
a view to granting export refunds on exports to non-member countries 
were concerted so that the quantities of surplus sugar remaining within 
the Common Market could be controlled and would exert no competitive 
pressure. 
In the decision it adopted, the Commission endeavoured to restore quickly 
the scope for competition on the European sugar market in favour of the pro-
cessing industries and of all the consumers in the Common Market. In addition, 
since sugar is a commodity consumed in large quantities and since the measures 
taken by those concerned were obviously in conflict with the aim of market 
integration, the Commission decided to impose on a number of the undertak-
ings fines related to the seriousness and the length of time during which the 
infringements are committed and to the size of their shares in the market. The 
highest fine was 1 500 000 u.a. and the other undertakings were fined from 
100 000 u.a. to 1 000000 u.a. The fines totalled 9 000 000 u.a. 
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No fines were imposed on certain undertakings involved only occasionally 
or only to a modest extent in the infringements, or which endeavoured to adopt 
a pattern of behaviour independent of the producers participating in the con-
certed practices. 
The Commission will ensure that its decision does actually have the 
desired impact, and will carefully examine any implications which it may have 
for the common sugar market organization. 
29. In adopting its decision prohibiting the "Cementregeling voor Nederland 
-1971" (CRN) agreement,! the Commission also freed the Netherlands 
cement market of the last restraints of competition in trade between Member 
States, the impact of which, combined with various internal control measures 
adopted by the organized dealers, had had the effect of eliminating competition 
on this market for several decades. 
The decision, which terminates a protracted procedure, concerns an 
agreement sharing out the Netherlands market, which still relies on imports 
to account for about a third of its cement consumption, between the Nether-
lands, Belgium and German industries, the shares being 69%, 17% and 14% 
respectively. A quantity varying between 250 000 and 55 000 metric tons per 
year - the actual quantity depending on the market share accounted for by 
"outsiders"-was, however, reserved by the members of the agreement for sale 
in free competition. In addition, the agreements provided for cooperation on 
research and for mutual information on investments of direct relevance to the 
supply of the Netherlands market. 
In fact, the agreement notified represented a version, amended by those 
involved, of the old "Noordwijks-cement-accoord", the main operative 
clauses of which provided not only for the allocation of quotas for the Nether-
lands market but also for the application of uniform pricing and sales terms, 
and which prohibited the construction of new factories. In the course of 
the proceedings conducted by the Commission, those concerned gradually 
whittled down their agreements to the terms of the present CRN, since in their 
original form their purpose and effect had been to eliminate all competition 
between the groups of Belgian, German and Netherlands producers partici-
pating. Moreover; those concerned had sealed off until 30 September 1967 
access to' the Netherlands market for outside producers or dealers, by estab~ 
lishing collective exclusive dealing relations with the organized Netherlands 
cement dealers. These restraints, the compatibility of which with Article 85 had 
been the subject of other proceedings, had been discontinued by those con-
cerned, and in 1971 the Commission had forbidden the dealers' price control 
arrangements.2 Eventually, although they had discontinued common price 
1 Commission Decision of 18 December 1972, OJ No. L 303,31 December 1972, p. 7. 
2 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 9 and note 1. . 
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fixing and standardized selling terms, the producers involved had applied for 
exemption for a limited-duration modified quota system, which they wished to 
maintain for a transitional period, the "CRN-1971". 
However, the Commission did not agree that the Netherlands market 
should remain closed to free imports of cement from other Member States. 
It felt that exemption from the ban on restrictive agreements could not be 
granted to an arrangement as restrictive as a quota agreement, the favourable 
effects of which, within the meaning of Article 85(3), it regarded as extremely 
doubtful and which, in any case, were apparently not indispensable for the 
achievement of the objectives pursued by the undertakings concerned. In the 
absence of any real danger of shortage of supply on the Netherlands markets, 
despite its dependence on imports, there was no case for waiving the principle 
established at the time of the inception of the Common Market, under which a 
system of competition between producers provides the best prospects of satis-
factory supplies for the markets of a Member State in products deriving from 
other Member States. Nor is a quota system better fitted to ensure sufficient 
production capacity for the Netherlands market, were it only because the 
situation on this market plays only a secondary role in the investment policies 
of the Belgian and German manufacturers participating in the contract. 
In more general terms, experience has shown that quota agreements are 
unlikely to solve the capacity surplus problem, since, with a view to strength-
ening their positions should the existing contracts be extended or after their 
cancellation, those concerned were endeavouring to step up capacity during 
the actual lifetime of the contracts. This was acknowledged by the Belgian 
cement industry, whose agreement had included clauses on this point. 
30. In another decision, the principal effect of which is to prevent the pro-
ducers concerned from eliminating all competition as between themselves in 
favour of group solidarity for exports within the Common Market, the Com-
mission also refused exemption from the ban of Article 85(1) for the Belgian 
cement industry agreement: "La Cimenterie belge-CIMBEL SA".1 
The market control arrangements established by an agreement among the 
manufacturers and the Cimbel decisions have been applied, as to their prin-
ciples, for several decades; even in the present version, which is less restrictive, 
of the "Coordination 1966", they still entailed serious restraints of competition. 
Taken as a whole, the purpose and effect of the arrangements was to artificially 
strengthen the competitive position of Belgian cement producers on export 
markets by coordinating their behaviour on the domestic market and outside. 
1 Commission Decision of 22 December 1972, OJ No. L 303, 31 December 1972, p. 24. 
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The restraints of competition consist mainly in a uniform price and terms-
of-sale agreement for the Belgian market, closely linked with a system of 
delivery quotas and of income-offsetting rules applying to all the markets inside 
and outside the EEC. The main aim of the other restraints was to strengthen 
this system. Although the requirement to comply with fixed prices concerned 
only the domestic market, export terms had to be approved by the contracting 
parties for inclusion in the income-offsetting arrangement. The main purpose 
of the latter was to align export revenues on the generally higher profits ac-
cruing from sales on the domestic market. 
The quota agreement was underpinned by a mutual information obli-
gation concerning capacity increases, and the establishment of new cement 
plants was subject to the prior approval of all the contracting parties; in ad-
dition, production plants in the BLEU could be sold only provided the seller 
undertook to subscribe to all the obligations deriving from the agreement, which 
automatically excluded any competitive effort on the market by a purchaser 
not party to the agreement. The prices and selling terms agreed for Belgium 
entailed further special distortions of competition engendered by the granting 
of preferential prices solely to certain categories of purchasers and by rules 
with regard to rebates vis-a-vis public undertakings. 
The Commission turned down the application for exemption since it 
found, on the credit side of this agreement, neither an improvement in the 
production process nor the promotion of technical or economic progress such 
as would offset beneficially the disadvantages deriving from the quota and 
price system provided for in the "Coordination 1966": whatever the scale of 
the investments and of capital as a production factor in the cement industry and 
the difficulty in achieving accurate adaptation of cement production capacity 
to demand, the agreement had not solved the overcapacity problem, since it had 
failed to prevent the establishment and maintenance of excess capacity in the 
Belgian cement industry. Indeed the Commission was convinced that as a 
consequence of the decline in the investment risk the agreement had actually 
helped to boost unneeded capacity and that the only explanation for this was 
the absence of any penalization due to competition. Moreover, the purely 
potential danger of cut-throat competition could not justify at the present time 
the elimination of competition in the field of prices between the members of the 
agreement. In addition, the objective pursued, of enabling the Belgian cement 
industry, being relatively small, to "speak with one voice" on export markets, 
could not rightfully be achieved at the expense of the Belgian cement users and 
of competitors from other Member States (through the,system of private exports 
subsidies deriving from the income-offsetting arrangement). 
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31. Preliminary examination of the agreement notified by the European pro-
ducers of cut polyester fibres l also showed that this agreement was not liable to 
lead to the appreciable improvements objectively ascertainable necessary to 
qualify for exemption under Article 85(3). According to those concerned, the 
agreement was designed to ensure coordination of investment and rational i-
ization of production with a view to eliminating or to preventing excess capacity 
in this industry. 
There is no doubt that the cut polyester fibre industry labours under heavy 
surplus capacity. And, because the manufacturers endeavour to scale down their 
surpluses, pressure is brought to bear on prices. 
However, the question as to whether these difficulties, which could well 
derive not only from factors connected with changes in current economic 
trends and in techniques, but also from structural considerations, can be solved 
in a manner compatible with the rules of competition of the EEC Treaty was 
not settled in this case. Whatever the real situation, the agreement notified 
failed to meet the conditions set down in Article 85(3), since it covered a wider 
area and extended to the participants' production and selling policies. 2 
When the Commission had informed those concerned of the matters to 
which it had taken objection in the agreement as notified, it was cancelled and 
the notification withdrawn. 
Other methods of protecting the natiomil markets 
32. In a decision adopted in association with other measures, the Commission 
restored un distorted conditions of competition on the Netherlands market in 
sanitary ware, 3 on which several private arrangements were assuring protection 
of Netherlands producers by hampering the economic integration which is a 
Treaty objective. 
The key element in these arrangements, which ranged from production to 
installation was the decisions of the Netherlands wholesale association "Ver-
eniging van Groothandelaren in Sanitaire Artikelen-GISA", which .controls 
more than 75% of the sales of the relevant items throughout the Netherlands. 
Through the fixing of minimum percentages of purchases to be reserved for 
1 The Commission has power to implement Article 15(6) of Regulation No. 17 ifit reaches the 
conclusion, after provisional examination, that the conditions determining the application 
of Article 85(1) are met and that application of Article 85(3) is not justified. As soon as the 
Commission has informed the undertakings concerned, the latter are liable to fines, not-
withstanding Article 15(5) of the same regulation. 
2 See, in particular, Oral question No. 16/72 with debate: excess capacity in the European 
polyester fibre industry (the Commission's reply was published in the "Debats du Parlement 
europeen, No. 154, 10 October 1972, p. 40 et seq.). 
3 Commission Decision of 22 December 1972, OJ No. L 303,31 December 1972, p. 45. 
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Netherlands manufacturers, the agreement prevented a large number of 
Netherlands wholesale dealers from importing freely, in particular from other 
Common Market countries, the items concerned, and thus restricted the market 
in the Netherlands for producers from other Member States. 
In addition to these partial exclusive purchasing arrangements for national 
producers, the agreement also provided for the fixing of prices and terms of sale 
to be applied by the wholesale dealers who were members of the association to 
their customers. This system, which prevented those concerned from availing 
themselves of competitive conditions by following their own pricing and selling 
policy and deprived tlie manufacturers of the scope for marketing which the 
free play of competition would have provided for at this level of distribution, 
concerned not only items manufactured in the Netherlands but also those 
imported from other Common Market countries. In addition, the GISA. rules 
fixed selling prices imposed on the member wholesalers, by increasing the 
manufacturers' gross selling prices by a percentage varying according to the 
nature and destination of the items. Although the gross selling prices were 
already established by each manufacturer on the basis of the peculiar nature of 
the products and his competitive position, the GISA thus implemented, on its 
own Initiative, an increase in the selling prices of the items, which, according 
to the association, were to be considered as being of better quality. In this way, 
the rules in force distorted arbitrarily the competitive relationships between·the 
manufacturers to the disadvantage of those producing better quality products, 
and compelled consumers to pay a higher price than the price they would have 
paid had the rules not existed. 
The Commission's decision was not its first move in this sector of the 
Netherlands market, which had been subject for several years to agreements 
ranging from the manufacturers to the installation firms: two agreements 
concluded by the same association, one with the Netherlands manufacturers 
(FABRISAN-GISA agreement), and the other with the fitters' associations 
(GISAfitters' associations agreement), which had been dealt with in separate 
proceedings, were cancelled without the Commission being obliged to intervene 
by adopting a decision. The first agreement covered the establishme'nt 'by 
the wholesalers' association and the' manufacturers' association of agreed 
prices and other terms of sale and the establishment of a system of accumulated 
rebate bases between the manufacturers. The second agreemt?nt had introduced 
reciprocal exclusive selling and purchase arrangements between the wholesalers 
and the fitters members of four associations. 1 Taken together, these agreements 
1 The agreement of the "Vereniging van Handelaren in Bouwmaterialen in Nederland 
(HlBIN)", which established exclusive reciprocal commercial relations with a number of 
manufacturers and importers of a construction material was also terminated after inter-
vention by the Commission. See Ee Bulletin, 5-1972, Part Two, sec, 8. 
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thus have the effect of consolidating market fragmentation by confirming the 
principle of national preference. 
33. A Commission decision also terminated a private market arrangement in 
the central heating industry in Belgium, which organized exclusive business 
relations and a system of equipment approval. This was the agreement concluded 
by the association of Belgian heating equipment manufacturers ("Chambre 
Syndicale du Materiel de chauffage central et des industries connexes (section 
chaudieres et radiateurs)") and the association of heating installation engineers 
"Union BeIge des installateurs en chauffage central, ventilation et tuyauteries".l 
The agreement created an exclusive collective purchasing arrangement for some 
600 installation engineers members of the Union and a number of non-member 
engineers, thus controlling about 70% of the distribution and installation of 
heating units and radiators on the Belgian market, for the manufacturers parti-
cipating in the agreement. These manufacturers were virtually all the Belgian 
manufacturers who are members of the Chambre syndicale and the other 
manufacturers whose equipment has been recognized, by a Committee com-
posed of representatives of the signatories of the agreement, as complying with 
the technical standards issued by the Belgian Standardization Institute. On 
their side, the manufacturers had to comply, under the agreement, with an 
obligation to sell the approved equipment only to the installation engineers, so 
that certain classes of purchasers-Belgian building contractors and wholesale 
dealers-were barred from direct delivery. 
The exclusive purchasing right for a very large proportion of purchasers 
restricted to the manufacturers participating in the agreement, and the obsta-
cles created by the members of the agreements to the participation of manu-
facturers from other Member States maintained fragmentation of the Belgian 
market by causing artificial curtailment of trade from other Common Market 
countries.2 No advantage on the credit side was discernible in this private 
market organization, since the technical standards to which the Approval 
Committee referred for acceptance purposes were those established by the 
Belgian Standardization Institute, and the qualifications required for heating 
installation engineers participating in the agreement were no different from 
those in the relevant Belgian legislation. 
34. The decision adopted with regard to the Interest Grouping of German 
ceramic tile manufacturers3 gave the Commission an opportunity to state its 
position with regard to aggregated rebates. Under these rulings,4 the Com-
1 Commission Decision of 20 October 1972, OJ No. L 264, 23 November 1972, p. 22. 
2 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 20. 
3 Commission Decision of 29 December 1970, OJ No. L 10, 13 January 1971, p. IS. 
4 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 24. 
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mlssIOn succeeded in achieving the termination of a cumulative system of 
rebates operated by Dutch manufacturers of liquorice. 1 
In 1971, one of the German liquorice manufacturers had lodged a com-
plaint against these manufacturers with the Commission, alleging infringement 
of Article 85. In his opinion, in view of the share of the market held by the 
members of the agreement, the collective rebate system they used was an ob-
stacle to his sales in the Netherlands, since the Netherlands wholesale dealers 
and wholesale dealers' associations preferred to obtain their supplies solely 
from the members of the agreement, in order to be able to claim the higher 
rebates for which they thus qualified. After studying the particular market, the 
Commission concluded, confirming a previous ruling, that the cumulative 
rebate base system was incompatible with Article 85. The manufacturers in-
volved then decided to discontinue any collective rebate system, without any 
decision being necessary to this effect. 
2. Encouragement of permitted forms of cooperation 
Specialization agreements 
35. The adoption of a block exemption regulation for certain production 
specialization agreements in order to facilitate cooperation between small and 
medium-sized firms does not mean, in specific cases, that specialization between 
large firms may not also qualify for exemption. However, owing to the size of 
the undertakings concerned, such agreements continue to be subject to the 
individual exemption procedure and also perhaps to the imposition of appro-
priate charges and conditions under Regulation No. 17. For example, the 
Commission continued in 1972 its policy of promoting cooperation by author-
izing several specialization agreements under Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty 
and 65(2) of the ECSC Treaty. 
36. In the first instance, the Commission endorsed under Article 85 a cooper-
ation agreement concluded between the industrial vehicles builders MAN 
(Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Niirnberg) and SAV/EM (Societe anonyme de 
Vehicules industriels et d 'Equipements mecaniques). 2 
The agreement provides that the parties will produce a joint range of 
industrial vehicles of 7.5 metric tons and over and that they will collaborate on 
research and development, manufacture, adjustment, assembly, distribution 
and after-sales service. Cooperation and development of these lorries-for 
1 Ee Bulletin, 5-1972, Part 2, sec. 9. 
2 Commission Decision of 17 January 1972, OJNo. L 31, 4 February 1972, p. 29. 
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which SAVIEM will be leader for the medium range up to 12 metric tons total 
load and MAN for the heavy range from 12 metric tons upwards-are designed 
to allow of standardization of types of vehicles and to provide the basis for 
specialization in production. The aim of specialization is to enable large 
quantities to be produced on each production line; the scope for combination 
on the basis of an assembly unit system will be increased. Cross-supplies of 
assembly components from specialized workshops should enable each partner 
to assemble the entire range and to sell in his own country through the network 
already established. Normally, in countries other than Germany and France, 
SA VIEM will export vehicles in the medium range and MAN the heavy 
vehicles. 
The agreement won approval in the first place because specialization helps 
to bring down unit costs. At the same time, it is reasonable to expect rationali-
zation effects and advantages for the users, thanks to cooperation in develop-
ment, assembling and distribution of the vehicles. The Commission also took 
the view that the restraints the partners have accepted in respect of the con-
clusion of agreements with third parties on purchasing, delivery and coopera-
tion, are essential since their purpose is to strengthen the bonds between the 
two partners, while the risks inherent in specialization may be offset to some 
extent by the exclusive selling rights of each partner on his domestic market. 
Lastly, the Commission felt that the MAN-SAVIEM agreement provided no 
opportunity for elimination of competition within the Common Market for a 
substantial share of the equipment concerned, since competing producers and 
groups of producers, some of them accounting for large shares of the market, 
will still be operating. 
Certain stipulations were attached to the decision ensuring the continuous 
provision of information on the competitive situation in the industrial vehicles 
industry and of information as to how the effects of rationalization are ex-
pressed in practical terms. 
37. The Commission also granted exemption from the ban of Article 85 of the 
EEC Treaty to an agreement among five French producers of fine paper.! 
In the first instance, three of the firms, Papeteries BolIore, the Societe Job 
and the Societe des anciens etablissements Braunstein, had concluded an 
agreement for close cooperation in the production and marketing of fine papers, 
including cigarette papers and carbon paper. The cooperation arrangement 
was particularly strictly and rigidly controlled, with quotas and profit distri-
bution through an equalization system, and a joint agency, the Private Fine 
Paper Office, coordinated commercial policies. Since it led to rigid reciprocal 
trading positions without providing sufficient incentives to specialization, the 
1 Commission Decision of 26 July 1972, 01 No. L 182,10 August 1972, p. 24. 
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agreement had been found incompatible with Article 85 and the Commission 
had sent to those concerned a statement of the matters to which it had taken 
objection. 
Consequently, the firms involved; which had been joined by the Papeteries 
Mauduit and the S.A. des Papiers Abadie, replaced the old agreement by a new 
one, containing none of the clauses criticized by the Commission. The new 
agreement is now concerned only with specialization and trading cooperation 
in the prospecting and the obtaining of orders in non-European countries. 
The Commission is of the opinion that these arrangements will help to encour-
age more efficient production in an industry which is worldfamed for cigarette 
paper and which exports more than 60% of its output of this kind of paper to 
non-Community countries located all over the world. 
The Commission found that the firms involved had concentrated their 
efforts to achieve greater specialization on the establishment of much larger 
production units, enabling wider ranges to be manufactured and costs to be 
brought down, bringing benefit to the users through lower selling prices. It 
also took the view that, in contrast with many specialization agreements, this 
one included no other restraints than that related to the declared intention of 
those concerned to specialize, such as exclusive territorial arrangements, 
exclusive supply obligations or the commitment to forego developing new 
materials of kinds the manufacture of which is the preserve of one or rather of 
the other participants. In other words, the arrangements made do allow some 
degree of competition within the agreement. However, in view of 'the very 
important position of the agreement within parts of the Common Market for 
this type of paper, the Commission felt compelled to scrutinize carefully the 
agreement to ascertain whether specialization, as thus arranged, did not elimi-
nate competition insofar as each member was now specializing in a part of the 
range of paper concerned. Mter detailed examination, it concluded that 
this was not the case, since the German and Italian cigarette paper industries 
are completely outside the agreement and can therefore compete freely with the 
members on their own ground, and since potential and actual competition from 
manufacturers in non-member countries, particularly American and Austrian 
manufacturers, is effective in the Common Market, freight costs being low. 
A last, important, factor is that the member· manufacturers are servicing 
very large purchasers, the French and Italian tobacco monopolies, and, in 
other countries, the cigarette manufacturers, who are few in number and some 
of whom belong to large international companies. Consequently, the existence 
of effective competition in this industry and the favourable impact of the 
agreement in respect of production and technical progress, from which the users 
will also draw benefit, enabled the Commission to take a favourable decision. 
The Commission attached to its decision a number of stipulations, re-
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quiring the firms involved to file, two years after the date of the decision, a 
report on the working of the specialization agreement and requiring them to 
notify without delay any acquisition of a holding or establishment of personal 
relations between the governing bodies of the firms involved and of any planned 
merger or takeover likely to take place between these firms or between one of 
them and an outside firm in the fine paper industry. 
38. Under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty, the Commission also authorized 
a specialization agreement concluded between the Hoesch Werke Hohen-
limburg-Schwerte AG and the Benteler Werke AG, relating to the rolling of 
steel sheet semi-products. 1 
One of the items manufactured by Benteler is steel tubes. The firm has a 
steel works but has no finishing facilities of its own. It has the steel sheet semi-
finished products laminated by the Hoesch Werke. 
The main part of the contract includes the following agreements: 
Hoesch undertakes to supply Benteler with input products up to an 
amount of 15000 metric tons per month for hot-rolling, on a jobbing 
basis, at an attractive price, of slabs supplied by Benteler. Benteler will 
not bring into operation a hot-rolling facility of its own. 
By virtue of Hoesch's commitment, Benteler will cover all its hot-rolled 
sheet needs from Hoesch, and will make supplementary purchases from 
other firms only with Hoesch's authorization. Benteler will use the sheets 
supplied by Hoesch solely for its own processing. 
Hoesch undertakes to procure certain additional quantities of slabs 
produced by Benteler. Benteler will not supply other firms with slabs. 
Although these agreements do restrain competition, the Commission 
nevertheless felt that without the reciprocal commitments the improvements 
could not be obtained to the desired degree, particularly in respect of continuous 
operation of the plants. 
Its scrutiny also showed that there will be no impact on the tube market 
such as might infringe Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. 
Other forms of cooperation between undertakings 
39. Although it was mainly concerned with establishing the conditions under 
which firms may be exempted from the ban of Article 85(1) pursuant to Article 
85(3) for specialization agreements, the Commission also continued its efforts 
to achieve legal clarification of the forms of cooperation between firms not 
caught by Article 85(1). 
1 Commission Decision of 9 November 1972, OJ No. L 283, 20 December 1972, p. 17. 
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For example, the Commission took a favourable decision with regard to 
a technical cooperation and joint sales promotion agreement for optical 
microscopes and their accessories concluded by the Wild Paris and Leitz-
France companies. 1 
The two companies are French subsidiaries marketing in France appa-
ratus manufactured by the respective parent companies, the Swiss .Wild Heer-
brugg SA and the German Leitz GmbH. The two companies market all the 
types of microscope manufactured by their parent companies, but the agreement 
on marketing-including pre- and after sales service and advertizing-concerns, 
for each company, only those types which, because of their features and appli-
cations, cannot be replaced by the partner's microscopes: this is a situation 
deriving from the peculiar nature of the technical features and ways in which 
each type of microscope can be used, and derives from the differing results of 
research carried out in the Wild and Leitz parent companies' factories. 
The Commission ascertained that the two companies concerned are not 
competing between themselves for the items covered by the agreement. They 
sell in France, without limitation of market outlets, all the equipment manu-
factured by the respective parent companies, and no other similar agreements 
are known involving in any way whatever the parent companies or their sub-
sidiaries. The Commission therefore issued negative clearance for this 
agreement. 
3. Application of Article 85 to distribution 
Avoiding fragmentation of the national markets 
40. Although the Commission's Decision of 23 September 1964 in the 
Grundig-Consten case and the Court of Justice's judgment of 13 July 19662 
confirmed that contractual agreements forbidding exports are a serious in-
fringement of Article 85, firms are still tempted to use this method of preventing 
trade in original products between Member States. The usual objective is to 
protect a high level of prices achieved in a Member State against the correcting 
effect of parallel imports. 
Since no firm in the Community can now adduce ignorance of the rule of 
Community law forbidding contractual restraints on exports, the Commission 
has recently imposed a fine of 60000 u.a. as penalty for such a case of restraint. 3 
1 Commission Decision of23 February 1972. 01 No. L 61,13 March 1972. p. 27. 
2 First Report on Competition Policy. sec. 47. 
3 Commission Decision of 22 December 1972, OJ No. L 303, 31 December 1972, p.- 52. 
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The WEA-Filipacchi Music S.A. company.in Paris had,,in·February 1972, .; 
forbidden its wl10lesale and retail· customers to export light music records which 
it distributes in France; 18 resale agents had given their consent. This was a 
method of preventing exports of records sold in France to Germany, where they 
are distributed by the WEA-GmbH company in Hamburg, which belongs to 
the same group. The price differential between the two markets (the same 
records of the commonest class were distributed on the German market at a 
price 50% above that of the French market) had proved an incentive to French 
resale agents to export to Germany, and the WEA-Filipacchi company was 
anxious to prevent these exports so as to maintain the higher price level in 
Germany. 
In order to restore the competitive effect which the French resale agents 
could exert by exporting the records to Germany, the Commission ordered the 
firms concerned to delete the export prohibition clauses and to disregard them 
in future. In imposing the fine, it bore in mind not only the seriousness and the 
obvious illegality of the infringement (this had been pointed out to WEA-
Filipacchi Music S.A. by French resale agents) but also the fact that although 
the infringement did not last long, it had been discontinued not on the initiative 
of the firm itself but only through the intervention of the Commission. 
This decision is significant in other ways. In the first place, it amplifies 
the Commission's Communication concerning minor agreements not caught 
by Article 85(1).1 The argument adduced by the WEA-Filipacchi firm that it 
held only a small share of the overall record market in France is not pertinent 
to an assessment of the restraint in question (apart from the fact that the overall 
turnover of the group to which the firm belongs is weII over the threshold of 
15 million u.a.), and the Commission found that there is no single market for 
classical music, light music and "pop" music. In addition, it must be remem-
bered that the records sold by this firm were interpretations by "hit" performers 
working solely for this firm; these performances are individual and can in no 
circumstances be regarded, because of their properties or their use, or their 
price, as similar, for the consumer, to the performance of other artists. 
Another interesting aspect of the decision is that it makes it clear that a 
firm cannot use carefully worded clauses to avoid the ban on agreements con-
tained in Article 85. In this particular case, the WEA-Filipacchi company had 
argued that its circular was only the expression of an opinion and that the 
consent given by the resale agents, which had signed it and stamped it with 
their house stamp, was no more than an acknowledgement of receipt. The 
decision restores these documents to their proper status as agreements between 
undertakings within the meaning of Article 85(1). 
1 Commission Communication of 27 May 1970, OJ No. C 64, 2 June 1970. 
48 REP. COMPo 1972 
41. The Commission also made it clear that 10 years after the entry into force 
of the Community competition rules, certain undertakings or groups of under-
takings constituting economic units cannot be allowed to maintain separate 
national markets by practices of a nature other than direct export bans but 
having an effect which is just as incompatible with the proper working of the 
Common Market. This is the point of the decision on the concerted practice 
constituted by discriminatory pricing according to country of destination within 
the Common Market, a practice pursued until recently between the Pittsburgh 
Corning Europe S.A. and the exclusive distributors of its products in Belgium 
and in the Netherlands, the purpose being to isolate completely the German 
market in favour of its subsidiary, the Deutsche Pittsburgh Corning. 1 
Within the context of Article 85, there can be no objection in principle 
to producers pursuing independent· specific supply policies for each EEC 
member country and adapting their pricing systems to the market and competi-
tive conditions peculiar to each country. But they cannot be allowed to ensure 
for themselves, through direct or indirect curtailment of the intermediaries' 
operations, entailing market fragmentation, scope for pursuing sales and 
pricing policies differing appreciably· according to the part of the market in 
which they are implemented. 
The Commission intervened in this question following inquiries showing 
that the insulating material called cellular glass manufactured in Belgium by 
PCE and distributed in the Common Market countries through concessionaries 
had been sold for nearly two years in Germany at the German subsidiary of 
PCE at prices much higher -up to 40% higher-than in Belgium and in the. 
Netherlands. It became apparent that PCE had endeavoured to control the 
final destination of the orders to prevent this wide price discrepancy at the same 
marketing stage from engendering parallel imports into the sales territory 
reserved for its subsidiary. Having failed to prevent such parallel imports, PCE, 
working with its Belgian and Netherlands concessionaries, organized and 
implemented a new sales tariff at much higher prices, but according substantial 
rebates to the concessionaries provided it was established that the merchandise 
was not to be exported. The tariff was calculated to make any parallel exports 
from Belgium and the Netherlands to Germany impossible, and was designed 
to enable PCE's German subsidiary, DPC, to go on charging high prices. 
The Commission took the view that the arguments adduced to justify the 
protection of the German territory for the DPC subsidiary-including the need 
to provide Gentian customers with expensive technical assistance-could not 
justify the granting of exemption from Article 85 for a concerted practice 
cotiflicting so strongly with Treaty objectives: the practice consisted in isolating 
1 Commission Decision of 23 November 1972, OJ No. L 272,5 December 1972, p. 35. 
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a national market within the Common Market in order to exploit it more freely 
and thus in depriving users of the opportunity of obtaining supplies on better 
terms in other parts of the Common Market. Manifestly incompatible with 
Article 85 and having a very appreciable impact on the market, the concerted 
practice led to a fine of 100 000 u.a. only the PCE was fined, since this was the 
firm sponsoring the practice wholly in its own interest and that of its subsidiary, 
DPC. 
Another interesting aspect of this decision is that it makes clear in a 
specific instance the scope of the Communication relating to agency contracts 
concluded with commercial representatives,l which had been relied upon t6 
argue that Article 85 did not apply to the introduction by PCE and its Belgian 
distributor of the discriminatory price tariff. Now, as concerned relations 
between PCE and Formica Belgium, it is true that the status of representative 
was provisionally assigned to this distributor for tax reasons. But in assessing 
the situation from the angle of Community competition law, the Commission 
could not simply accept such reported status; it was its duty to go beyond the 
formal situation and consider the actual relations between PCE and Formica; 
in this connection, it took the view that the circumstances under which, in 
accordance with the Communication, Article 85(1) would not be applied, were 
not the circumstances of the present case. 
Adaptation of distribution systems 
42. The Commission's consistent practice and the Court's rulings have made 
clear to what extent an exclusive sales concession can be used within the 
Common Market. Regulation No. 67/67 has fulfilled its objective to a large 
extent, which was to provide an incentive to firms to conclude exclusive dealing 
agreements fulfilling the conditions set out in this Regulation. 2 Nevertheless, the 
tendency to keep the national markets separated is still apparent in certain 
sectors. 
For that reason the Commission is pursuing its efforts to ensure that 
Article 85 is complied with by the elimination of export bans and restrictive 
practices of equivalent effect still imposed by certain firms when distributing 
their products in the Common Market. 3 
The objective is that, in all areas of economic life, dealers or users of any 
member country should not be prevented from acquiring products elsewhere 
in the Common Market, if the supply conditions are more favourable there. 
1 Commission Communication of 24 December 1962, OJ No. 139, 24 December 1962, 
p. 2921. See also the decision in the sugar case. Sec. 28. 
2 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 47. 
3 See Commission's reply to written questions No. 378/72, OJNo. C 138, 31 December 1972, 
p.68. 
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A large number of procedures are under way in various sectors or industries 
and the Commission has succeeded in inducing a number of firms to discontinue 
the restraints of competition. 
43. In two cases, it has already stated that it is contemplating favourable 
decisions. The first case is in the photographic material and products industry, 
where the ADOX firm has deleted, in standard sales contracts for its products 
on the German domestic market, the export ban imposed on its customers and 
the rule forbidding dealers to resell to customers other than consumers.1 The 
second case is in the radio and television receivers' industry, in which the SABA 
firm has adapted its marketing arrangements within the Common Market so 
that its exclusive concessionaries, both wholesalers and distributors, are author-
ized to distribute in other EEC countries not only to final consumers but also 
to SABA resale dealers. 2 
The Commission has adopted measures the first objective of which is to 
induce motor vehicle builders to delete export bans expressly written into 
exclusive dealing agreements applicable in the Common Market. It has notified 
the "matters to which (it) has taken objection" in the main test cases chosen; 
one manufacturer has deleted the export bans following the Commission's 
intervention, without it being necessary to notify the objections. The Com-
mission is now examining the effects of exclusive dealing agreements containing 
no formal export ban but including clauses (such as those relating to the payment 
of allowances, to the standard pricing of after-sales services, or to the obligation 
to notify the producer of all outside-area sales) which may prevent or may 
hamper purchases by users or resale agents abroad. 3 
In the tyre industry, most of the manufacturers have also deleted export 
bans, following intervention by the Commission, without communication of 
the "objections". 
44. In the course of its current investigation of exclusive dealing agreements, 
the Commission adopted under Article 11(5) of Regulation No. 17 a total of 
62 decisions requiring the same number of firms (in a wide range of industries, 
including foodstuffs, aircraft construction, film equipment, electric equipment, 
optical equipment, watches and clocks, industrial vehicles) in six Member 
States to reply to requests for information, failing which fines or periodic 
penalty payments would be incurred. 4 
1 Communication made in accordance with Article 19(3), Regulation No. 17 concerning a 
notification (Adox-Du Pont de Nemours tDeutschland) GmbH), OJ No. C 122,24 Novem-
ber 1972, p. 30. 
l OJ No. C 116, 7 November 1972, p. 4 (SABA). 
3 See Commission's reply to written question No. 557/71, OJNo. C 37,13 April 1972, p. 9. 
4 Commission Decision of 28 September 1972, 01 No. L 267, 28 November 1972, pp. 17 
and 20. 
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The firms concerned had notified the Commission of one or more exclusive 
dealing agreemen~s, and the Commission, in order to be able to assess the 
effects of each of these agreements from the angle of the competition rules, 
had submitted requests for information. Despite reminders, no replies had been 
received. In the circumstances, the Commission has used its power of compulso-
ry decision, thus emphasizing its intention to use all the instruments available 
to it, including fines'and periodic penalty payments, to prevent firms postponing 
unduly the submission of the information which the Commission must have if 
it is to conduct the investigation properly. 
4. Application of Article 85 to licensing agreements 
45. The first decision in this field concerns a patent knowhow and utility 
models licence granted by the German subsidiary of the French Raymond firm, 
the biggest firm in its industry in the Common Market, to the Japanese Nagoya 
Rubber Co., the biggest sub-contractor in the Japanese motor industry, con-
trolled by the Toyota motor company.1 The licensee obtains the right to manu-
facture in Japan and to sell in the Far East, applying the grantor's technique, 
plastic fixing components used in motor construction; the grantor had under-
taken to license no other firms in any part of the territory covered by the agree-
ment. 
Granting negative clearance, the Commission accepted the argument that 
the exclusive nature of the licence and the export ban (under which the licensee 
may sell only in his own territory) do not affect the competitive situation within 
the' Common Market, given the special features of the particular case: the 
exclusive dealing arrangement has solely for effect to eliminate potential com-
petitors on the Far East market, and, because of the nature of the items con-
cerned, their export from Japan to the Common Market is virtually ruled out 
(they are manufactured only to special order in close and constant association 
with the firm giving the order; if the items covered by the contract are incor~ 
porated into the spare parts or the coachwork of Japanese motor vehicles, they 
can be exported in this state to any country in the world). 
An earlier version of the licensing contract provided that any improve-
ments made by Nagoya to the Raymond technique would become the property 
of Raymond and that Nagoya was required to grant only to Raymond a licence 
on the ownership rights covering parallel inventions. However, following the 
Commission's intervention, the parties adjusted these commitments so that 
Nagoya is now only required to grant to Raymond a non-exclusive licence on 
I Commission Decision of 9 June 1972, OJ No. L 143, 23 June 1972, p. 31. 
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the patents which it would obtain if improvements or changes were to be made 
to the Raymond technique. 
Nagoya's undertaking not to challenge the validity of Raymond's con-
tractual industrial property rights during the lifetime of the agreement was not 
found incompatible with Article 85(1), since it seems unlikely that the Japanese 
licensee would challenge the industrial property rights held by his co-contractor 
in Europe, since there was little or no possibility of such action succeeding. 
But, in principle,' a non-objection clause of this kind involves a restraint of the 
freedom of action of the licensee which is not covered by the essential substance 
of the industrial property right: it prevents him from challenging the validity 
of the contract in order to reduce the rovalties and have certain restrictions 
. ~ 
discontinued, an action which could strengthen his competitive position while 
improving that of outside undertakings interested in the manufacture of pro-
ducts under licence, and also improve the position of the users. . 
On the other hand, it must be possible to include quality control and 
information exchange within the contractual exploitation of the invention and 
of the knowhow.' Consequently, they do not constitute a restraint of compe-
tition covered by Article 85(1). 
46. In the other decision adopted in this field, the Commission exempted 
under Article 85(3) exclusive patent licensing arid knowhow concession con-
tracts relating to a process for the manufacture of cushions and' arm-rests for 
motor cars concluded by the American Davidson Rubber Company with· it~ 
licensees in Germany, France and Italy. 1 
In this case, the Commission took the view that the exclusive manufactur-
ing and salesrights conferred by Davidson on its licensees, although temPered 
by a clause under which the items covered by the cpntract can be sold freely as 
between EEC Member States, was caught by the ban of Article 85(1),. since. 
curtailing the number of suppliers produced a perceptible effect on the play of 
competition and the development of trade between the Membe~ States: the 
process concerned may be considered as the most important process for mariu-
facturing arm-rests for motor cars, and Davidson's licensees account for about 
a third of the market in these items within the EEC. 
However, the Commission recognized that the restraint of competition 
which derives from the Davidson's policy of exploiting its inventions by using 
exclusive licensees in the countries having large motor industries was a restric-
tion without which the favourable objectives of the patent licences and know-
how concessions 'could not possibly be achieved: it would not be reasonable to 
expect the licensees to agree to develop a new process and adapt' it to' the 
1 Commission Decision of 9 June 1972, OJ No. L 143, 23 June 1972, p. 31. 
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European market, setting up production facilities and hiring skilled staffs, if 
they could not be sure that, within the conceded territories, Davidson would 
not license competitors. 
Although the position held by the licensees within the EEC was an impor-
tant one, the Commission found that the agreements did not enable them to 
eliminate competition to a substantial extent, not only because there are other 
arm-rest and cushion manufacturers in the Common Market also accounting 
(together) for a third of the total production of these items, but also because the 
motor manufacturers, who themselves use various arm-rest shaping processes, 
account for about a third of their needs from their own resources and have a 
bargaining position in relation with their suppliers strong enough to avoid any 
one-sided imposition of terms. 
Another important factodn the Commission's assessment was that, even 
if each licensee normally supplies the firms having their principal places of 
business in the territory assigned to him, competition between the licensees is 
not eliminated, since they are not prevented from selling, and since they do in 
fact make sales of these items outside the territories for which they are more 
especially responsible. 
In the same context, the decision points out that the clause, deleted during 
the investigation but contained in the original version of the knowhow con-
cession contract which one of the licensees had been instructed to conclude with 
the others, forbidding each party to export the items concerned to the terri-
tories of the other, would have stood in the way of exemption under Article 
85(3). 
Before exempting the agreements, the Commission had also required the 
deletion of the non-objection clause, which prevented the licensees from availing 
themselves of the opportunities provided to them by their national laws for 
escaping, through proceedings for annulment, from commitments to which 
they were held by their contracts; there was no evidence that the favourable 
objectives of the contracts could not be achieved without this clause. 
5. The abuse of dominant positions (Article 86) 
47. In a further decision implementing Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, the 
Commission recorded its finding that a dominant position was being abused in 
that a firm holding a de facto monopoly for an intermediary product had 
discontinued supplying a firm acting on the market for a final product derived 
from the intermediary product. This action was liable to lead to the elimination 
of one of the few producers on the market in question and thus severely impair 
competitive conditions in the Common Market. 
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The decision was adopted against the United States Commercial Solvents 
Corporation (CSC) and its Italian subsidiary Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano 
(ICI)l. The Commission adopted the decision after finding that CSC had a de 
facto world monopoly for the manufacture and sale of nitropropane and 
aminobutanol, chemical substances which are an essential raw material for a 
drug in ordinary use at the present time for treating tuberculosis and which, 
as such, is of great importance for public health and represents an important 
market in the EEC and non-member countries. 
The Commission's investigations show that until 1970 CSC delivered this 
raw material to the Common Market through independent distributors or 
subsidiaries, chiefly through its Italian subsidiary, rCI. ICI sold the products 
to various manufacturers of the speciality, including one of the leading EEC 
firms in the field, ZOJA ("Laboratorio Chimico Farmaceutico Giorgio Zoja 
Spa"), which was supplied in large quantities for four years (1966-1970). 
Following the failure of a takeover of ZOJA through ICI, CSC instructed ICI 
to enter directly on the market for the drug and discontinued provision of 
intermediary products for sale, supplying it only with the quantities necessary 
for its own production. At the same time, CSC took measures, for the EEC 
markets and the markets of non-member countries, designed to prevent sup-
plies becoming available for the manufacture of the drug, so that ZOJA was no 
longer able to obtain supplies either in the Common Market or from non-
member countries. For ZOJA, which, in April 1971, had filed a complaint with 
the Commission, the situation could entail its early elimination from this 
market, and perhaps from all markets, since the bulk of its operations consists 
in the production of ethambutol. 
The Commission ruled that, in these circumstances, the decision to dis-
continue supplies to ZOJA constituted abuse of a dominant position by CSC 
and ICI. . . 
The importance of the decision resides first and foremost in that it estab-
lishes for the first time the principle that a de facto monopolist's decision to 
discontinue supplies, so as to eliminate competition, constitutes an abuse of a 
dominant position within the meaning of Article 86. In order to ensure the re-
establishment and the maintenance of effective competitive conditions, the 
Commission ordered CSC and ICI to supply ZOJA immediately with enough 
of the raw material to satisfy its most urgent needs, and to submit to the Com-
mission a plan for the provision offurther supplies. The Commission also used, 
for the first time, its right to impose periodic penalty payments, so as to ensure 
that the obligations were met oli schedule. It also decided, in view of the im-
1 Commission Decision of 14 December 1972, OJ No. L 299, 31 December 1972, p. 51. 
REP. COMPo 1972 55 
portance and the circumstances of the infringment established, to impose a 
fine of 200 000 u.a. jointly on CSC and ICI. 
The decision also develops the Commission's rulings on the relationships 
between parent companies and subsidiaries. 1 The Commission ruled that the 
ownership of 51 % of the corporate capital of ICI by CSC and the fact that five 
of the ten members of the ICI Board of Directors also had duties in CSC, that 
the Chairman of CSC was also Chairman of the ICI Board of Directors, and 
that of the six members of the ICI Board of Management, three were also 
servants of CSC, taken with other circumstances, showed that CSC had power 
of control over ICI and actually exercised such control, at least in respect of 
ICI's relations with ZOJA. 
The two companies, in their relations with ZOJA and for the purposes of 
the implementation of Article 86, were therefore to be regarded as constituting 
only one economic undertaking. 
48. The Commission also found that concerted practices between the main 
sugar producers and sellers on the European sugar market, intended to secure 
for them control of the marketing of this commodity on their respective nation-
al markets, had been underpinned by measures taken by the firms concerned 
vis-a.-vis their national customers to prevent the latter from influencing the 
sales policy agreed by the parties to the practice. 2 It having been recognized 
that some of these firms held dominant positions on the markets involved, the 
Commission also applied Article 86, which was relevant since there was an 
abuse of a dominant position. 
On the Belgo-Luxembourg market, the Raffinerie Tirlemontoise compelled 
exporting wholesalers, through contractual clauses and the exercise of business 
pressure, to resell the sugar delivered to them only for the purposes fixed by the 
refinery. This was also the case, on the Netherlands market, for the group 
formed by Suiker Unie and Centrale Suiker Maatschappij, which, in the 1969/70 
season, had compelled the main Netherlands importers to comply with its main 
distribution policy, by threatening to eliminate them from the market by 
charging exceptionally low prices. On the South German market, the Stidzucker 
Verkaufsgesellschaft compelled regional reselling agents to import sugar only 
on its approval and, by granting fidelity rebates, prevented the processing firms 
from obtaining supplies freely on external markets. 
In this last respect, the Commission held that the granting of fidelity rebates 
entails an unjustified disadvantage for the purchasers, who, in addition to home 
produce, also purchase imports: the disadvantage suffered through the loss of 
1 Christiani & Nielsen and Kodak cases. See also First Report on Competition Policy, sec. S. 
2 Sec. 28. 
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the fidelity rebate soon more than offsets any benefit obtained by purchasing 
sugar from "outsiders", even if the latter quote lower prices. This is typically 
the situation of a supplier dominating the market when the purchasers have no 
opportunity to use other suppliers-for example, because they are obliged to 
account for part of their requirements from. neighbouring national refineries-
and must therefore comply with his terms. The payment of a fidelity rebate by 
a firm enjoying a dominant position in order to curtail import opportunities 
even further and to strengthen and extend the dominant position constitutes 
objectively abuse of that dominant position within the meaning of Article 86. 
49. Last year, the Commission had reported that it was examining, at the 
request of the Gesellschaft fur musikalische AujJuhrungs-und mechanische 
Vervielfiiltigungsrechte (GEMA) how far freedom to split rights must be en-
larged where the minimum period of membership is lengthened beyond one 
year.! 
In a new decision,2 that of 2 June 1971 was supplemented so that GEM A 
can extend to three years the minimum membership period provided it also 
grants its members the right to dispose separately of the various forms of 
exercise of copyright which, from the economic point of view, can be split 
throughout the world. 
In the Commission's view, any assessment of the length of a member's 
commitment and any fixing of a time-limit beyond which a further commitment 
would involve abuse, depend on the scope of the commitment. If the minimum 
membership period is raised to three years, balance between length in time and 
the scope of the commitment is maintained if greater freedom is allowed for the 
members in disposing of their copyright. 
The Commission was therefore in a position to grant GEMA the oppor-
tunity it sought, for economic reasons, to provide a solution alternative to that 
foreseen in the first decision to the abusive practice consisting in GEMA im-
posing excessive obligations on its members. . 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 83 and note 1. 
2 Commission Decision of6 July 1972, D/No. L 166 of 24 July 1972, p. 22. 
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CHAPTER III 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES 
IN INDIVIDUAL SECTORS AND INDUSTRIES 
50. In the resolution it adopted following the Commission's First Report on 
competition policy, the European Parliament invited the Commission to 
"include in future competition policy reports data relating to competition on 
the fuel and power market and in certain services industries". 
The Commission welcomes this request, being well aware that application 
of the competition rules must take account of the peculiar characteristics of 
certain industries or must constitute one of the components of a common policy 
defined for a specific industry. However, except for agriculture and the road, 
rail and inland waterway transport sector, for which special regulations have 
been adopted, the Commission's basic principle is that the Treaty's rules of 
competition and the implementing regulations are of general application. 
1. Banking 
51. Starting from the principle that normally Article 85(1) must be applied, 
the Commission, both in consulting the Monetary Committee and in discussion 
with the Member States and the European Banking Federation, has endeav-
oured to determine whether, and if so to what extent, monetary policy require-
ments might necessitate use of Article 87(2) (c) to delimit, in the banking sector, 
the scope of Articles 85 and 86, where Article 85(3) or Article 90(2) are found to 
be inapplicable. The question as to whether, and if so how far, certain banking 
agreements should be treated as "monetary policy instruments" of the Member 
States arises in respect of agreements on interest rates, authorizes or approved 
by the national monetary authorities, and also perhaps in respect of other 
banking agreements which could be. considered as being an essential aspect of 
interest rate arrangements. The Commission has always argued that obligations 
arising under Regulation No. 17 remained valid unless and until special regu-
lations were made on the basis of Article 87(2) (c). It has received some noti-
fications from the banking sector. 
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52. The question does not arise for inter-bank agreements, whose relevance to 
monetary policy can be almost definitely ruled out. The Commission adopted 
this attitude with regard to the investigation of a case concerning the standard 
"general terms" recommended by a national banking association and applied 
by its members to their customers, whether nationals or foreigners: the "general 
terms" govern solely civil-law problems relating to the aIIocation of responsi-
bility between the banks and their customers in connection with transactions 
carried out by the banks on the instructions of and on behalf of the customers. 
In this case, the association of banks concerned, though challenging the princi-
ple of the applicability of Article 85 to the banking sector, agreed to amend 
those clauses in the general terms which, in the original version, were unfavour-
able, in the Commission's opinion, to the users. The procedure was therefore 
discontinued and no formal decision was necessary. 1 
53. The recent trend towards the conclusion of transnational cooperation 
agreements between the large banks in the Community countries is also being 
examined by the Commission from the point of view of the competition rules. 
So far, four cooperation groups of this kind have been established. 
Generally speaking, one or, at most, two banks from an EEC country are 
members of the groups. Banks which, though large, were until now only of 
national importance have decided to join one or other of the cooperation groups 
in order to be able to operate at international level. The European banks-in 
contrast with certain American banks-have not availed themselves of the 
opportunity of making their structures multinational by systematically extending 
their networks of subsidiaries outside their own countries, although a few 
establishments have been set up in neighbouring countries. 
In the establishment of banking cooperation groups (the practice has 
recently become common), more is concerned than the simple continuation of 
cooperation arrangements already made in one form or another in the past 
between the large banks of the various countries for international business. For 
cooperation between banks chosen at international level had previously been 
pursued only with a view to the execution of specific business operations, such 
as the issue of international loans or financing through consortia, and for 
international trade. 
When submitting the revised general conditions to their customers, the banks concerned 
stated, on the advice of their Association, that the "revision has been made after consultation 
of the Commission of the European Communities, in order to eliminate any doubt concern-
ing any possible incompatibility of the current general conditions with the requirements of 
the BEC Treaty". 
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In addition to the development of the Euro-dollar and Euro-currency 
markets, banking cooperation groups are being established-mainly to meet the 
requirements of the large multinational industrial and commercial undertakings, 
which require a diversified range of services and credits from the banking 
system. Only by adapting to this trend can the banks expect to retain their 
status as acceptable partners for their customers. The cooperation arrangements 
constitute one of the ways of building up the financial and other services ren-
dered by the banking system to the scale of the multinational units, since 
mergers are not yet possible and interlocking holdings between banks are 
subject to certain limitations. Another facility will be placed at the disposal of 
the banks through the coordination of the banking legislation of the Member 
States: now under study within the Commission, coordination will facilitate 
the direct access to other Community countries of each bank having its principal 
place of business in a Community couI.1try, for example through branches. It 
will provide the banks with new opportunities for operating throughout the 
Common Market. 
The Commission is at present examining whether the establishment and 
the operation of banking cooperation groups are compatible with the provisions 
of Article 85. 
2. Insurance 
54. In insurance, certain problems derive from the establishment by the of-
ficial control authorities of conditions governing the right to become a member 
of the profession and to operate, and of conditions governing policies. Obvi-
ously, in these circumstances, uniform conditions are not the result of any 
agreement, decision or concerted practice; the imposition of standard policy 
terms fixed officially is not a matter for Article 85(1) (subject to the applica-
bility of Article 90(1». But the approval or the authorization of policy terms by 
national control authorities is not to be treated as if it were the same as the 
fixing of terms by the same authorities: in the former case, the standardized 
terms are agreed by the insurance companies and are not a result of the inter-
vention of the control authorities. 
55. This was the Commission's attitude in connection with determining 
whether one result of the uniform tariff system in motor insurance followed in a 
Member State was not discrimination against imported cars as compared with 
home-produced cars, and therefore whether there was not a restraint of compe-
tition caught by Article 85: while in some respects the insurance companies 
involved could not change the general tariff level without authorization by the 
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authorities, they were free to determine the structure of the tariff,l and indeed, 
in another area, to fix both the structure and the level of their tariff, the authori-
ties merely being informed. So that it could be argued that there was an agree-
ment between insurance undertakings or, in any case, a concerted practice, 
restraining appreciably competition on the motor insurance market. However, 
in the case at issue, a substantial change in the tariffs applied occurred during 
the investigation and under pressure brought to bear by the Commission, so 
that there was no longer any case for taking the view that there was a discrimi-
nation against imported motor vehicles. 
56. Subject to a solution of this question, the information at present available 
to the Commission is not such as to lead to the conclusion that Article 87(2) (c) 
should be relied upon in the insurance sector. Any agreements concluded 
between insuring, co-assuring or re-assuring companies are subjeet to the 
obligations deriving from Regulation No. 17 and their compatibility with 
Article 85 must be studied. For example, the Commission investigated an 
agreement concluded between their national associations by firms of four 
Member States operating in a specialized insurance branch: the insurance of 
the hulls of inland waterway vessels. 2 In its original version, the agreement 
included tariffs for supplementary premia which the insurer taking over a . 
policy taken out previously in another country should apply to the premium 
charged by the preceding insurer; these tariffs had been discarded after the 
Commission's first intervention. The agreement still provided, however, for 
extensive exchanges of information where cover. was transferred from one 
country to another. It included an obligation for the insurer approached to 
request, and for the previous insurer to provide, information which normally 
constitutes business secrets not exchanged between genuine competitors (rate 
of premium charged, actual premium received, financial background of con-
tract to be taken over). Such provision of information being liable to curtail 
the scope for competitive action between insurers in this specialized branch and 
to jeopardize the freedom of intra-Community trade with regard to offers and 
supplies of insurance services, the Commission obtained complete revocation 
of the agreement, without needing to adopt a decision. 
57. A special and new problem in the insurance sector is that of the "atomic 
pools". The Commission, having received a few notifications of this sector, has 
begun examining them. Assessment of the "atomic pools" means that the 
examination of the private agreements which govern them must be conducted 
in the light of the international treaties in this field: the .Paris Convention 
1 If the measures had ranked as official, they would have constituted measures of effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions, covered by Articles 30 et seq. 
2 EC Bulletin, No. 5-1969, Chapter VI, sec. 5. 
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(29 July 1960) and the supplementary Brussels Convention (31 January 1963V 
The organization of the pools includes exclusive responsibility of the grouping 
for the cover of atomic risks plus some degree of distribution of liability on a 
national geographic basis between the various groupings; it entails a form of 
co-insurance within the pools and between the pools and a "total" insurance 
excluding any possibility of re-insurance. 2 
Recent development in the work of the "atomic pools" has had the result 
that "limited" character risks (including isotopic risks) are excluded and that 
only nuclear risks which may have a "catastrophic" nature-in respect of which 
complex problems arise-are retained. Having due regard to these develop-
ments, the Commission will consider whether the existence and the working of 
these pools is compatible with Article 85. 
3. Fuel and power 
The principles set out in the "First guidelines for community energy 
policy,,3 specified how far competition policy measures, consisting in the inde-
pendent implementation of absolute rules, can and must contribute to the 
. attainment of common energy policy objectives. 
Gas 
58. With regard to Netherlands natural gas, the Community's main source of 
hydrocarbons, the Commission carried out a detailed study of the NAM-Export 
policy to check that none of the practices pursued were caught by Articles 85 
or 86. 
59. In respect of the determination of the frontier price, it became clear that 
the renewal of expiring contracts coming up for renegotiation on a three-year 
basis of prices and terms of sale had led to the application of new tariffs taking 
current conditions on the fuel and power market into account. 
The Commission is monitoring the application of the new tariffs estab-
lished for non-Netherlands purchasers. 
The companies importing Netherlands gas have diversified the sources of 
supply and thus reduced their dependence on NAM-Export. In 1975, it is 
1 Under Article 98(1), of the Euratom Treaty "Member States shall take all measures nec-
essary to facilitate the conclusion of insurance covering nuclear risks". 
2 Only co-assurance and re-assurance contracts concluded to cover a specific risk and not 
including other commitments escape Article 85. 
3 Commission Memorandum to the Council of 18 December 1968, Supplement to the EC 
Bulletin No. 12/1968. 
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expected that the share of Netherlands gas in consumption will be only 30% 
for the whole of the Community (47% for Germany, 36% for France, 17% 
for Italy). Alone among the Common Market importing countries, Belgium 
would still depend wholly on Netherlands gas for its supply. 
The prices proposed by the other countries supplying gas to the Common 
Market importing companies are as high and in many cases higher than those 
charged by NAM-Exports. 
60. Lastly, in comparing the selling prices to the consumer charged in the 
Community, the Commission has found that in each Member State, as in the 
Netherlands itself, the distributing or selling companies pursue, on the terri-
tories in which they operate, their own sales policies related to the particular 
circumstances in the country or the area. Price discrepancies have been brought 
to light for the same type of consumer in different parts of the Community, in 
a study carried out by the Statistical Office of the European Communities on 
the price of gas in the European Community countries from 1965 to 1970. 
The discrepancies are a result of an arrangement tantamount to the actual 
territorial allocation of the markets among the distributing firms, which have 
differing supply arrangements and differing price structures. 
Petroleum! 
61. On the basis of section 3, paragraph III "Competition rules" of the "First 
guidelines for the Community energy policy", the Commission's staff are 
endeavouring, with assistance volunteered by the companies, to establish 
information on the prices that have actually been charged for petroleum prod-
ucts and other energy sources. 
The Commission gave careful attention to price trends when the threats to 
supply in the course of the second half of 1970 and the winter of 1971 engen-
dered sharp increases in the prices of the main petroleum items, in particular 
domestic and heavy diesel fuels. 
As the Commission is informed, the Tripoli and Teheran Agreements 
(early 1971) fixed the posted prices for unrefined petroleum which were used as 
the basis of calculation for the royalties paid to the producing states, but they 
establish no quota arrangements between the oil companies. It cannot therefore 
be inferred from these agreements alone that they restrain competition and 
affect trade between Member States. 2 
• For the application of Article 37 to the French petroleum system, see First Report on Com- _ 
petition Policy, sec. 198. 
2 See Commission's reply to written question No. 11/71, OJNo. C 64,25 June 1971, p. 1. 
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For, through the play of competition, after supply conditions improved 
and the sea transport situation reverted to normal towards the end of 1971, 
diesel oil prices quickly fell back and thereafter continued to fall.! 
However, towards the end of 1972, prices began to rise again, and the 
Commission is once again watching carefully a very unstable situation. 
62. With regard to competition in petroleum products in the Common Market, 
the Commission has contemplated applying Council Regulation No. 17, partic-
ularly Article 12, which provides for investigation by sector, and Articles 13 
and 14, which allow investigations within undertakings or associations of 
undertakings. 
Article 12 of Regulation No. 17 cannot be applied unless the trend of 
trade, price movements or inflexibility of prices suggest that competition is 
being restricted or distorted by practices conflicting with Articles 85 or 86 of 
the Treaty. So far, there has been no such presumption. Intra-Community trade 
considered as a whole has increased slightly more rapidly than the Communities 
gross domestic consumption, of which it represented 11.65% in 1970, compared 
with 10.80% in 1965. But the trade trend varies from one country to another 
within the Common Market, since it is influenced by certain national controls 
(for example, provision for consumption scheme governed by a law adopted in 
1928 in France, control by the administration of refining and storing capacities 
in Italy). 
The difference from country to country in the price trends is a result of the 
action taken by the central authorities themselves through national price and 
taxation controls. 
For discrepancies between national tax and control arrangements relating 
to maximum prices can affect market price trends and levels. When the pet-
roleum market situation is normal, competition leads to real market prices 
generally below the maximum prices fixed under the controls. When, on the 
other hand, the petroleum market is under strain, the prices charged come 
nearer the maximum prices and may even be aligned on them. 
Consequently, the Commission has not so far begun investigations into 
the petroleum sector under Article 12 of Regulation No. 17. It remains vigilant 
and will check any circumstance suggesting that competition is being restricted 
or distorted in this industry. 
63. The only individual cases submitted to the Commission concern a com-
plaint in the liquid petroleum gas sector and a notification of the establishment 
of joint subsidiaries. 
I See "La conjoncture energetique dans la Communaute, Situation 1971-Perspectives 1972", 
p. 21 et seq. 
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With regard to bottled liquid petroleum gas, thorough verification suggests 
that there are no agreements or concerted practices in this sector; on the other 
hand, the general problem of permissible clauses in a series of exclusive dealing 
contracts with distributors in a single country has been raised. The Commission 
takes the view! that national exclusive dealing agreements are not generally 
liable to affect trade between Member States and consequently are not generally 
caught by Article 85(1). This consideration appears to apply in the present case. 
64. From the angle of competition policy in the transport of hydrocarbons, 
the Commission takes the view that the proposed regulation laid before the 
Council concerning pipelines and gas lines crossing frontiers, particularly 
Article 2, is an application of the principles contained in the Treaty, particularly 
Articles 90 and 86. 
The proposal is. for a scheme requiring the concessionary of a frontier-
crossing pipeline to charge non-discriminatory prices as between the pipeline or 
gas line users. 
Electric power 
65. Since electric power cannot be supplied without power lines, the undertak-
ings operating the networks inevitably enjoy a position which can be described 
as dominant in the area covered by the network. Even in the countries where 
national legislation would allow it, competing networks would be prohibitedly 
expensive, quite apart from the environment problems which an increase in the 
number of power lines would involve. 
Insofar as trade between Member States is liable to be affected by it, 
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty prohibits the abuse, by one or more undertakings, 
of a dominant position on the Common Market or in a substantial part of that 
market. The Commission, which, incidentally, has received no complaint, has 
so far discovered no such cases of abuse in the electric power field.2 
In cases lying outside the scope of Article 86, the problems deriving from 
the dominant positions of network operators are a matter for the competent 
authorities of each of the member countries. 
66. The Commission gave special attention to the problems raised by the 
Italian arrangements concerning the private generation of electric power. Given 
the restrictive interpretation by the Ministry of Industry and by the ENEL of 
the Law of 6 December 1962 and the Decree of 18 March 1965, Italian industri-
alists are often refused authorization to avail themselves of rational and eco-
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 52. 
2 See Commission reply to written question No. 222/72, OJNo. C 124, 29 November 1972, 
p.5. 
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nomic private generation potential, and this could well hamper the competi-
tivity of their products to an extent liable to involve an impact on trade between 
Member States. 
The Commission would intervene under the Treaty competition rules if a 
specific case justified this. It has also taken the view that an effort should be 
made to eliminate any distortion of competition by harmonizing laws and 
regulations governing relations between those operating the networks and 
undertakings producing their own electric power in the various member 
countries. 
67. Discrepancies have been noted in electricity prices in the various areas 
of the Common Market. Apparently they are solely due to the fact that although 
harmonization has been noted in certain areas, each power producer conducts 
within his territory an independent tariff policy and may even conclude "one-
.off" contracts for heavy industrial consumers. The Commission would intervene 
if such contracts were to distort competition between consumers. 
68. Trade in electric power between the Community member countries is on 
only a small scale, but this has not led the Commission to assume that compe-
tition was being restricted or distorted within the Common Market. The electric 
power production and distribution undertakings are public utility servic~ 
undertakings, and electric power production costs are tending to become uni-
form within the Common Market, partly because of the decline in the relative 
importance of hydraulic production, so that it is understandable that the internal 
needs of each Member State are covered only to a very small extent from power 
plants located in other member countries; however, as and when coordination 
at European level of the national development programmes in the electric power 
sector is achieved, this should lead to a gradual increase in the structural trade 
in electric power between the member countries. 
Coal 
Unlike the energy forms referred to above, which are covered by the EEC 
Treaty competition rules, coal comes under the ECSC Treaty both in respect 
of agreements and mergers (Article 65 and 66) and in respect of prices (Article 
60). 
69. The structural crisis on the coal market has led to fundamental changes 
in the structure of both coal production films and marketing firms. Most of the 
old sales cartels of the production firms, once autonomous, have now disap-
peared, either through closures or by mergers of the remaining firms, so that 
they are now merely sales organizations of the latter. As part of this change, 
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the two last great Ruhr sales cartels disappeared when the mining companies, 
until then independent, contributed their mining assets to the RuhrkohIe AG. 1 
These cases no longer involve any kind of restrictive agreement. The Union 
charbonniere sarro-lorraine and Cobechar are therefore the only firms that can 
be properly described as applying restrictive agreements. 
Complying with the conditions contained in the decision authorizing 
Ruhrkohle, the latter filed a request for amendment of its commercial regu-
lations, which was authorized by the Commission. 
The sales rules include the following changes to the previous situation: 
the sale of a minimum quantity of 6 000 metric tons of Ruhr coal in the 
Common Market during the preceding coal year, the condition stipulated 
until then for a dealer to allow him to buy directly, is replaced by the 
letting of a two-year contract providing for a minimum purchase of 6 000 
metric tons per year from Ruhrkohle in coals for domestic hearths and 
small industry in one of the eight defined sales regions. The right of direct 
purchase is at the same time valid for the provisioning of industrial con-
sumers. Fuel is delivered by Ruhrkohle AG only to purchasers (resale 
agents and consumers) established in the sales region for which the dealer 
is approved. 
the dealer is authorized to supply industrial firms having an annual con-' 
sumption exceeding 30 000 metric tons with Ruhr fuel only if he provides 
certain objectively defined services. 
Other decisions under Articles 65 and 66 were adopted in 1972 fOi extend-
ing authorizations of the Union charbonniere sarro-Iorraine2 and of a joint 
processing organization (Oberrheinische Kohlenunion),3 and for the author-
ization of a wholesale coal dealers' merger (Bayerischer Brennstoffhandel 
GmbH & Co KG).4 
4. Transport 
70. Because of the special aspects of transport and the fact that the definition 
of the competition rules applying in this area forms part of the common trans-
port policy and of general economic policy, the Council had decided, under 
Regulation No. 141 of 26 November 1962/ that Regulation No. 17 would not 
1 This contribution was the subject of authorization under Article 66, by a Commission 
decision of 27 November 1969. See Third General Report, sec. 38. 
2 Ee Bulletin 5/1972, Part 2, sec. 12. 
3 Ee Bulletin 6/1972, Part 2, sec. 4. 
4 Ee Bulletin 7/1972, Part 2, sec. 2. 
5 OJ No. 124, 28 November 1962, p. 2751. 
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be applicable in this industry. Council Regulation No. 1017/68,1 the specific 
regulation for the application of the competition rules to "land" transport (rail, 
road and inland waterway), entered into force only on 1 July 1968. 
The regulation introduces an exception to the principle of prior notification 
contained in Regulation No. 17. It lays down the rule that in the first instance the 
transport firms must assess for themselves what element is the most important in 
their agreements, the effects restraining competition or the effects of economic 
benefit, and assess for themselves, on their own responsibility, the legality of 
the agreement; thus it does not impose compulsory notification of agreements, 
though this means that agreements examined by the Commission (following a 
complaint or on the Commission's own initiative) are liable to be declared void 
with retroactive effect, but does not prevent their being retroactively declared 
lawful in the event of such subsequent examination.2 The firms and association 
of firms can, however, apply to the Commission, ifthey wish to avail themselves 
under Article 12 of the provisions of Article 5 of the Regulation in favour of ail 
agreement. 
71. No such application has yet been sent to the Commission, although it 
has drawn the attention of those firms which have notified agreements under 
Regulation No. 17 to the existence ofthis possibility, for any action they might 
wish to take. 
72. The Commission, has, of its own motion, made various requests for 
information under Article 19 of the regulation. The replies received have not so 
far led it to institute proceedings to bring about the termination of an infringe-
ment. 
73. Also on the Comrr,tission's own initiative, its staff has examined, from the 
angle of the competition rules established by Regulation No. 1017/68, and on 
the basis of information provided only by the pools and conventions concerned, 
the working of five Rhine navigation pools and conventions: the Duisburg 
Freight Convention, the French Rhine Traffic Convention, the Kettwig Pool, 
the Rhine Container-Linie, and the Rhine Grain Shipping Convention. 
Since these pools and conventions include restraints of competition covered 
by Article 2 of Regulation No. 1017/68, the prohibition as to principle can be 
declared inapplicable only if they meet the conditions for exemption set down 
in Article 5 of the same regulation. 
In this regard, one of the questions arising is whether they help to promote 
on an inland waterway market subject to wide fluctuations in supply and 
1 OJ No. L 175, 23 July 1968, p. 1. 
2 See 14th and 15th points of the preamble of Council Regulation (BEC) No. 1017/68. 
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demand, improved continuity and stability in the satisfaction of transport 
requirements, having due regard, to a fair extent, to the interests of the users. 
All of them establish transport rates not subject to business fluctuations or to 
weather variation; moreover, in certain cases, they ensure the availability of 
hold space in line with users' needs. 
Another condition is that the restrictions imposed on pool and convention 
members must in fact be indispensable for the attainment of the objectives 
described as favourable. In certain cases-the Kettwig Pool and the French 
Rhine Traffic Convention in respect of potash and sodium-quotas were fixed 
by shipping company concerned. This system is described, in respect of these 
conventions, as essential to their working, since the conventions assume re-
sponsibility for the proper implementation of contracts freely concluded by any 
of their members, whatever the tonnage involved, even if it exceeds the contrac-
tor's transport capacity. 
The last question arising is whether the pools and conventions allow 
effective competition to continue on the transport markets concerned. The 
shipping companies and boatmen not signing the conventions and the other 
modes of transport-road and rail-still account-in respect of the products 
and routes covered by each of the pools and conventions-for a large share of 
the transport. Nonetheless, it is difficult to assess, on the basis of the information 
at present available to the Commission, what real degree of competition sur-
vives, according to product and route. 
The vertical agreements binding certain conventions to certain shipping 
or forwarding agents were also examined: the Duisburg Freight Convention 
with the chemicals and iron and steel industries, the French Rhine Traffic 
Convention with French forwarding agents. Under these agreements, the 
shipping or forwarding agents make an undertaking to deal with all the merchan-
dise covered by the agreement should it be transported by waterway. 
The Commission has not so far decided to institute proceedings with a 
view to the termination of infringements arising from the Rhine pools and 
conventions. 
5. Agriculture 
74. The establishment of arrangements ensuring that competition is not 
distorted and the introduction of a common agricultural policy are two general 
Treaty objectives of equal status. However, in view of the particular importance 
which the Treaty attaches to the latter objective, the competition rules apply to 
agricultural produce only insofar as determined by the Council, having due 
regard to the objectives of Article 39. The Court of Justice has already stated 
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its position on the relations between the common agricultural policy and the 
competition rules. It has stated1 that the implementation of safeguard measures 
in the form of a curb on imports from non-member countries may be necessary 
to forestall serious disturbances on the farm produce market liable to endanger 
the achievement of the objectives of Article 39: in these circumstances, explicit 
explanation of the reasons for such measures, in the light of Articles 85 and 86, 
is not indispensable. Moreover, as stressed in the same judgment, while it is 
true that a system of import certificates issued in relation to reference quantities 
may affect competition by leading to inflexibility in the pre-existing commercial 
relations with non-member countries, it is also true that determining, on the 
basis of objective criteria, quantities the import of which is authorized, serves to 
prevent discrimination against those who, because of formerly existing trade 
relations with'non-member countries, qualify for import certificates. The Court 
concluded that this system is the one liable to distort competition least. 
75. The Council regulation2 implementing Article 42 of the EEC Treaty, estab-
lished a general system of exemptions from Article 85(1) for agreements 
relating to agricultural products but forming an integral part of a national 
market organization or which are necessary for the attainment of the objectives 
set out in Article 39 of the Treaty. The Commission has sole power to determine 
which agreements fulfil these conditions. The first exception provided for in 
Article 2 of Regulation No. 26 is in line with Articles 40 to 46 of the Treaty, 
which provide for the replacement of the national organizations by a common 
organization of the agricultural markets and authorize the maintenance of 
these national organizations, if necessary through waivers to the principles of 
the Treaty, until such replacement has taken place; only agreements which are 
an integral part of a national market organization still existing in a field in 
which the common organization has not yet been established qualify for ex-
emption. As to the second exception, the third recital of Regulation No. 26 
shows that the intention of the Council was to bar application of Article 85(1) 
only in those cases where implementation of the Article would prevent the 
common agricultural policy from achieving its objectives. 3 
1 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 13 May 1971 in joint Cases 41 to 44/70 (N.V. Inter-
national Fruit Company v. Commission), Recueil, 1971, p. 411. Cf. Fifth General Report, 
sec. 611. 
2 Council Regulation No. 26 of 4 April 1962 applying certain rules of competition to produc-
tion of and trade in agricultural products, amended by Council Regulation No. 49 of 
29 June 1962. (OJ No. 30, 20 April 1962, p. 993 and OJ No. 53, 1 July 1962, p. 1571.) 
3 As a special casein the general scheme provided forby Article2(I), first sentence, ofRegula-
tion No. 26, the Council established, in the second sentence, an exception for certain agree-
ments, decisions and practices of farmers (essentially cooperatives), provided they meet 
the de facto requirements set out in the Article, and provided that the Commission does not 
ascertain that the agreement, decision or concerted practice endangers attainment of the 
objectives of Article 39 or, precludes competition. 
70 REP. COMPo 1972 
76. This last exception would apply, for example, in the case of the groups of 
producers and of their unions provided for in the proposed regulation laid before 
the Council by the Commission on 29 April 1970,1 insofar as associations of 
producers are assigned a role in the common agricultural policy. The Commis-
sion stressed the importance it attaches to their value as an instrument in the 
promotion of joint adaptation, by the farmers, of their output to market re-
quirements. 
The third recital of the draft regulation on groupings and unions thereof 
states that the "grouping of farmers within organizations requiring their 
members to accept joint discipline is necessary for the attainment of the ob-
jectives of Article 39 of the Treaty; and these objectives can be pursued not only 
by the grouping of isolated farmers within producers' groupings, but also by 
the formation of unions of these groupings." 
Consequently, if a grouping, or a union,'in addition to contributing to the 
attainment of the objectives of Article 39, as provided for in Article 7 subpara-
graph Ca) of the draft regulation, meets all the other conditions established by 
Article 7 and is thus recognized, it will comply with the wishes of the Council. 
expressed by the regulation and will be considered as necessary to the attain-
ment of the objectives of Article 39. As a result, any agreements, decisions and 
practices enabling it to be set up and operate will be exempted from Article 
85(1) of the Treaty by virtue of Article 2(1) first sentence of Regulation No. 26. 
This will be the case, in particular, for common production and marketing 
rules applied by the grouping or the union, provided such rules comply with 
the criteria adopted pursuant to Article 7, subparagraph (b) of the draft. On the 
other hand, the Commission will have to assess the impact on competition of 
any agreements, decisions or practices other than those necessary to enable the 
grouping to be established and to operate, in particular, if this arises, in respect 
of supplementary common rules applied without complying with the above-
mentioned criteria or in respect of agreements concluded with outside parties. 
Neither the proposed regulation concerning groupings of producers and 
unions thereof, nor Regulation No. 26, provide for any exception as to the 
applicability of Article 86 on the abuse of dominant positions. 
77. The Commission will also be required to consider, under proceedings 
initiated in accordance with Regulation No. 17, whether the agreements and 
practices forbidden by Article 85(1) of the Treaty may qualify for exemption 
under Article 2(1) first sentence, of Regulation No. 26. This has already hap-
pened in the European sugar industry case, 2 in which it was acknowledged that 
1 Amended proposal for an (EEC) Council Regulation concerning grouping of producers and 
unions thereof, OJNo. C 70,12 June 1970, p. 31. 
2 Commission Decision of2 January 1973, OJNo. 140,26 May 1973, p. 17. See also sec: 28. 
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the first of these exceptions could not be invoked in respect of a Common 
Market organization replacing the national market organizations, and defined 
in Council Regulation No. 1009/67 of 18 December 1967.1 Nor was the second 
of the exceptions applicable, since there was no evidence that prohibiting the 
agreements and practices would have jeopardized the attainment of the ob-
jectives of the common agricultural policy in the sugar sector. 
Now, apart from the fact that the agreements and practices in question 
were established with aims completely alien to these objectives, they were also 
completely foreign to the context of the facilities provided, for this purpose, 
by Community arrangements; in some ways they actually conflicted with these 
arrangements and sharply curtailed the scope developed by the Community 
sugar market organization for free intra-Community trade. 
1 OJ No. 308, 18 December 1967, p. 1 
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Part two 
Competition policy and government assistance to undertakings 
73-74
CHAPTER I 
STATE AIDS 
SECTION 1 
APPLICATION OF THE EEC TREATY 
I. General 
78. In its first report on competition policy,l the Commission explained its 
general interpretation of the Treaty rules on aids and its approach to their 
application. It showed that there were no inconsistencies between competition 
policy and the various structural policies-industrial, regional or social-since 
policy with regard to aids is designed just as much to ensure a more orderly 
structural development of the Community as to assure effective competition. 
This approach was unchanged in 1972. 
The Commission also stressed in the first competition report the diffi-
culties it had encountered or which still persisted. In this connection, progress 
made in the actual application of some general principles stated in previous 
years (with regard to regional aids, for example), and general policy positions 
adopted by the Commission in 1972 with regard to Government intervention 
still lying outside Community rules (concerning general aid schemes or tempo-
rary Government intervention with regard to the corporate capital of certain 
firms), will help to eliminate some remaining difficulties. 
79. In view of the trend of the general economic situation in the Community, 
the Commission feels bound to emphasize this year that State aid policy can 
either help to control or help to aggravate the inflationary strains now besetting 
the European economy. 
The policy will help to control inflation if the aids facilitate changes likely 
to resolve situations engendering strain by ensuring greater mobility or greater 
effectiveness of available factors of production and by eliminating outmoded 
structures in favour of more competitive structures; aids will then constitute 
an effective instrument for price stabilization. 
1 Sees. 132 to 139. 
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80. However, aids can feed inflation if they are merely transfers of financial 
facilities without real counterpart, even in the long term. This is the case 
with purely "conservational" aids (operating aids) designed to ensure the 
survival of industries or undertakings which cannot be expected to cope 
with national, Community and international competition or to play a con-
structive role in the growth of the Community economy. In these cases, the 
social problems or the problems connected with security of supplies which 
would arise if the aid was not provided are sometimes overestimated. Apart 
from the fact that such aids permanently immobilize factors of production in 
less productive, and therefore less remunerative employment than that to which 
those factors could be assigned, they also encourage inflation directly by 
burdening the budgets and indirectly by correspondingly saddling industries 
with extra costs in fiscal terms. 
The same applies to State aids, the value and need for which have not been 
proved, in cases where the aim is to promote certain prestige operations whose 
industrial future is by no means assured. 
Last but not least, certain forms of aid feed inflation by shielding firms 
from the impact of the price increases they must support in respect of the 
factors of production they use (guarantees to export prices); the result of this is 
that the firms are no longer encouraged to resist the pressures brought to bear 
upon them. 
81. The Commission is therefore helping to control inflation by applying, in 
its supervision of aids granted by the Member States, principles which it has 
always followed and which entail its disapproval of aids which do not have as 
their basis and objective the structural adaptation which is genuinely necessary. 
The same applies in respect of its efforts to harmonize and control national aids 
with the object of reducing them to the level justified by the seriousness of the 
problems to be solved. In this way it prevents budgetary costs from rising as a 
result of senseless bids and counter-bids. Under the present circumstances this 
work must be pressed forward vigorously, and the Commission gave it full 
attention in 1972 as in the past. 
2. Aid schemes for regional purposes 
82. The first report on competition policy described the coordination princi-
ples1 applying, from 1 January 1972 onwards, to regional aid granted by the 
Member States in the central regions of the Community. The principles stated, 
1 Sees. 143 to 153. 
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however, that implementation would be gradual. For this purposes, 1972 was, 
as intended, a transitional year used to carry out the technical work needed for 
the full implementation of the principles. In addition, the Commission expressed 
its views in a number of specific cases in respect of regional aids established in 
Germany, Belgium and Italy. 
TECHNICAL WORK RELATING TO THE COORDINATION PRINCIPLES 
83. The time available to the Member States and the Commission to prepare 
for the full implementation of the coordination principles was used for the 
following purposes: 
(i) Internal administrative measures adopted by the Member States; 
(ii) Establishment of a method of supervising the application of the coordi-
nation principles; 
(iii) Technical work designed to make certain types of aid easier to investigate; 
(iv) Technical work concerning the establishment of information on the 
impact on individual industries of regional aids. 
The results obtained in the various fields, will, as planned, be discussed in 
a Commission report to the Council and the other Community institutions on 
the implementation of the coordination principles. The following summary 
information can already be given: 
Administrative measures adopted by the Member States 
84. At national level, instructions have been given to all the authorities 
involved in the granting of regional aids to ensure compliance with the coordi-
nation principles, and information work has been undertaken to familiarize the 
decentralized authorities and administrations, as far as this proves necessary, 
with certain technical aspects of the principles (common method of assessing 
aids). 
Such in depth information work must inevitably take time to bear fruit; 
it is essential if the method of supervising the implementation of the coordi-
nation principles is to be properly established. 
Supervision method 
85. The coordination principles provide that the supervision of their imple-
mentation shall be carried out by the Commission by means of the a posteriori 
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communication to it of significant cases applying. It will be a supervIsIOn 
limited to the most important cases and not general oversight. Work has had 
to be carried out with the experts of the Member States to establish, in relation 
with the size of investments, the thresholds above which it will be generally 
accepted that cases are significant. These thresholds must be low enough to 
ensure the effectiveness of the supervision but high enough to keep the number 
of cases within reasonable limits. 
The following thresholds are the ones eventually chosen: 
4000000 
u.a. for setting up and extension investments for establishments entailing 
the creation of new jobs in the regions concerned; 
3000000 
u.a. for other types of investment assisted. 
Of course these thresholds cannot be fixed for alI time. They will have to 
be reviewed in the light of experience. 
The work also established the details of the communication of these cases, 
their frequency and the contents of the information to be supplied. 
In order to facilitate the colIection of information essential to the function-
ing of the supervision system in certain Member States with more decentralized 
structures, the Commission proposed that the Council adopt, on the basis of 
Article 94 of the EEC Treaty, a regulation making the procedure compulsory 
in all its parts throughout the Community in respect of central regions. At the 
level of individual cases the Commission's supervision will therefore become 
effective only from 1973 onwards. 
Making certain types of aid easier to investigate 
86. Progress has been made in this field, although it proved impossible to 
complete the work. For certain types of non-transparent aid (for example, 
fiscal aid), it was agreed that the means of making them measurable would 
consist in fixing for each aid instrument of this type a standard ceiling in subsidy 
equivalents which could not be exceeded. 
In practice, this ~ethod raises three types of problem: 
(i) If the maximum ceiling is chosen in advance, the aid schemes being modi-
fied along these lines, an element of rigidity is introduced which may 
hamper the combined or cumulative application of several types of aid; 
(ii) If, on the other hand, the maximum aid is fixed only for each case applied 
the aid scheme must be modified to alIow of the modulation, it being 
established that this would be carried out in such a way as to comply with 
the 20% ceiling in net subsidy equivalent; 
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(iii) Whatever the arrangement chosen, an administrative problem arises for 
the Member States in the verification in practice that the ceiling is not 
exceeded, even if the granting of the fiscal aid extends over several fi-
nancial years. 
The Member States whose regional aid schemes include such fiscal aids 
undertook the studies needed to enable the measures required to be taken so as 
to make the aids more "transparent". 
Progress was also made in respect of other types of opaque aids (including 
aids to building sites and aids to building), but the implementation of the 
solutions envisaged can only be implemented experimentally in connection 
with the application of the supervision method described above. Lastly, in 
respect of other non-transparent aids (for example guarantees), work is stm 
needed. 
Impact on individual industries of general regional aids 
87. As explained in the first competition policy report, regional aid schemes 
are generally not concerned with specific industries, i.e., they can be applied 
without distinction, to all industries. It is therefore impossible to assess their 
impact on anyone industry. This is why the establishment of a procedure 
enabling effects on given industries to be understood and assessed has been 
included among the coordination principles of the general regional aid schemes.! 
Working in close association with the Government experts, the Com-
mission has therefore endeavoured to work out a method of analysis by which 
to grasp, on the basis of statistical data broken down by industry, the signifi-
cant problems of competition, arising at industry or branch of industry level as 
a result of the application of the general regional aid schemes. Agreement was 
finally reached on the principles of a method which will become operational in 
1973 and which will use the statistics concerning the application of regional 
aids during the years 1969-71. 
The method is devised so as to show in succession: 
(i) The industries or branches of industry in which, at EEC level, the use of 
regional aid schemes is proving the most extensive. 
Oi) Among these, the industries or branches of industry in which application 
of aids entails the greatest hazards from the point of view of Community 
trade and competition. 
(iii) The Member State or States in which the use of regional aid could engen-
der problems in these industries or branches of industry. 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 152. 
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(iv) The possible causes of the situations thus diagnosed. 
The method of analysis is based on two complementary measures: 
The first of these is a quantitative measure based on a statistical exercise. 
The second is qualitative and based on a set of criteria which at present are 
not quantifiable or are purely quantitative, intended to weight and interpret the 
statistics. 
This instrument of analysis, which will be developed as time goes on, will 
lead, if appropriate, to intervention by the Community to correct any distorting 
incidence on various industries caused by regional aid. The framework and 
nature of such intervention have not yet been finalized. 
88. Lastly, it was during this transitional year for the application of the coordi-
nation principles that the Accession Treaty was signed with Denmark, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom. . 
At Article 154, the Treaty confirms that the principles, as "acquis com-
munautaire", will apply to the new Member States, at the latest from 1 July 1973 
onwards. The six months' period of grace was established to enable the Com-
mission's memorandum to the Council and the first resolution of the Member 
States' meeting within the Council on regional aids to be adjusted in so far as 
the enlargement requires this. 
Preparatory work was therefore begun at administrative level on a bi-
lateral basis with each of the acceding States, the first phase being devoted to 
obtaining fuller information on regional aid schemes in the relevant countries. 
This preliminary work was made more difficult than expected by the fact 
that in two States, Denmark and the United Kingdom, new aid schemes were 
brought in during the period. 
SPECIFIC STATEMENTS OF VIEW 
Pursuant to Articles 92 et seq. of the EEC Treaty and the abovementioned 
coordination principles, the Commission expressed its views on aid schemes 
instituted in the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France and Italy. 
Investment bonuses in the German coal areas 
89. Further to the Commission's decision of 17 February 1971,l the Federal 
Republic of Germany was required to terminate without delay, in the mining 
1 OJNo L 57,10 March 1971, p. 19. 
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regions of Land North Rhine/Westphalia, the award of investment bonuses 
granted because of the extension beyond 31 December 1969 of Article 32 of the 
law on the adaptation and reorganization of the coal mines and the German 
mining areas (Kohlegesetz), unless the aids were limited selectively to those 
areas only in which they were justified, the areas to be determined on the basis 
of objective criteria to be agreed with the Commission. An agreement1 was 
reached on area demarcation, but differences of view emerged between the 
Commission and the German Government on the problem of outstanding 
aid applications ("Altantrage") submitted under the extended aid scheme. 
The German authorities argue that the outstanding applications are not 
affected by the Commission's decision, no matter where the investments are 
. located. The Commission argues that the ban contained in its decision of 
17 February 1971 does not apply to those outstanding applications where the 
investments involved were begun before 20 August 1970 or where the application 
filed under Article 32 reached the granting authority before that date, for the 
proceedings provided for under Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty were started 
in respect of the scheme challenged on 30 July 1970, and the notice published 
in the Official Journal of the European Communities-the purpose of which 
was to inform the parties concerned of the incompatibility of the aids and to 
elicit their comments-appeared in OJ No C 104/1 of 14 August 1970. By 
establishing the date as 20 August 1970, six days after publication of the notice, 
the Commission wished to consider the interests of investors, who, before such 
publication, could not know that the aids were liable to be found incompatible 
with the common market although, from the formal point of view, the decision 
of 17 February 1971 had terminated the granting of such aids from 24 February 
1971 onwards. 
The German authorities felt entitled to process all the outstanding appli-
cations (Altantrage) without distinction and, from 24 February 1971 onwards, 
they granted aids against applications filed after 20 August 1970 in areas in 
which, under the objective criteria agreed with the Commission, such aids were 
no longer justified. Accordingly, the Commission decided on 26 July 1972 to 
refer the matter directly to the Court of Justice, as provided for in Article 93(2) 
second subparagraph, asking the Court to declare an infringement, with a view 
to obtaining an annulment by the German Government of the aid grant de-
cisions in the cases challenged. 
Belgian economic growth law 
90. Under the procedure provided for in Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty which 
the Commission had opened in June 1970 in respect of the Belgian draft law on 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 157. 
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economic growth, the Belgian Government submitted to the Commission a 
draft amendment changing the criteria for demarcation of the regional aid 
grant areas, and a draft establishing new areas with the social and economic 
criteria and background arguments leading to this selection. 1 
In a decision adopted on 26 April 1972,2 the Commission decided that 
Belgium should, in the first place, limit the granting of the regional aids provided 
for in the economic growth law to those regions and areas designated provision-
ally for two years, and in the second place classify the development areas in two 
categories graduated according to the severity of the problems in the regions 
concerned. The maximum intensity of the aids should be varied according to 
category. 
In adopting this decision, the Commission was applying the principle of 
regional specificity, under which aids should vary in intensity according to the 
nature, the gravity and the urgency of the regional development problems that 
the authorities are tackling. With this in mind, the Commission took account 
of all the social and economic criteria underlying the law of 30 December 1970 
and treated with all appropriate care the data provided by the Belgian Govern-
ment (current and foreseeable unemployment, the decline of certain activities, 
average incomes per inhabitant and the growth rate). 
On the basis of these considerations, the Commission reached the con-
clusion that, in present circumstances, aids could be deemed compatible with 
the Common Market in a number of regions listed in its decision, it being 
understood that it will be for the Belgian Government to determine the lo-
cation and size of the aid areas within these regions. 
The Commission also decided that the granting of the aids for individual 
industries provided for by the law outside development areas must be made 
subject to certain conditions which will enable the Commission to state its views 
in advance on the cases of granting of such aids. 3 
In general, the Commission decision has had the effect of terminating the 
procedure which the Commission had opened under Article 93(2) of the EEC 
Treaty. It does not concern the problem raised by Article 36 of the economic 
growth law relating to the rule that foreign companies must advise the Belgian 
Government of any large holdings they may intend to acquire in companies 
located in Belgium: this problem is being dealt with under a special procedure 
started under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty for infringement of Article 67 of 
the Treaty, relating to the free movement of capital, and Article 221, 'which 
provides that Member States must grant the same treatment regarding financial 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 163. 
2 OJ No L 105,4 May 1972 and No L 106,5 May 1972. 
3 Sec. 118. 
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participation by the nationals of other Member States in corporate capital as 
they grant to their own nationals. 
In accordance with the decision of 25 April 1972, the Belgian Government 
submitted to the Commission three preliminary draft Royal Decrees imple-
menting the law in question, and the Commission did not object to imple-
mentation of the decrees, subject to a number of amendments and adjustments. 
New French regional bonus scheme 
91. On 29 June 1972, the Commission initiated the procedure provided for in 
Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty against a new regional aid scheme which was 
established in France before the Commission could make comments as provided 
for in Article 93(3) of the EEC Treaty. The scheme comprises a regional de-
velopment bonus ("prime de developpement regionale"-PDR), and a location 
bonus for certain services,l which take the place of the old industrial develop-
ment and adaptation bonuses. 
Although it appreciates the nature and dimensions of certain structural 
problems arising in a number of main French regions, the Commission initiated 
the procedure against the new rules because of the lack of economic and social 
evidence to justify the demarcation of the aid areas provided for and the lack 
of regional specificity in the scaling of the bonus rates. In addition, the new 
scheme provides for the granting of "pinpoint" aids outside the areas anywhere 
in France (except in the Paris and Lyons areas). Lastly, as regards the geo-
graphical scope of the location bonus for certain service activities, no reasons 
have been given as to why the areas concerned do not coincide with those 
qualifying for the regional development bonus. 
Under the Treaty procedure, the French authorities have forwarded to 
the Commission supplementary information to justify the regional case for the 
bonus areas. The Commission is now studying this information. 
In order to take account of the new bonus scheme, the French authorities 
have also sent the Commission a draft decree designed to adapt the scope of the 
tax abatements foreseen for regional development (total or partial exemption 
from business tax (patent), reduction of transfer duty, and exceptional depreci-
ation rules) to the new bonus areas mentioned above: the scope of these tax 
abatements has always par:tly coincided with the areas in which regional aids 
are granted in the form of bonuses. 
1 Decree No 72-270, 11 April 1972, and Decree No 72-271, 11 April 1972, JournalOfficiel 
de fa Repuh/ique fran~aise. 12 April 1972. 
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Italy: assistance to industrial undertakings in the autonomous region of· 
Friuli- Venezia Giulia 
92. The Commission has commented on two draft laws for the Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia autonomous region amending aid schemes previously established and 
increasing the funds originally appropriated for their implementation. The 
Commission had already endorsed the two laws. One provides for construction 
loan interest subsidies, and the extension and modernization of industrial 
establishments; the other provides for subsidies for the setting-up of new 
industrial establishments in hill and mountain areas. The new amendments 
do not alter the scope of the current aids. 
However, one of the amendments specified that, in the granting of aids, 
preference would be given to undertakings with majority Italian ownership. 
This provision conflicted with the EEC Treaty right of establishment rule 
(Articles 52 to 58, which are, incidentally, an application of the general rule of 
Article 7 banning all discrimination based on nationality). The Commission 
ordered that the clause in question be deleted. 
In addition, without altering its general endorsement ofthe two laws given 
the situation and problems of the region, the Commission reconsidered its 
position, on receiving the two drafts, in the light of the coordination principles 
for general regional aid schemes. 
On the question of the standard ceiling for intensity of aids in the Com-
munity's "central regions", the Commission asked the Italian Government to 
ensure not only that the ceiling is in fact complied with by the Region, but also 
that it is not exceeded by the simultaneous application of aid schemes handled 
by the Region and regional aids granted under national statutes. 
Lastly, since one of the regional laws has general scope because the aid 
measures it provides for can be applied anywhere in the Region, the Commission 
demanded that regional specificity be introduced into it. 
3. Aid schemes for individual industries 
93. The general policy lines described in the first report on competition 
policyl have been given practical expression in new developments whose effect 
will be to make Member States' industrial action more consistent overall and 
to lead gradually to real Community policies for a number of industries. 
1 Sees. 164 to 186. 
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Shipbuilding 
94. Since the first report on competition policy,l two major agreements have 
been established which should appreciably alter the conditions of competition 
on the shipbuilding market: in the first place, a directive was adopted on 20 July 
1972 by the Council of the European Communities concerning shipbuilding 
aids2 and, secondly, a general arrangement was agreed by the OECD Council 
on 20 October 1972 with regard to the gradual elimination of obstacles to the 
achievement of normal conditions of competition with respect to shipbuilding. 
The main innovation in the two agreements is that they will not only affect 
shipbuilding aids but will also forestall supply trends liable to jeopardize equi-
librium with demand on the market. In other words, the aim is to strengthen 
measures whose purpose is to bring competition conditions back to normal by 
also tackling, directly, the problem of production capacity. 
95. The second directive of the Council of the European Communities should 
be seen as a transitional measure, designed to coordinate provisionally-until 
31 December 1978-shipbuilding aids, until such time as fresh Community 
measures can be prepared covering all the problems arising in this industry. 
In the first place the directive cuts the Community ceiling for shipbuilding 
aids; it thus forms part of the general aid dismantlement movement recently 
confirmed by the general OECD arrangements mentioned above. The ceiling, 
which had been 10% under the first Community directive, was reduced for 1972 
to 5% and for 1973 to 4% of the selling price of ships for all aids other than 
credit facilities to sales. But the facilities themselves must be granted within the 
restrictions imposed by the ship export credit arrangement deriving from the 
OECD Council resolution of 16 December 1970, under which credit may not be 
provided at a rate below 7.5%. 
Secondly, the aim of the directive is to strengthen this aid harmonization 
within the Community by taking into account all support measures' in the 
industry, whether direct or indirect or granted for specific purposes or pursuant 
to general aid schemes. However, only an agreement of principle was achieved 
in this connection, several types of aid having been provisionally excepted by 
the second directive. Nonetheless, it provides that the Council, on a proposal 
from the Commission, will take a decision before the end of 1973, on a new 
directive designed to coordinate all shipbuilding aids and subsidies. The neces-
sary preparatory work has already begun, and national experts are providing 
assistance. 
1 Sees. 168 to 170. 
2 OJ No L 169,27 July 1972, p. 30., ' 
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Finally, the directive of 20 July 1972 provides that the Commission should, 
without delay, and assisted by the Member States, study the various factors 
accounting for supply/demand disequilibria in the shipbuilding market, pro-
fiting inter alia, from studies carried out by other international organizations, 
i.e. the OECD. The Council will take decisions on relevant proposals, if possible 
at the same time as it adopts the new directive relating to shipbuilding aids and, 
in any case, at the latest by the end of 1973. 
The recent developments in the shipbuilding aid problem should help 
towards the gradual establishment of a real Community policy for this industry. 
96. Objectives similar to those in the Community directive have been written 
into the abovementioned OECD general arrangements, concluded on 20 October 
1972. This was done at the insistence of the original and new Community 
Member States. The nine countries also insisted-through common declara-
tions made at the time of the adoption of the arrangement by the OECD Coun-
cil and in OECD Working Party No 6 ("shipbuilding") at its Tokyo meeting on 
7 November 1972-that the progress made in bringing conditions of com-
petition back to normal should include arrangements ensuring some measure 
of equilibrium between demand and supply on the international ship market. 
At the Tokyo meeting, it was also agreed that the subgroup examining these ar-
rangements will begin work as soon as possible, so as to submit findings within 
the next few months. 
Of course, the Commission of the Member States will continue the studies 
on production capacity provided for by the directive of 20 July 1972, in close 
association with the OECD work, since at the present time the OECD is ap-
parently the most appropriate forum within which to seek out a solution to the 
problem at world level. 
Textiles 
97. Aware of the structural difficulties which have prevailed for several years 
in the textile industry and the concomitant tendency for most of the Member 
States to provide assistance, the Commission took the initiative, on 20 July 1971, 
with a measure designed to provide "framework arrangements"! to coordinate 
national aids to the industry and, consequently, to prevent any escalation in 
this area. The "framework arrangements" specify the limits beyond which 
textile aids must not go and the conditions upon which they may be granted. 
In order to ensure compliance with these guidelines, the Commission, 
helped by Government experts, made an inventory in 1972 of all the aids the 
textile industry may qualify for in the Member States, on whatever gounds, 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sees. 171 and 172. 
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whether the aids are granted under aid schemes specifically available to the 
industry or schemes which may cover all industries within a specific region or 
more generally. The inventory brought to light the wide diversity of support 
measures that can be mobilized in favour of textiles and the difficulty of grasp-
ing and comparing the actual uses of these aids. 
It was therefore agreed to introduce the following arrangements: 
(i) Any specific assistance for the textile industry special terms or conditions 
. of qualification, application under agreements between the textile pro-
cessing industry and the central authority) included in aid schemes which 
are otherwise not specific to the industry (general aids, regional aids), will 
be submitted in advance to the Commission for Community examination 
from the point of view of the textile industry; 
Oi) A bilateral, or even multilateral, consultation procedure will be organized 
by the Commission to consider all properly motivated complaints received 
from the national Governments against cases of aids to textile firms liable 
to seriously affect trade and competition in the Community. In this con-
nection, no distinction will be made between aids accorded under speci-
fically textile schemes or aids under schemes of wider scope; 
(iii) The inventory of aids available to the textile industry will be brought up 
to date annually. A statistical return will be attached, showing, for each 
financial year, all the investments assisted and all the aids from which the 
investments have benefited, whatever the scheme under which the aids 
have been granted. As far as possible, the return will be broken down 
between the various branches of the industry. 
In addition, the Commission has continued to impiement the principles 
it had set out in the "framework arrangement", for textile aids. For example, 
it had commented on two Italian aid schemes. 
98. In its decision of 27 May 19701 the Commission stated its views on 
certain aspects of the draft Italian law for the restructuring, reorganization and 
conversion of the textile industry, in respect of which it instituted proceedings, 
in 1969, under Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty. The draft provided for various 
aids: 
(i) Credit facilities and tax abatements to assist the financing of restructuring, 
modernization and conversion operations for textile firms; 
(ii) Credit facilities for the establishment or the extension, in the same areas, 
of industrial activities in other industries; 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 173. 
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(iii) Ten-year exemptions from all direct taxes on incomes deriving from 
investments made as part of these operations in the "textiles" areas. 
This partial decision concerned the withdrawal of the operating aid con-
stituted by the ten-year income tax exemption and the need, for the authorities, 
to take into account, not only from the national point of view but also from the 
Community point of view, excess capacity problems, when granting investment 
aids. The Italian Government has borne this decision in mind, in particular 
when it published this draft as Law No 1101, of 1 December 1971. However, 
this is a framework law, the criteria for which (notably the geographical criteria 
and those applying to specific industries) and the terms for implementation in 
successive stages according to procedures included in. the law itself, are worked 
out by the Italian authorities. The Commission therefore adopted at the end of 
1972 a new interim comment on the law and on some of the implementing texts, 
subject to further comments it may make. The substance of the latest comment 
is as follows: 
(a) As regards investment aids, the problems raised by the demarcation of the 
beneficiary industries and branches of industry and areas and by any overlap-
ping with aids provided for under other schemes, are well on the way to being 
solved. The Commission has noticed, in particular, the ban on any plurality of 
aids under the textile law and those provided for by other laws, stressing, 
however, that since the firms can chose between the two types of advantage, 
the use of other aid schemes for textile firms should also be subject to the general 
guidelines laid down for the application of the textile law. 
It also reminded the Italian authorities that they must submit in advance to 
the economic planning committees (CIPE) arrangements for specific definition 
of criteria determining textile activity, operation schemes and the location of 
benefiting investment, and for sharing out available credits (Lit 200 000 million 
in subsidized credit) between conversion operations and restructuring opera-
tions. Only with this information to hand can the Commission reach a proper 
assessment of the impact on the textile industry. 
The Commission also advised the Italian Government that it has no 
objection to make in respect of the eight textile areas defined by the intermin-
isterial decrees of 31 July and 21 August 1972; the strong predominance of 
textile activities and serious employment problems are the main economic 
features of these areas. 
(b) During the Parliamentary procedure for the adoption of the law, a new 
aid rule for textile and garment firms was introduced without prior notification 
to the Commission, this being temporary fiscalization (for three years) and 
partial reduction in the rate (from 15 to 10%) of the social costs relating to 
family allowances. According to the Italian authorities, the measure would 
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reduce the costs borne by the firms concerned by nearly Lit 31000 million, a 
figure which is about 0.8% of their turnover. It would therefore have an appre-
ciable effect on intra-Community trade and competition, this being an industry 
in which competition is very keen and trade on a large scale. The Commission 
decided to persist in its efforts to have the measure deleted, since it was a purely 
operating aid barred by the Community framework arrangements from textile 
aids. Being granted automatically to firms, it was also not likely to provide an 
effective remedy to the structural difficulties besetting the industry. 
99. A similar problem arose in connection with the Italian law designed to 
extend for a further year the abatement of social dues payable, for very small. 
small and medium-sized firms.1 The abatement is a 5% reduction in the basis 
on which the unemployment insurance contribution is calculated, up to a limit 
not exceeding the pay of 300 workers. Although this is a measure designed to 
boost economic activity, its scope is wider for the textile industry, since the 
ordinary law ~ule that firms must not employ more than 500 persons to qualify 
is not applied to textile firms. 
For the very reasons set out in the preceding section, the Commission, on 
31 July 1972, opened the proceedings provided for in Article 93(2) of the EEC 
Treaty against this specific assistance to the textile industry. The Italian Govern-
ment reacted on 9 August 1972 by referring the matter to the Council under the 
exceptional procedure provided for in Article 93(2), subparagraph 3, by virtue 
of which "on application by a Member State, the Council may, acting unani-
mously, decide that aid which that State is granting or intends to grant shall be 
considered to be compatible With the Common Market, in derogation of the 
provisions of Article 92". But the Council gave no ruling on the matter within 
the three-month period provided for in the Treaty, and the Commission is 
therefore continuing the procedure. 
Aircraft production 
100. As stated in the First Report on Competition Policy,2 the Commission has 
before the Council a memorandum on the "industrial and technology policy 
measures to be adopted in the aircraft production industry". On this occasion, 
the Commission advised the Member States of the forms and methods it felt 
should be used in aids to this industry and to which it would give favourable 
consideration when, under the. powers conferred upon it by Articles 92 and 93 
of the Treaty, it is called upon to comment on aid schemes in force or planned 
1 Sec. 120. 
2 First Report on Competition Policy, sees. 176 to 178. 
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in the Member States. The Commission's aims here are to guide the Member 
States in planning their schemes and to provide itself with general guidelines 
for their case by case assessment. 
The "framework arrangements" for the aids have been designed with 
proper regard to the very special features of the aeronautical industry and are 
therefore without prejudice to the Commission's views on aids to other indus-
tries. 
The special features can be summarized as follows: 
(a) The modest position of the Community industry not only on the world 
market but also on the Community market, entailing "relative under-
development" ; 
(b) Importance of the industry for the economic development and general 
technical progress of the Community, one aspect being the likelihood of 
a very sharp increase in air transport; 
(c) Increased recourse to public support in all the manufacturing countries 
because of the scale of capital requirements, of the length of the pro-
duction cycle and of the danger of failure; 
Cd) Unsuitability of a single country, in terms of size, to provide facilities 
enabling manufacturers to reach a level of competitivity matching tech-
nological, industrial and commercial requirements; 
(e) Distortions of competition besetting the Community industry in com-
parison with the manufacturers in certain non-member countries, who 
also serve large domestic markets which are dynamic, unified, and pro-
tected. 
101. In view of this situation, the European industry, pending a reorganization 
operation necessarily involving cross-frontier mergers, have no choice but to 
cooperate if they wish to achieve a sufficient level of competitivity. Coopera-
tion will enable them to carry out more expensive and more hazardous schemes, 
to prepare more lasting regrouping operations, to raise the technological level 
of the various partners and to widen their market. 
In most European manufacturing countries, the central authorities provide 
large-scale support, but in varying degrees and in ways that are not always the 
same, for the development and production of aeronautical equipment. Such 
diversity is in itself liable to affect competition and trade in this industry. More-
over, the maintenance of purely national aid schemes will contribute, unless 
they are properly coordinated in design and implementation, to the fragmenta-
tion of industrial structures and of the market in the Community, while dis-
couraging firms from cooperation or hampering the execution of the programmes 
coming under cooperation. Though still indispensable, national aids are there-
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fore likely to have distorting effects jeopardizing the positive results planned. 
The establishment of a harmonized framework under which such aids are 
granted could on the other hand enhance their effectiveness and encourage the 
development of cooperation. 
The Commission's aim is to eliminate such disadvantages by defining 
which national aids the transnational civil aircraft production programmes 
executed in the Community should qualify for, i.e. the programmes executed by 
associated or multinational companies operating in two or more Member States 
and within which each of the cooperating parties assumes a share of the techni-
cal, industrial and commercial risks of the full project. 
102. The Commission believes that aids should, first and foremost facilitate 
the implementation of such programmes and be mainly concentrated on 
research and development and investment. 
Rand D aids should consist in advance credits of up to the total amount 
of the Rand D costs and be reimbursable from the yield on sales when the 
aircraft are marketed. Rand D costs should be taken to include all expenditure 
-including expenditure on initial production pooling-occasioned by the imple-
mentation of the programmes up to flight worthiness certification (construction 
of prototypes and tests). 
To facilitate for the aircraft constructors investment for production series, 
guarantees of the loans contracted by the firms to finance the relevant investment 
could be provided. 
Within each cooperation programme, aids should be so devised that each 
cooperating party shares, in balanced conditions, by obtaining equivalent 
benefits from the public authorities of its country. The prospects of successful 
cooperation would thus be enhanced and competition problems would be solved 
at the same time. 
In addition, in view of the way the aids are designed, the intervention of the 
authorities would be of a supplementary nature only, leaving maximum respon-
sibility in the hands of the manufacturers. It should, moreover, be scaled down 
as Community manufacturers are gradually in a better position to cope with 
their competitors. 
103. The Commission has further noted that serious financial problems also 
arise at the marketing stage, whether the problem is that of providing all poten-
tial customers with credit terms matching those offered by competitors in 
non-member countries or that of maintaining firm prices despite abnormal 
upward movements engendered by production cost increases or alterations in 
exchange rate. 
There is no denying the fact that manufacturers in certain non-member 
countries receive direct aids, in the form of very favourable credit terms, for 
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their sales abroad, and can thus offer financing terms well below the lowest 
rates in the Community. At the same time, because of the suspension of the 
Common Customs Tariff duties, manufacturers established in the Community 
face the same conditions for sales in the Common Market as for those on exter-
nal markets and have a less favourable position than that enjoyed by producers 
in certain non-member countries, although these enjoy a dominant position on 
their own domestic markets. 
The attention of the Commission has also been drawn by European in-
dustry to difficulties encountered because of the disparities between, or the 
absence of, guarantees provided by the Member States against the dangers of 
abnormal upward movements in prime costs or against exchange tisks. The 
difficulties are particularly troublesome in the aircraft production industry 
because the production cycle is so long, the markets are so big and manufac-
turers must propose firm sales prices five or six years in advance. They are also 
apparent in relations between firms cooperating on the same programme, since 
the relations between cooperating parties can be markedly disturbed by price 
exchange rate variations. 
Accordingly, the Commission has taken the view that it should make an 
exception to the general principles precluding aids to production and export 
aids in intra-Community relations. On the basis of Article 92(3) (b) of the EEC 
Treaty, under which "aid to promote the execution of an important project of 
common European interest" can be considered compatible with the Common 
Market, it has therefore empowered the Member States to grant aid for the 
marketing of aircraft and aircraft parts within the Community, provided that: 
(a) Such aids apply to sales of civil aircraft manufactured under European 
transnational programmes; 
(b) Such aids constitute a joint and harmonized support provided by the 
Governments concerned to the programme; 
(c) Their purpose is to place Community manufacturers in a situation as 
favourable as that enjoyed by competitors in non-member countries; 
(d) The programmes concerned can be considered as important for the com-
mon interest from the angle of the development of the European aero-
nautical industry or of air transport in the Community. 
These marketing aids may consist in assistance for the supplier or purchaser 
taking the form of: 
(i) long-term credit with or without interest rebates; 
(ii) insurance against the commercial risk; 
(iii) guarantees against exchange fluctuations or, where circumstances so 
require, guarantees against abnormal and unforeseeable upward costs 
movements during the period between the conclusion of the contract and 
the delivery of the aircraft . 
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It goes without saying, nonetheless; that the Commission will pronounce 
case by case under the procedures provided for this purpose by the Treaty on 
the compatibility of such aids with the Common Market. 
Electronic data processing 
104. This is an industry of great importance to the Community, because: 
(a) of the role it plays in industrial,activity and of its rapid growth both of the 
hardware side and in respect of operations connected with the preparation 
of software and with leasing; . 
(b) of its effects in boosting other industries, particularly electronics; 
(c) of the more and more common incorporation of numerically controlled 
tools in the engineering industry and of the construction of complete 
production command units using computers; 
(d) of the applied research such an industry induces; 
(e) of the fact that the development of the use of electronic data processing 
allows for better employment of the production factors, more efficient 
corporate management, rationalization of public services and the de-
velopment of scientific research. 
For all these reasons the Community industry must be able to compete 
on the world market. 
105. However, European manufacturers attempting to find a place on this 
market, which is very much dominated by non-member country companies, 
are hampered not only by technological backwardness but also by the lack of 
funds. A hardware manufacturing firm providing a wide enough range of 
computers is profitable only beginning from a certain output figure. In the 
meanwhile, for a period which could well last for ten years, it must tie up the 
large amounts of capital which a continuous research and development effort, 
hardware production investment, the preparation of software 1ibraries and the 
constitution of a range of computers for rental all require. 
Consequently, the granting of State aids may be justified in this context 
and may help to solve the difficulties encountered by the firms concerned in 
their attempts to mobilize private capital. However, although it is true that 
national aids can provide proper support for the operations of Community 
firms, they must not help to maintain fragmentation of the structures of the 
European industry, since only grouping operations would enable it to solve the 
current problems. The Commission must therefore regret that the measures 
adopted by the countries are not fitted more carefully into a Community 
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framework which would enable the human, financial and scientific resources 
mobilized-which are necessarily limited-to be used more rationally and more 
effectively. It is aware of the need to develop a genuine Community approach 
to the problems of the industry and it is now working on such an approach. 
106. In this context, the Commission has endorsed two national aid schemes 
in the electronic data processing industry. 
In France, the Government signed a new agreement in 1971 with the 
Compagnie internationale pour l'informatique (CIl), a private firm, which 
includes a number of assistance measures for the 1971-75 period. What the 
French Government is trying to do is to develop a production potential which 
is competitive at international level and is independent of the non-member 
countries' groups. This does not preclude closer relations with other European 
firms, and practical progress has recently been made along these lines. The 
assistance to the cn consists in: 
(a) the financing of survey contracts in an amount of FF 150 million per year 
of interest-free credit reimbursable only if the venture succeeds; part of 
these contracts will go to the CII's software divisions, the other French 
firms belonging to this branch of the industry qualifying for the loans 
reimbursable in case of success provided for by the French research and 
development aid scheme, which has more general scope; 
(b) Five-year credits from the economic and social development fund at low 
interest rates, to help the cn to finance its industrial immobilizations; 
the ceiling has been set at FF 40 million per year; 
(c) Preferential access to public contracts whenever cn equipment is com-
petitive in technical and economic terms. 
The Commission has called upon the French Government to discontinue 
this last practice, finding it incompatible with the principles of the Treaty re-
lating to free movement of goods and services and to freedom of establishment. 
In Germany, the second "Datenverarbeitungsprogramm" (2 DV Pro-
gramme) will make DM 800 million available in credits over the same 1971-75 
period, for assistance going well beyond industrial framework, since education 
and the use of computers in medicine and the public administrative services 
are also included. 
The German Government's objectives are as follows: 
(a) Fuller and wider application of EDP in the economic and scientific field 
as an instrument for rationalization and improved productivity; 
(b) Mastery of one of the most significant key technologies; 
(c) Establishment of more balanced competitive conditions on a rapidly 
expanding EDP market which is dominated by firms from non-member 
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countries which have benefited at home from major development and 
procurement contracts let by the authorities. 
The aids to the specifically industrial EDP sector will take the form of: 
(a) Subsidies to long-term research and development work up to 50% of cost; 
(b) Credits reimbursable in case of success for development work of more 
direct relevance to production and the market, such credits to cover up to 
25 to 35% of costs; 
(c) Subsidies to the development of software, utilization ranging up to 40% 
of cost. 
The aids will be granted on condition that the bulk of the production or 
research operations of the applicant firm is carried out in Germany, but this 
does not bar German subsidiaries of firms having their head offices in other 
Community Member States. 
Films 
107. The First Report on Competition Policyl outlined the problems in this 
industry and the action the Commission had taken with regard to aids with the 
twofold objective of eliminating certain distortions of competition and of 
conferring on the Community film industry structures enabling it to draw more 
benefit from the European scale of activity. These measures led to a closer 
alignment of Government intervention, in respect both of rates and methods, 
and some measure of entitlement to the benefit of the aids accorded by one 
Member State to the work being carried out in the other Member State. 
In view of the progress already made and the prospects offered by the 
enlargement of the Community, the Community film industry should now aim: 
(a) at establishing firmer bases by stepping up financing resources for the 
production of feature films; 
(b) improving the profitability of its productions by extending their com-
mercial distribution beyond the national frontiers throughout the whole 
Community. 
As a contribution to the achievement of these two objectives, the Com-
mission examined with the Member States, on the basis of the proposals it had 
already made with regard to blanket availability of all national aids to all 
Community productions, the possibility that open access should be granted for 
feature films: 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sees. 174 and 175. 
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(a) produced with the financial coparticipation of the producers of more than 
one Member State; 
(b) and which would be assured, within the framework of the distribution 
contracts, of marketing throughout the Common Market. 
The producers would thus be encouraged to enlarge both their sources of 
finance and their market prospects. 
A id systems financed from quasi-flscal charges 
108. Implementing its general policy standpoint, l confirmed by the Court of 
Justice on 25 June 1970, that the financing of national aids by the Member 
States from the yield on quasi-fiscal charges levied not only on domestic items 
but also on those imported from other Member States is incompatible with 
the Common Market, the Commission has stated its views on several aid 
systems financed from such charges. 
The Commission raised no objection to the implementation of some of 
these systems, since they are financed from charges from which items imported 
from other Member States are exempt, while the aids they provide for are 
likely to encourage the reorganization of the industries concerned. This was 
the case for certain French aids to the furnishing and footwear industry. 
The limited credits appropriated (10 million FF for four years and -S million 
FF for three years respectively) will be provided by a charge levied only on 
domestic products. They will serve to finance the renovation of industrial struc-
tures and the promotion of sales and economic or social survey work. 
In several other cases, however, the Commission challenged the compat-
ibility of the aid systems, objecting in some cases solely to the financing 
method and in other cases to the financing method and other procedures. 
109. In France "occupational technical centres" in certain industries such as 
clocks and watches and hides and leather help the firms in the industries, 
in the form of technical assistance, technical research and standardization. 
Some of the financial resources of these centres derive from the levying of 
a quasi-fiscal charge on sales in France of the products of these industries, 
whether they are manufactured in the country or imported from abroad. 
While the assistance provided to the national industries by these occupa-
tional technical centres does not take the form of direct aids to firms, its objec-
tive and effect are nonetheless to improve competitive capacity by relieving 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sees. 181 to 183. 
96 REP. COMPo 1972 
the firms of certain tasks, including applied research, which they would normally 
have to assume and which they would not be in a position to carry out or which 
would represent appreciable costs. Consequently, this assistance constitutes 
State aids liable to affect trade and competition in the meaning of the EEC 
Treaty, and can be considered compatible with the Common Market only if 
the quasi-fiscal charges entailed are no longer levied on items imported from 
the other Member States. 
The Commission has therefore made representations to the French 
Governme"nt, but the latter has argued in response that the work of the occupa-
tional centres could not be regarded as aids to French firms, since the results 
of the work carried out is accessible to all Community firms on a non-discrimi-
natory basis. 
The Commission felt, however, that it· could not change its position. 
In the first place, firms from other Member States seldom have resource to 
the French centres, since they already dispose, at national level, of similar 
agencies which they finance themselves. Secondly, the work of the French 
centres is normally concerned with areas related to the specific needs of French 
finns and therefore not necessarily corresponding to the needs of other Com-
:inunity firms. This means that the other Community firms, when paying the 
charge to which their products are subject when imported into France, are 
bearing a burden which does not have the same counterpart as it d@es for 
the French firms. The Commission therefore initiated the procedure of Article 
93(2) in respect of the aid schemes constituted by these centres. 
110. In Italy the Ente Nazionale per la Cellulosa e la Carta (ENCC), a semi-
governmental agency, provides support to newspapers in the form of a bonus 
calculated from the quantities of paper they use to print daily papers and 
reviews in Italy; paper imported directly from abroad without going through 
the ENCC is, however, not counted for the calculation of the bonus. 
The aim of this arrangement, which is part of an information policy, 
is to use .the aids to facilitate the dissemination of the Italian press~ The ENCC 
also grants aid for paper" and" forestry research and for reafforestation. All 
these aids are financed by the yield from two quasi-fiscal charges, one of which 
is levied on paper and cardboard and the other chemical pulp consumed in 
Italy, whether these products are produced there or imported. 
The aids to the press are liable to affect intra-Community trade and 
competition, since "they enable Italian firms to obtain supplies on favourable 
terms, while a major percentage of intra-Community trade in newspapers 
and periodicals is accounted for by Italian exports to France (50% in 1970) 
of newspapers and periodicals printed in Italy, often in French. The Com-
mission tooK the view that aids to paper and forestry research and to reaffores-
tation could have the same effect. 
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Accordingly, the Commission took the following position as part of the 
procedure it had opened against this aid scheme in accordance with Article 
93(2) of the EEC Treaty: 
In the first place, relying on the principles recalled above, it asked the 
Italian Government to provide that the quasi-fiscal charges used to finance 
ENCC aids should no longer be levied on paper, cardboard and paper pulp 
imported from the other Member States. 
It also requested that paper imported directly from the other Member 
States by Italian newspaper firms, without going through the ENCC, should 
from now on be counted for the calculation of the bonuses to be paid to the press, 
the exclusion of this paper is not justified in relation with the objectives of 
this aid, which is to support the Italian press and to improve the flow of infor-
mation in Italy. Indeed, it hampers achievement of this objective by curtailing 
competition between the suppliers of printing firms, while having a protective 
effect for Italian newsprint producers. 
The Commission also took the view that the payment of the bonus for 
the printing in Italy of newspapers and periodicals in other Community 
languages was out of line with the objective of providing a better flow of 
information in Italy. 
On the other hand, the Commission accepted that the reafforestation aids 
are compatible with the Common Market, since the levying of a quasi-fiscal 
charge is not liable, in this instance, to increase the impact of ,the aids on com-
petition and trade, since the link between the items taxed and the items assisted 
is very indirect. 
111. In April 1968 the French Government notified the Commission of a new 
aid scheme for the paper pulp industry. This scheme was to supersede aid 
measures from which this industry had already benefited between 1960 and 
1968, and which the Council of Ministers had declared compatible with the 
Common Market, on the basis of Article 93(2), third sentence, of the EEC 
Treaty.1 The intention of the Council was to take account of the adaptation 
problems which the French industry had to face because of tariff cuts following 
the introduction of the Common External Tariff or to be expected from the 
Kennedy Round. 
The aids under this scheme are of several kinds: paper pulp production 
bonuses, aids for research into paper in an occupational technical centre, 
1 Under this provision "on application by a Member State, the Council, may, acting unanim-
ously, decide that aid which that State is granting or intends to grant shall be considered 
to be compatible with the Common Market, in derogation from the provisions of 
Article 92 ...... 
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investment aids designed to curb pollution and protect the environment, 
forestry and reafforestation research aids. They were to be financed from a 
quasi-fiscal charge levied on all paper and cardboard consumed in France, 
whether imported or not. 
The Commission initiated the procedure of Article 93(2) against this 
scheme for two main reasons. The first was the method of financing the aids, 
and the second was the paper pulp production aids themselves; the latter, 
calculated in relation to the quantities and types of pulp produced by each 
firm were subject neither to an adequate scaling down coefficient nor linked 
with specific commitments· by the beneficiary firms as to the rationalization 
of their structures. They were therefore not likely to provide an effective incen-
tive to these firms to carry out necessary adaptation and were purely operating 
aids to which the Commission is opposed in principle. 1 
After talks with the French authorities, which led the latter to discontinue 
the granting of production bonuses from 1 January 1971 onwards, the Com-
mission eventually closed the procedure opened in 1968 by adopting a final 
decision in December 19722 relating to the scheme in question. The effect of 
this decision is that: 
(a) The French Government must not resume payment of the paper pulp 
production bonuses, since these aids do not qualify from any of the 
derogations provided fOI in the Treaty with regard to incompatible aids; 
(b) While aids to paper research and aids to the protection of the environment 
and the reduction of pollution are liable to affect intra-Community trade 
and competition and while, nevertheless, they can be regarded as likely 
to facilitate the development of the industry concerned without distorting 
trade to a degree conflicting with the common interest, they cannot be 
financed through the levying of a quasi-fiscal charge on paper and card-
board imported from the other Member States. 
4. Export aids 
II2. The Commission has consistently maintained that export aids are in-
compatible in intra-Community relations with the general principles of the 
Common Market, and particularly with that of free movement. There can be 
no exception to this rule. The Commission's position has been affirmed on 
many occasions without distinction as to the form, degree or motivation, 
regional or otherwise, of the aids concerned; the Commission has thus de-
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 165, second indent. 
2 OJ No L 297, 30 December 1972. 
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manded that a number of export aid schemes be discontinued in Community 
relations. 1 
113. In 1972, the Commission received complaints which led it to study a 
French fiscal measure. Under Article 39(viii) of the General Tax Code, and 
further to the amendment of this article made by Article 34 of Law No 65-566 
of 12 July 1965, French firms and groups may, with the approval of the Ministry 
of Economic imd Financial 'Affairs, definitively deduct from their taxable 
profits in France certain operating expenditures and costs relating to sales 
establishments, survey offices or information offices, industrial establishments 
and construction sites they set up abroad, for the first three financial years. 
This tax concession is not justified since French firms can make this 
deduction although the incomes of the establishments concerned are taxable 
not in France but abroad, where the operating costs of the establishments 
have already been counted, from the tax point of view, before determination 
of the taxable income. The result is the possibility of double deduction of costs 
which has, effects similar to those of a non-reimbursable bonus subsidizing 
the setting up of establishments abroad. The bonus, which facilitates goods 
and services export operations or the establishment of French firms in other 
Member States, constitutes an aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of 
the EEC Treaty. 
This aid also conflicts with the general principle applying in matters of 
right of establishment that Member States must refrain from facilitating through 
aids the establishment of their nationals in other Member States. Moreover, 
there is no way of calculating the size of the tax concession beforehand. As it 
can be granted to large firms as well as to small- and medium-sized ones, 
it may invoive quite large sums. Lastly, the approval procedure enables the 
authorities to encourage only certain firms and, by the same token, certain 
production branches only. This enables the authorities to influence the indus-
trial pattern of the establishments set up abroad by French firms. 
114. The Commission therefore decided to open the procedure under Article 
93(2) of the EEC Treaty against the application of the measure in question in 
intra-Community relations, in which it had enabled the authorities to facilitate, 
in certain industries; the establishment of French firms on the markets of the 
other Member States . 
. In June 1972 the French Government informed the Commission that this 
fiscal measure would be discontinued and that, for this purpose, it was laying 
before Parliament a measure to harmciriize the provisio'ns' challenged with 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sees. 187 and 189. 
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the Treaty rules. The abovementioned tax concessions were to be abolished 
and replaced by a scheme fOl carrying forward losses; this is the right granted 
to French firms to constitute, tax-free, a reserve of the same: amount as the 
losses suffered in the first five years of-operation of their establishments or sub-
sidiaries abroad. The reserves deducted would be carried, forward, in 'equal 
fraction~, against, the taxable profits of the five consecutive fil).ancial, years 
from the sixth onwards. From the angle of competition, such a rule allowing 
losses to be carried forward IS neutral and consequently would entail no 
objection under the Treaty. ' , ' 
The Commission had not yet seen the measure amending the law chal-
lenged and is therefore not yet in a position ~o close ,the procedure opened 
under Article 93(2) EEC. ' 
5. New areas of action 
115. The Commission is aware that the progress made in the coordination of 
regional aids and aids for individual industries would, lose much of its value 
if other forms of intervention which can be used by the States for the same 
purposes still escaped its control: if this w,ere so, the national, authorities 
might be tempted to replace regional or individual industry aids by such 
interventions, where they intend to provide support to industrial firms. The 
Commission has therefore acted in new fields: that of," general': aid schemes 
and that of the temporary acquisitions of holdil)gs: by the authorities in firms. 
" General aid" schemes 
116. In addition to "individual industry" or "regional" aid schemes, there 
are, others knowp as" general: aid" schemes in the Member States! because, 
under the discretionary powers conferred on the comPeten~ national authoritie~, 
the relevant aids. can be provided to assist industrial investment whatever the 
location or the business of the firriis 'copcerned. These schemes, which can 
have an important influence because of tIielarge '~ums involved, usually have 
one of the following objectives: "general economic growth", "modernization 
of the national economy", "restructuring of firins beset by adaptation diffi~ 
culties". ' ' , 
I ' 
These schemes are not in 'line with Co~mu:p.ity aid requireme,nts, for three 
main reasons: 
1 First 'Report on Competition Policy, sec. 164, third para'graph. 
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(a) Legally, because they have no specific relationship to given industries or 
given regions and cannot normally qualify for the derogations from the 
aid incompatibility rule provided for in Article 92(3) of the EEC Treaty 
for aids designed to help the development of "certain" activities or 
"certain" regions, 
(b) Secondly, the Commission has no means of assessing their impact on 
competition and trade: it has no way of determining, on an examination 
of the rules governing the scheme in question, what areas or industries 
benefit from the aids, nor is it informed, at least a priori, as to when, 
where or to what industry the aids are granted, 
(c) In addition, these aids can jeopardize the Community arrangements 
gradually worked out for national aids which have definite specific 
objectives in respect of given industries or regions. Although they can be 
used to help to further any of these objectives, they nonetheless do not 
come under the arrangements, 
(d) Lastly, whereas a Member State wishing to establish an aid scheme with 
a specific individual industry or regional objective is subject to the pro-
cedures provided for in Article 93 of the EEC Treaty, another Member 
State, using a general aid scheme, can pursue the same work under cover 
of this scheme while escaping the Treaty plOvisions, the result being an 
unjustifiable discrepancy in treatment. 
117. Full application of the Treaty and of the Community principles with 
regard to aids implies that the Commission should demand· the abolition of 
these schemes in their present form, though the Member States could, as 
appropriate, replace them with other schemes specifying the objectives. with 
regard to particular industries or regions. It must not, however, be forgotten 
that the Member States may need to possess facilities enabling them to inter-
vene in economic activity as soon as this becomes necessary, and without 
being bound in advance to respect certain limits as to specific industry or to 
specific geographic areas. . 
To reconcile this necessity felt by the Member States with Community 
requirements with regard to aids, the Commission has taken the view that 
the best solution would consist in allowing the schemes to continue provided 
the Member States apply them henceforward under programmes having an 
individual industry or regional nature in line with Treaty requirements as 
to the specific character of aids. These programmes would be defined gradually 
as needs emerged, and submitted in advance to the Commission. Should certain 
Member States feel that they could not undertake a breakdown of general aids 
in relation with specific industries or specific regions, other solutions would 
have to be found. These could well consist, for example, in prior submission 
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to the Commission of the concrete cases of implementation of the aids which 
appear most significant. 
The two alternatives (submission of implementing programmes or of 
significant practical cases) have equivalent merits when viewed from the 
standpoint of Treaty requirements, since they would both enable the Com-
mission to assess the impact of the aids on competition and trade. However, 
the" implementing programme" approach would be certainly easier to apply 
from the political and practical points of view and more rational from the 
economic point of view-it is already used by certain Member States for the 
administration of their general aids. 
118. Recently, the Commission has achieved acceptance of this principle in 
respect of several general aid schemes: 
(a) Either by challenging the compatibility of the aid scheme itself, as in its 
decision 72/34 EEC, of 15 December 1971,1 discontinuing conservation 
aids granted by Belgium to firms in difficulties. In this decision, the Com-
mission stressed that' merely because these aids can be applied to all 
economic activities and throughout· Belgium, these aids cannot qualify 
for one of the derogations from the incompatibility rule, 
(b) Or in that it has made the effective granting of aids provided for in such 
a scheme subject to the submission of the individual industry programmes 
or of the individual significant cases of application. This was the position 
it took, in its Decision 72/173 EEC,2 of 26 April 1972, in respect of aids, 
which the Belgian Law of 30 December 1970 on economic growth provides 
for, in addition to regional aids, for" achievements in individual industries 
or technological achievements of special interest" (Article 5 of the Law). 
119. For the same reasons, ~e Commission opened the procedure of Article 
93(2) in respect of: 
(a) Aids provided for in Article 9 of the Italian draft law No. 231/72. Apart 
from certain changes to the social benefits granted to workers dismissed 
or placed on short time, and on which the Commission natUlally could 
only look with favour, the draft also provides, in Article 9, that benefits, 
in the shape of tax exemptions or low-interest credits, can be granted to 
encourage the restructuring of certain firms, without specifying any 
geographic or individual-industry scope, 
(b) . The scheme under which loans on preferential terms-mainly in respect 
of interest rates, duration and reimbursement requirements-are granted 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 186. 
a Sec. 90. 
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in France to encourage "the conversion, the adaptation, the specialization 
and the concentration of industrial undertakings". The loans are granted 
through the Economic and Social Development Fund (FDES) either to 
facilitate the achievement of the industrial objectives set out in the mod-
ernization and equipment Plans or to enable specific industrial modern-
ization operations to be implemented. These involve hundreds of millions 
of French francs annually. 
In opening these procedures, the Commission does not wish to see the 
schemes abolished but to require the Member States to submit in advance, 
as indicated above, either-and preferably-the practical implementing pro-
grammes under which the aids will be applied, or significant cases of application. 
Similar aid schemes exist in other original or new Member States; in due 
course the Commission will take identical action on these. 
120. The Commission's position of principle does not, however, preclude in 
certain exceptional circumstances, the acceptance of general aids for very 
short periods, provided that, as laid down in Article 92(3)(b), the aim is to 
remedy serious disturbances occurring in the economy of a Member Sta~e. 
For example, in July 1971, the Italian Government adopted a series of 
decree laws as emergency measures to· deal with the serious difficulties then 
besetting the national economy (decline of activity, increasing unemployment, 
slowdown in investment) .. The measures taken were of three kinds: 
(i) Increase in financial endowments for the implementation of various 
existing aid schemes under which credit facilities could be granted to 
f4ms. The Commission made no objection to these measures; 
(ii) Very appreciable increase and extension until 1980 of the abatement of 
welfare charges paid by small craft and industrial firms in the South of 
Italy. As these are large-scale operating aids, the Commission could not 
approve them as compatible with the Common Market, but the problems 
they raise will be solved subsequently as part of work relating to the 
search for an appropriate solution for the coordination of regional 
aids granted in the peripheral areas of the Communityl ; 
(iii) Institution of a temporary (one year) abatement and partial abatement 
(exemption in respect of 5% of remunerations subject to unemployment 
insurance contribution) of welfare charges, for crafts firms and small-
and medium-sized industrial firms and for all textile firms, the abatement 
to apply throughout Italy. 
The Commission, having due regard to the special situation in Italy, 
took the view that this last category of benefits, given their short duration, 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 147. 
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could be considered compatible with the Common Market, since they were 
likely to help remedy a "grave disturbance" to the economy, and to boost 
activity. The Commission stated, however, it could not allow the systematic 
use of operating aids to combat temporary business situations, which must be 
handled by overall economic policy instruments. It therefore informed the 
Italian Government, that saving exceptional circumstances, an extension of 
this form of aid beyond the one-year period set, could not be accepted and 
that in no circumstances could such an extension be granted to the textile 
industry, for which the Community framework arrangement for- textile aids1 
had forbidden all operating aids. ' 
Nonetheless, without informing the Commission in advance, - Italy 
extended unti130 June 1973, by decree of 1 July 1972, the abatement in welfare 
charges. Since the business recovery had not met forecasts, the'Commission 
accepted this extension. 'It did not accept, however; the implementing methodS 
for the abatement peculiar to the textile industry;2 
12/ In Decision 72/261, adopted on 28 June 1972,3 'the ,Commission also 
stated its position on the aids established by Italian Law No. 471 of 14 July 1969. 
These aids consist in low interest credits for the import--'-by industrial under~ 
takings as well as agencies of public interest-of. scientific instruments and 
sophisticated technology apparatus, where such_ items are ~ot ma~ufactured 
in Italy. 
, In 1971 ~he Commission had initiated, the procedure of Article 93(2) 
against this arrangement, making a distinction between aid,s given to agencies 
engaged in research ona non-profit making basis (universities- for example) 
and to firms. Only in the latter c~seare the aids caught by" Arti~le 97(1) of 
the Treaty. By favouring Italian"industry taken as a whole 'ip comparison 
with the other industries' of the Com~on Market n9t _ qualifying for such 
benefits for th~ir eqtiipm~nt, the aids_ distort' competition and affect trade 
in industrial goods manufactured with -this equipment. They are also of a 
general n-ature, since there are no rules ,as to region or'as to 'specific -iiidustry 
governing their grant. -
I_n its final decision, the Commission's position ,was not the same for 
items whose import was facilitated but which were- intended for research 
enterprises as it was for items intended for utilization inthe production process 
.of the firms. In the first case, the _Commission, which has adopted a favourable 
attitude to aids designed to facilitate research and develppm~pJ. ;work, autho-
1 First Report on _Competition Policy, sec. 172, 
2 Sec. 98. --
3 GJNo. L 166, 24 July 1972, p. 12. -,-
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rized the maintenance of the aids. In the second case, it ruled that they must 
be discontinued. 
Temporary official acquisitions of corporate capital by the State 
122. When it was examining Italian Law No. 184 of 22 March 1971, providing 
for Government intervention "to encourage the restructuring and the con-
version of certain industrial undertakings", the Commission had an opportunity 
to define its position on the work of certain financial agencies set up by the 
Member States with direct or indirect Government financial support, to make 
temporary acquisitions of capital in firms facing problems of various kinds: 
for example, firms whose failure to adapt to changing conditions is jeopar-
dizing their future, and dynamic firms suffering from" growth pains". 
In the law in question, the Italian Government thought to facilitate the 
restructuring, reorganization and conversion of industrial undertakings 
suffering from adaptation or management difficulties. With a view to the 
maintenance of employment, the policy goal was, in particular, to provide a 
remedy to the financial difficulties of small- and medium-sized undertakings 
which had suffered from the difficulties besetting the Italian economy since 
1970. There were two kinds of measure: 
(i) The Instituto Mobiliare Italiano (IMI) was to facilitate the implementation 
of restructuring programmes for the modernization or the merger of 
industrial undertakings or groups of undertakings. The IMI contribu-
tions-from a Lit 40 000 million revolving fund provided by the central 
government-may take the form either of preferential credits for these 
programmes (whether for new investment, the adjustment of commercial 
structures, the acquisition of production units of existing firms or the 
purchases of holdings in such firms) or temporary purchases of holdings 
by the IMI in the firms concerned; 
(ii) Measures-entrusted to a new financial company, the GEPI (Gestione e 
Participazioni Industriali) set up by various semi-public groups (IRI, 
ENI, IMI, EFIM)---designed to help by reorganization or conversion 
plans, to put on a sound footing industrial undertakings facing temporary 
finance or management difficulties. For this purpose, thanks to a financial 
grant from the central government-originally Lit. 60 000 million, 
raised subsequently to Lit 111 000 million-the GEPI will be able to 
acquire under the instructions of the Interministerial Committee for 
Economic Planning (CIPE) temporary holdings in companies and grant 
credit, with or without reduced interest rates. 
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In assessing this, the Commission distinguished between IMI and GEPI 
intervention in the form of temporary holdings and intervention in the shape 
of preferential credit. 
123. On the question of preferential credit, it noted that such credit was of 
general scope and could be granted to encourage investment by firms com-
pletely irrespective of their location or of the industry to which they belong. 
These are therefore general aids, and the Commission ought to have considered 
them incompatible with the Common Market, saving prior supervision of 
their application either by a study of practical cases, or of the programmes 
setting out the objectives for which the aids were granted.! Nevertheless, 
the Commission felt that it should take account of the general context of 
the Italian economy underlying the Government's decisions. The small-
and medium-sized undertakings which receive these credits on a priority 
basis face structural difficulties which have become harder to cope with since 
the business slowdown at the end of 1970 and an increase in wage costs which 
in some cases has proved hard to finance. These factors have made necessary 
restructuring operations more difficult to carry out (from the financing point 
of view) at a time when certain strains were already discouraging firms from 
embarking on new capital ventures. Without assistance from the central 
authorities to help them carry out reorganization operations, the firms con-
cerned might have been forced to scale down operations or even, in some cases, 
to close down altogether; this would have been bound to worsen further an 
economic and social climate which is already unfavourable. 
In view of this situation, the Commission ruled, in line with previous 
rulings concerning other Italian measures to encourage activity,2 that the 
measures in question could be considered as designed "to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State" and that it could therefore 
rule them compatible with the Common Market, as provided for in Article 
92(3)(b) of the Treaty; this ruling was for a period of one year, expiring in 
April 1973, since the aim is to cope with essentially transitional difficulties 
which should disappear once the economic recovery expected is under way. 
124. On the question of acquisitions of temporary holdings by IMI and 
GEPI in certain firms, the Commission took the view that the principle of 
neutrality set out by the EEC Treaty (Article 222) with regard to ownership 
arrangements in the Member States prevents the latter from using their power 
to intervene in the ownership of production facilities to take measures which, 
if other intervention techniques were used, would be incompatible with Ar-
1 Sees. 1'16 and 119. 
~ Sec. 122. 
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ticle 92 et seq., since these distort intra-Community competition and trade. 
Any other interpretation would entail unacceptable discrimination between 
Member States or between the differing measures adopted by the same Member 
State, but in fact having the same objectives. 
But it was not necessary to consider all the aspects of what is known as 
State capitalism. In certain cases (establishment by a central government 
of new undertakings, acquisition of non-precarious holdings in firms already 
existing or to be set up in association with private interests), the central govern-
ment normally assumes the role of entrepreneur or venture capital investor. 
Although the official measure is normally dictated by exigencies going beyond 
the profit motive, this factor is inherent in the public ownership, the existence 
and the special nature of which is confirmed by Article 222, and it could not 
be used alone to justify the bringing into play of the Treaty rules on aids. 
This is not the case, however, where the central authority, through 
financial agencies it sets up at its initiative and with its financial support, 
confines itself to the acquisition in certain firms of holdings which by their 
special nature (e.g. duration, purpose, terms) show clearly what the aim of 
the acquisition is to help the firms until such time as they will have overcome 
temporary difficulties. In addition, certain industrial or regional priorities 
are often assigned to the agencies in question. Lastly, from the point of view 
of the beneficiary firms, the holdings are an advantage which may range from 
a mere improvement in their credit to the obtaining of new financial resources 
not to be come by elsewhere. 
Because of this similarity (both in respect of the objectives aimed at by 
the central authority and in respect of the interest of the beneficiary firms) 
with other official measures which have always been regarded as constituting 
aids within the meaning of the EEC Treaty, the work of these agencies must 
also be considered in the light of the Treaty rules, in so far as it is liable to 
affect intra-Community trade and competition. This does not mean, however, 
that their work is necessarily and automatically to be treated as that of an aid 
scheme. Generally only the actual working of the agencies considered brings 
out aid effects, discernable on the basis of concordant evidence, such as, for 
example: 
(a) that the acquisitions of holdings are used as an alternative to or a factor 
strengthening traditional forms; 
(b) that they are provided for firms in liquidation which would disappear 
from the market without such assistance; 
(c) or, lastly, that the purchases of holdings do not ensure normal remunera-
tion of the capital committed or that they are eventually sold to the 
partners falling short of the acquisition price. . 
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Only post/acto knowledge of the actual work of the agencies can therefore 
enable the Commission to determine whether the acquisitions do in fact have 
the effect of aids and only then will it be in a position, if necessary, to stipulate 
conditions and limits in respect of the future activities of the agencies. 
In the light of the foregoing, the Commission ruled, under arrangements 
for the continuous monitoring of State aids carried out under Article 93(1), 
that the Italian Government should submit regular reports showing, with 
regard to IMI arid GEPI acquisitions of holdings: 
(a) the firms having be~efited fr~m intervention, their location an'd the 
industry to which they belong, their economic and financial situation 
at the time of the purchase and the terms on which this was made; 
(b) the manner in which IMI and GEPI acquisitions were eventually liqui-
dated and the development of the financial situations of the firms con-
cerned during the period of the IMI and GEPI holdings; any other ad-
vantages the firms may have gained elsewhere from the public influence 
of IMI and GEPI. 
125. It goes without saying that the Commission had to make the same stipu-
lations in respect of similar financial' agencies in other Member ,States. The 
stipulations 'were stressed in respect of: , 
(a) The "Institu! de developpement industlielle (IDI)" fOl: France; the IDI 
is ,a private-law financial establishment 39.1 % of whose capital (FP'333 
million) is held by the State itself and 54.6% by'various ~emi~p~blic 
financial establishments. 
Its task is to "encourage the increase in the glowth rate of ,the French 
, economy by, contri1:mting, through temporary intervention, to strength-
ening the financial basis of firms lacking own funds". While it helps 
only firms which have a reasonably secure profitability outlook, the IDI 
must also take into account the Government's priority 'requirements in 
the choice of areas or regions or industries in which it intervenes;" , 
(b) The Societe Nationale d'investissement (SNI) for Belgium; the SNI's 
capital (BFrs 3500 million) is held by the State (37.7%) arid by various 
semi-public financial establishments (45.7%); its objective is to encourage, 
in the interests of the Belgian economy, the establishmerit, organization 
Of extension of industrial or commercial undertakings by pursuing the 
following aims: to reorientate, the national economy towards industries 
with sophisticated technology and a high risk rate which discourage 
private investors, and to facilitate the financing through own resources 
of small- and medium-sized firms; 
(c) The Friulia. This is a financial company set up in 1966 by the autonomous 
region of Friuli-Venezia-Giulia. Its aim is to use temporary acquisitions 
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of holdings in firms, with, as appropriate, other benefits, to facilitate 
the industrial development of the region. The region set up special 
funds in 1970 to cover losses incurred by the company through its opera-
tions. Considering, therefore, that the machinery could be used to keep 
alive non-competitive firms having no sufficient prospect of sound reor-
ganization, the Commission opened the procedure under Article 93(2) 
of the EEC Treaty and stipulated as conditions for the continuation of 
intervention by the Friulia not only the submission of reports on its 
operations but also that the Friulia should discontinue salvage operations. 
SECTION 2 
APPLICATION OF THE ECSC TREATY TO STATE AIDS 
TO THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES 
126. Because of the inadequate information provided by certain Member 
States on aids granted in the past to their iron and steel industries, the Com-
mission has had to implement the infringement procedure provided for in 
Article 88 of the ECSC Treaty against two of these. On 3 July 1972 it adopted 
a reasoned decision under this procedure, establishing that Belgium and 
Italy had failed to meet their obligations under Articles 86, subparagraph I 
and 47, subparagraph 1, of the ECSC Treaty. The two Member States sub-
sequently supplied the information to the Commission. The procedure against 
Belgium was thus closed, and additional time was given to Italy, as this country 
was submitting the further data requested by the Commission. 
The Commission also again approached the Member States for informa-
tion concerning aids granted to the iron and steel industries in 1971. 
All this information collected by the Commission should enable it, 
through analysis and comparison, to check that no specific aid prohibited by 
Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty is being granted to the iron and steeUndustry 
and that, in respect of aid schemes for regional or more general purposes, 
aids to the industry granted in conditions similar to those granted to others 
are not liable to lead to the serious imbalances· referred to in Article 67 of 
the ECSC Treaty. 
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CHAPTER II 
PUBLIC UNDERTAKINGS 
GENERAL 
127. The Commission is continuing its analysis of the problems which may 
arise from the existence of undertakings with which the Member States have 
special links (whether they are public undertakings or undertakings to which 
the States grant special or exclusive rights, in keeping with the spirit of 
Article 90(1 V 
. One aim of this analysis is to meet the European Parliament's request 
"that the Commission should study the relationship between the State and 
the public undertakings, so as to be in a position to work out directives and 
decisions enabling distortions of competition as between public and private 
undertakings to be eliminated". However, the elimination of distortions of 
competition as between public and private undertakings cannot be the only 
objective of such an analysis. 
128. Article 90(1) of the EEC Treaty forbids the Member States to enact 
or maintain in force measures contrary to the Treaty in respect of the under-
takings to which the Article refers. On these grounds the Commission ensures 
that the behaviour of such undertakings, and that of the Member States 
towards them, do not break the Treaty rules binding both the undertakings 
and the Member States, and in particular the rules on competition. 
For instance, the Commission sees to it that the undertakings in question 
do not contravene the provisions of Article 86 by abuse of a dominant posi-
tion.2 It has to ensure that the Member States do not grant these undertakings 
aids incompatible with the common market-aids which may be difficult to 
detect, masked as they are by the special relations between the Member States 
and the undertakings. The Commission has also made arrangements for 
ascertaining that the Member States do not grant what amounts to aid to 
these undertakings by acquiring temporary capital holdings in them. 3 
1 See First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 192 et seq. 
2 Sec. 58. 
3 Sees. 124 and 125. 
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129. Furthermore, the Commission considers that Article 90 is not merely 
meant to prevent the undertakings concerned and the Member States from 
evading the Treaty rules, which apply absolutely generally to both parties 
individually. Its object is also to prevent the Member States from evading 
these rules under cover of the apparently spontaneous behaviour of the under-
takings with special status or prerogatives. Because of this special status or 
these special prerogatives-from which the undertakings may derive certain 
advantages (monopolistic situation in some cases, easier access to credit in 
others) granted by the State, the Member States have special responsibilities 
with regard to these undertakings. Accordingly, they also have the means 
and the duty to act in such a way that the undertakings' behaviour does not 
produce effects which, if they resulted from actions by the States themselves, 
would constitute a violation of the Treaty. 
It is on these grounds that the Commission is now examining the pos-
sibility of demanding (by appropriate directives or decisions under Article 90(3» 
that the Meinber States, in certain fields where the risk of such behaviour is 
apparent, should take the necessary steps to stop' the undertakings referred 
to in Article 90(1) from excluding all or sonie of the products or services of 
the other Member States when placing their contracts. For it is inadmissible 
that such actions, which would be caught by Article 30 of the EEC Treaty 
if they were performed by the State itself, should continue to be performed by 
these undertakings. 
130. For the better accomplishment of these various tasks, the Commission 
has endeavoured to assemble the essential data providing an overall view of 
the public sector in each Member State and to assess its impact on the economy. 
The brief description given below is necessarily incomplete. As existing 
sources emphasize! the inadequacy of the availabh:!· data makes accurate 
description of the public sector, of its share in the various industries, and 
particularly of its financing structure, extremely difficult. . 
The definition of the public sector raises a difficult problem: its extension 
and content differ widely when defined in legal terms from when defined in 
1 The statistics and other information published below are drawn from a limited number of 
official documents or studies relating to the public undertakings of each Member State . .The 
references are given at the beginning of the part relating to each country. 
Only one of the sources used concerns the public undertakings of the six Member States. 
This is the "L'evofution des entreprises publiques dans fa Communaute europeenne au cours 
des dernieres annees", published by the Centre europeen des Entreprises publiques, CEEP 
(1971). The CEEP's analysis goes only as far as 1968 or 1969 according to case. The CEEP, 
which is preparing an up-to-date version, has been good enough to transmit to the Com-
mission certain data referring to the more recent years. 
The CEEP publication was the only source available covering public undertakings in the 
Benelux countries. 
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economic terms, if the principle is one of absolute dependence on the public 
authorities or not, if only firms controlled by the central authorities are included 
or if the definition is extended to firms controlled by the local authorities. 
The description of the sector in a given country is difficult but a description 
at Community level is an even more complex undertaking. To give only one 
example, the main sources concerning the French public sector do not cover 
the subsidiaries of public undertakings. 
In Italy, on the other hand, the available sourCes include in their calcula-
tions all the holdings which the State has in a large number of undertakings 
where such holdings confer control. 1 
131. The following plan has been adopted' for the description of the public 
sector of each country: 
(a) a demarcation of the sector is provided by the accepted definition of 
a public undertaking. Because of the difficulties referred to, the definition 
has been worked out for each country, on the basis of available informa-
tion. As far as possible, only undertakings controlled by the central 
public authority have been induded (in the wide sense, including any 
agency, even lacking legal personality, engaged in production and/or 
sales of goods or services, except farms, and in certain cases, financial 
undertakings). This has, however, not always been possible (see the case 
of the Federal Republic of Germany). Because of the differences-in 
some cases major ones-between the data relating to the various countries, 
and because of deficiencies in the sources used, both an assessment of 
the public sector in the economy of each country and comparison between 
the six public sectors must be made with the greatest caution. 
(b) An overall description of the public sector of each country is made by 
providing (for a reference period varying according to the information 
available) data relating to: 
- numbers employed, 
- turnover and/or added value, 
- investments, 
- finance sources and instruments. 
For each of these values, the share of public undertakings in the economy 
as a whole (without agriculture) of the country concerned is given. 
1 A sufficiently uniform definition cannot be based on the CEEP publication either (see 
preceding note), in which the discrepancies between the national sources also appear. For 
France, for example, the CEEP refers-like the INSEE-to the national accounting 
nomenclature, which excludes subsidiaries, whereas, for Italy, the definition adopted is much 
wider, even including firms controlled by the communes. 
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(c) The information also shows-through the most significant data relating 
to the values under (b) above-which are the industries in which public 
undertakings are particularly strong. 
132. The fOllowing description leads to a number of general comments on 
the development of the public sector in the six Member States; the lack of 
statistics on specific points and the difficulty of comparing data from country 
to country should, however, be stressed. 
Nonetheless, it can be stated that while certain data recorded stress the 
special importance of public undertakings (this is the case, in particular, 
for the percentages relating to investment in France· and in Italy, which were 
respectively 24.2% and 31 % of the national total in 1971), in other cases, 
there are no very wide disparities from one member country to another. 
A second point is that while the growth trend of the public sector, ex-
pressed in absolute values, shows, in general, a tendency to mark time or 
increase slightly, its relative share in the economy as a whole is tending to 
contract in most of the member countries. The main key to this trend is the 
increase, in recent years, in the growth rates of industries in which public 
undertakings have always been poorly represented. In certain cases, for example 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, the decline in the number of persons 
employed has been a result of the adoption of streamlining measures by certain 
major public undertakings. In France, the pressure on the charges that can 
be levied by the main public services has helped to curb the increase in added 
value. 
It is, however, not certain-in view of the fact that the public undertakings 
are required by the authorities to assume special responsibilities-that their 
relative decline is also due to any change in official attitudes to them. 
On the question of the application of the Treaty rules, the information 
obtained so far by the Commission under the analysis it is carrying out does 
not alter the standpoint it has always maintained, as to the need to ensure 
that the same principles and same rules are applied to all undertakings, whether 
public or private, and to all the Member States, in respect of measures they 
implement with regard to undertakings. 
FRANCE 
Definition of a public undertaking and sources 
133. The definition of public undertaking used here is that adopted for national 
accounting purposes, which is the one to which the main sources used also 
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refer: 1 the definition includes all nationalized undertakings and national 
semi-public companies, plus industrial and commercial public services (Atomic 
Energy Commissariat, the Post Office, Tobacco and Matches Industrial 
Operation Department, etc.) and certain intervention agencies. 2 As mentioned 
above, the definition does not include the subsidiaries of public undertakings. 3 
Most farms and financial undertakings are also excluded. 
General description 
134. An analysis of trends in the French public sector in recent years shows 
balanced growth with the maintenance of the positions that have long been 
strong in certain industries. However, the position of the public undertakings 
in the economy as a whole is tending to contract slowly but steadily. 
In recent years there has also been a far-reaching review of relations 
between the central authority and the public enterprises; a number of basic 
principles have been affirmed on several occasions by the authorities with 
regard to the control, management and financing of these undertakings. Some 
of the principles have been implemented through the adoption of practical 
measures which have perceptively changed the relations between the authorities 
and certain undertakings. 
This review process got underway after the publication in 1967 of the 
"Nora" report, released by the Working Party a/the Interministerial Committee 
on Public Undertakings. The report recommended less supervision and more 
autonomy for all the public firms-i.e., for the non-competitive as well as for 
the competitive sector-arguing that this was indispensable if efficiency was 
to be stepped up. Another important criterion recommended by the report 
was the offsetting of costs incurred through constraints of public interest or 
of other kinds imposed by the State. 
Discussing undertakings "with serious public interest constraints", 
the non-competitive sector undertakings, the report recommended that, 
1 In addition to the CEEP publication, the main source used here is: Huret, Keller, Honore 
et Rivier: "Les entreprises publiques de 1959 a 1969". This work published by INSEE 
(Institut national de la statistique et des etudes economiques), as No. 52, 1972. The INSEE 
made available to the Commission the figures relating to 1970 and 1971. 
The following sources have also been used: The XII General Report of the Auditors of 
public undertakings (1971), the XVII report of the FDES (1971-72; Le Pors, Trans/errs 
Etats-Industrie, Statistiques et etudes financieres (Ministry for Economic and Financial 
Affairs), 1971, No.2. 
2 For a complete list see Methodes de la comptabilite nationale, Etudes et conjoncture 1966, 
No.3, p. 191. 
3 For this reason the CEEP stressed that the percentages it published concerning the public 
sector share should be raised from 15 to 20%. 
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without prejudice to the principle of autonomy, the authorities should take 
powers to fix the objectives the undertakings must aim at and to supervise 
their operations. Guided by this proposal, the authorities redefined their 
relations with certain undertakings responsible for major services (the Elec-
tricity Board, the French state railways, Coalmines, Radio and Television), 
by means of "programme contracts". 
As for competitive sector undertakings belonging to the State or in 
which the State owns holdings, the report recommended the same treatment 
in all respects as that meted out to private undertakings. It stressed that where 
a Government contributed new funds for growth purposes, it should also 
require normal market returns on its capital and its loans. The report also 
raised the question as to whether the authorities should not pursue a more 
active policy in the matter of holdings and should not take the necessary 
powers for this purpose. 
Numbers employed 
The numbers employed in public undertakings have increased only 
slightly in recent years: they rose from 1.41 million in 1959 to 1.53 million 
in 1969. The figure remained virtually unchanged in 1970 and 1971. With the 
numbers employed in all undertakings (except farming and financial under-
takings) rising steeply over the same period, the percentage accounted for by 
the public sector of the total has declined: it fell from 14.8% in 1959 to 12.9% 
in 1969, and to about 10.6% in 1971. 1 
Value added and turnover 
The share of gross value added accounted for by public undertakings 
as a proportion of that of the economy as a whole has also declined, the 
figures developing from FF 27 500 million in 1959 (13.3% of fall non-farming 
and non-financial undertakings) to FF 65300 million in 1969 (11.8%).2 
In 1970 and 1971 the figures where FF 73400 million (11.8%) and FF 79400 
million (11.5%)3 respectively. 
1 Source: INSEE, the CEEP figures are slightly different: FF 1.37 million in 1963 (12.6% of 
all non-agricultural and non-financial undertakings), 1.41 million in 1969 (11.5%). 
Source: CEEP. 
Source: INSEE. 
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The decline is due not only to the decline in the relative share of the 
public sector but also to an appreciable fall in relative prices (as compared 
with average prices of gross domestic production) of the main public services. 1 
Investment 
The distinction made in the available sources between gross fixed asset 
formation (namely the productive investment of non-financial undertakings, 
housing and other investment) and the narrower concept of productive invest-
ment should be borne in mind. 
The gross fixed asset formation of public undertakings rose from FF 
26500 million in 1966 to FF 35000 million in 1971. The share of public 
undertakings in the total for non-financial and non-agricultural undertakings 
developed as follows over the same period: 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 2 
33.3% 33.2% 31.9% 28.9% 26.1% 24.2% 
The data on productive investment confirm the contraction in the share 
of public undertaking, which fell from 36.7% (for all non-agricultural under-
takings) in 1959 to 33.5% in 1963, and to 25.3% in 1969 (Source: CEEP). 
In 1970/71 the percentage (as a proportion of all non-financial undertakings) 
was 18.9% and 17.8% respectively. 
Financing 
The following main trends are revealed by a study of financing sources 
and methods (see Table below): 
(a) Self-financing and subsidies 
The rate of self-financing by public undertakings varies (both in absolute 
values and as a percentage of all finances), and is evolving very differently accor-
ding to whether we include or not-in the computation of undertakings' 
own resources, State subsidies, granted under various heads to several 
public undertakings. 
Thus, according to the INSEE, which defines self-financing as the total 
of gross savings minus operating and equipment subsidies, the rate declined 
1 See INSEE, p. 10; CEEP, p. 100. 
2 Source: IN SEE. According to the CEEP, the percentages are slightly different: 29.6% in 
1967, 29.3% in 1968, 27.5% in 1969. 
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steadily from 1959 (26.1 %) to 1969 (13.2%) for all public undertakings. 
The corresponding absolute values were about FF 4 200 million and about 
FF 5 000 million. On the other hand, according to CEEP, which includes 
subsidies in own resources, self-financing has increased appreciably, from 
50% in 1959 to almost 65% ten years later. (In absolute values, from more 
than FF 7 000 million to about FF 22 000 million over the same period.) 
The scale and the destination of the subsidies are therefore worth exam-
ining. According to "Transferts Etats-Industrie",1 all the subsidies paid by 
the central authority to public undertakings totalled about FF 20 000 million 
in 1968. After deduction of the "compensation" subsidies, which are accorded 
for certain specific aims, 2 the amount is FF 14600 million. 
A detailed account of the subsidies provided by the central government 
to the main public undertakings is given-for the area of which it is respon-
sible-by the Audit Board for public undertakings. 3 This shows that, for 
the majority of the most important public undertakings in the non-competitive 
sector,4 the subsidies provided under various heads by the central government 
have contributed appreciably to bringing about a financial recovery; but the 
undertakings have generally continued to operate at a loss. The Audit Board 
spotlights the particularly difficult situation of the coal mines, the State Rail-
ways and the Paris underground, which accounted for 94% of total aid from 
public funds in the period from 1967 to 1969.4 
Lastly, in the reference ten-year period, the rate of self-financing minus 
subsidies of private undertakings was much higher than that of public under-
takings, rising from 51.6% in 1961 to 61 % in 1969. (With subsidies included, 
the percentages are 57.3% and 67.2% respectively.)S 
(b) Several conclusions may be drawn about external financing; 
(i) From 1965 onwards, the contributions to the capital of public 
undertakings increased appreciably, in 1968, reaching 5.2%, of 
all sources of financing (about 1 % in previous years); 
1 P.42. 
2 For example FF 621 700 000 were paid to the French State Railways in the period from 
1967 to 1969 "for refraining from increasing tariffs" (see Commission, p. 67). 
3 Twelfth Report, p. 65 et seq. 
4 Coalrnines, French State Railways, Paris underground, Air France, Air Inter, Paris Airport, 
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes, autonomous 
ports. 
5 For the undertakings listed in footnote 4, subsidies paid in 1967, 1968 and 1969 totalled 
FF 23 000 million. The three undertakings named accounted for FF 22 000 million by 
themselves. 
6 Subsidies to private firms rose from FF 2200 million in 1962 to FF 4 500 million in 1968 
(Transferts Etats-Industrie), op. cit., p. 43). According to another source (Enterprise, 
No. 1131, 26 April 1971) they rose in 1969 to about FF 2 500 million. 
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1961 % 1962 % 1963 % 1964 % 1965 % 1966 % 1967 % 1968 % 1969 % 1970 % 
(a) External 
financing 
Long-term loans 5166 34.2 5061 29.4 5663 28.3 6873 29.9 5901 23.4 6518 22.9 7658 25 7861 24.3 
Medium-term 
loans 29 0.2 240 1.4 80 0.4 65 0.2 -94 0.4 -198 0.5 656 2.J 332 1 
Bonds 1240 18.2 1370 7.9 1428 7.1 1539 6.7 2476 9.8 2351 8.2 2944 9.6 1626 5 
Capital increases 183 1.2 124 0.7 333 1.6 170 0.8 1292 5.2 1396 4.9 1428 4.7 1669 5.2 
Insurance 
compensation 23 0.2 81 0.4 29 0.2 37 0.2 40 0.2 39 0.1 39 0.1 39 0.1 
Total external 
resources 6641 44' 6876 39.8 7533 37.6 8684 37.8 9615 38.2 10106 35.6 12725 41.5 11 527 35.7 
(b) Self-
financing 
(including 
subsidies) 8456 56 10347 60.2 12570 62.4 14285 62.2 15562 61.8 13 286 64.4 18866 58.5 20693 64.3 
..... ---
(Source: CEEP) 
The inclusion or exclusion of subsidies in own resources makes an appreciable difference. If the subsidies are left out, the self-financing 
trend is as follows: 
% 
(Source: IN SEE) 
(ii) The share of long-term loans declined sharply, particularly after 
1965; this was mainly due to a decrease in loans from the Economic 
and Social Development Fund; 
(iii) The share of bonds contracted sharply over the reference ten-year 
period, declining from 10.1 % in 1961 to 5% in 1968. 
Finally, comparison of public undertakings and private firms shows 
that the main difference lies in the role played by long- and short-term credit 
in financing them. Long-term credit is of great importance for public under-
takings, accounting for virtually all their external resources, whereas short-term 
credit is to all intents and purposes negligible. For private firms, the opposite 
is the case. 
Individual industries 
135. The above summary account of the economic impact of public under-
takings shows that their share in the economy has been steadily declining in 
recent years, particularly in the last ten years. This development is apparently 
due to the fact that French public undertakings have always been of great 
importance in a few industries (power and energy industries and communica-
tions, for example), the growth of which is tending to slow down, while other 
sectors (such as wholesale and retail trading), in which public activity is on 
a much smaller scale, are expanding much faster. 
Broadly speaking, the public undertakings play a prominent part in 
the power and fuel, transport and telecommunications industries. 1 Some 
essential data on undertakings in these industries have been communicated 
by the 1M SEE and are given in the following table. 
1 The undertakings are the following: French Coalmines, French Electric Power Board, 
French Gas Board, Rhone National Company, Petroleum Research and Operations Cor-
poration, ELF Company for Research and Development of Oil and Gas, National Aqui-
taine Petroleum Company, Company for Petroleum Exploration and Development in 
Alsace, Petroleum Development Company, Company for the Transport of Petroleum by 
Pipeline, Paris Airport, French State Railways, Paris Underground, Compagnie generale 
trans atlantique, Messageries maritimes, Air France, Independent Commune and Depart-
ment Transport Boards, Post Office, French official cable service. 
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Value added Gross fixed asset Numbers employed 
formation 
Industries 
1969 1 % /1970 I % I 1971 % 1 1969 1 0/ 0 I 1970 I % 1 1971 % 11969 I % 1 1970 I % I 1971 
Coal and coke 3606 4155 4138 843 973 893 139.9 
} 249.1 
-
Electricity 
Gas 12323 13 939 15149 7846 7750 7688 122.5 
-
Petroleum 1082 1058 1 153 462 345 350 7.7 7.7 figures not 
available 
Transport 12828 13 650 14316 5709 5824 6071 403.7 394.2 
Post Office 11 101 12 347 14098 3688 4160 4632 372.1 383.6 -
Total 40940 7.3 45149 7.2 48854 7 18548 16.5 19052 14.4 19634 13.5 1045.9 7.4 1034.6 7.2 -
-~ 
- -
The percentages ~s a proportion of all non-financial and non-agricultural firms are given alongside the absolute values. 
ITALY 
Definition of a public undertaking and sources 
136. The definition of a public undertaking used generally covers companies 
in which the central authority has a controlling interest (i.e., all the undertakings 
covered by the annual report to Parliament, by the Minister of State-Subsidized 
Industries) and ENEL (the National Electricity Board). 
As far as available information has permitted, data relating to the main 
"aziende autonome" of the State have been added. These are agencies belonging 
to the administration-not normally having a legal personality of their own-
which, because of their economic importance, have special legal status. (They 
are the Italian State Railways, the State Monopoly Corporation, the National 
Autonomous Road Corporation, the Forestry Corporation and the Post Office.) 
This delimitation is largely dictated by the sources used, which include, 
besides the CEEP, the Report of the Governor of the Bank of Italy for 1971 
and the reports by the Minister of State-Subsidized Industries Report (particu-
larly those for 1972).1 
General description 
137. The outstanding feature of the Italian public sector is the organic arrange-
ment combining the State's holdings in a large number of firms operating in 
almost all the industries. The State-holding system has been applied in a 
growing number of firms and is now the basis for intervention by the public 
authorities. 
This has led to the development of forms of intervention which are very 
hard to summarize briefly and the most recent changes in which are also 
difficult to pinpoint. The tendency for the authorities to intervene generally in 
the economy, either through undertakings partly owned by the State or outside 
these, by using traditional facilities, has blurred the usual distinctions between 
the public sector and the private sector. 
Indeed, the common distinction made, within the public sector, between 
competitive undertakings and non-competitive undertakings or undertakings 
of general interest also seems to be disappearing in Italy. As the undertakings 
which are partly publicly owned, nearly all of which belong to the competitive 
sector, are gradually given responsibilities of general economic interest and 
1 The General Report on the Economic Situation 0/ the Country (for 1971), presented by the 
Minister of Budget and Planning and by the Minister of the Treasury, has also been used. 
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become-by express declaration of the public authorities-a privileged in-
strument of intervention, management on the basis of economic administration 
(which is in principle legally required) raises difficult problems. 
The figures on numbers employed and value added are not sufficient by 
themselves to give an idea of the scale of the operations of undertakings 
partly owned by the State; they suggest that the public sector in Italy is not 
much larger than that in the other Member States. The role played by these 
undertakings is highlighted by the figures for their shares in total corporate 
investment and for the corresponding increase in the financial facilities placed 
at their disposal by the authorities. It is true, however, that the role played 
by the public undertakings in very recent years has been of particular im-
portance because of the present period of slack economic activity in the country. 
The trends mentioned above have led to two contrasting developments. 
The strengthening of the financial basis of the State partial-ownership system 
raises again the problem of the danger of distortion of competition to the 
detriment of private firms, though this, even more than in the past, must be 
considered in the light of the public interest constraints to which the under-
takings are subjected. Secondly, the support provided by the public authori-
ties-often through State acquisitions in firms-at national and at local level, 
designed to contribute to the solution of regional problems, problems con-
cerning individual industries or general problems, reduces or dispels altogether 
the danger of distortions. 
Despite the varied complexity of the Italian public sector, a few general 
trends have become discernible of late. In the first place, it is evident that 
the traditional use of the public holding in a private undertaking as a means 
of contributing to the solution of problems raised by regional disequilibria 
has increased. 
In some industries, it would seem that the public sector has started a 
support or recovery operation in view of certain difficulties, both managerial 
and financial, besetting private industry. 
Lastly, it would seem that the tendency to regard the system of state 
participations more and more as a weapon against the economic and social 
problems engendered by the existence of firms that have run into difficulties 
is growing stronger, encouraged by the large number of factors bound up-
at least in part-with the present difficult business situation which has been 
known for some years. 
Numbers employed 
The numbers employed in public undertakings have not varied to any 
great extent in recent years. In absolute figures, they increased from 460 000 
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in 1966 to 637000 in 1971. As a percentage of the labour force (excluding 
farming and housing) the figure rose from about 4% in 1966 to about 5% in 
1971. 
These data do not include persons employed in the autonomous under-
takings ("Aziende autonome dello Stato"), in respect of whom no complete 
information is available. The numbers employed in the monopolies administra-
tion, the railways and the Post Office were 325000 in 1968. 
Value added and turnover 
Available sources on value added do not give information for all the 
public undertakings and this gives rise to statistical difficulties. For under-
takings partly owned by the State, the value added for the industrial sectors, 
which was Lit. 1 090000 million in 1968 and Lit. 1 231 000 million in 1969, 
rose to Lit. 1 486 000 million in 1970 (an increase of 20.7% over 1969). 
As a percentage of the whole of the national industrial sector the proportion 
rose from 8.8% to 9.2%. 
The rise from 1969 to 1970 was 12.6%. The average of these percentages 
in comparison with the corresponding national totals is 11.1% in 1968,11.3% 
in 1969 and 11.6% in 1970. 
The turnover of the public undertakings (State holdings plus ENEL) 
is as follows: 
Lit. 4600000 million in 1968, 
Lit. 5250000 million in 1969, 
Lit. 6 200 000 million in 1970, 
Lit. 6950000 million in 1971. 
Available statistics are not full enough to show the relationship between 
these figures and the national totals. 
Investments 
Investments by the State-participation undertakings and ENEL (gross 
fixed asset formation and stock variation) total Lit. 2230000 million in 1970. 
This was about 16.9% of overall fixed asset formation (Lit. 13 206000 million). 
The gross fixed asset formation of public undertakings accounted for 
29.6% of the national investment total, in the same year, in the industrial, 
transport and communication, wholesale and resale distribution, credit and 
services sectors. 
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For 1971, the figures are as follows: Lit 2638000 million (gross fixed 
asset formation and changes in stocks of public undertakings), which is 
20.7% of overall fixed asset formation (Lit 12750000 million). In relation 
to all investments in the industrial, transport and communications, retail 
and wholesale distribution, credit and services sectors, this was 31 %. 
The increase in investment by public undertakings was therefore par-
ticularly sharp for 1971. In the recession period then occurring in the overall 
economy at that time, the role of the public undertakings was thus of special 
importance. 
When the figures for the "Aziende autonome" are added to the above 
data, the result is that, as a proportion of overall investment by firms (excluding 
farming, housing and investment by the public authorities), the percentage 
accounted for by the public undertakings was 39% in 1970 and 40% in 1971. 
Financing 
Both the public undertakings and the private sector have tended to 
increase their indebtedness in recent years. The share of equity and holdings 
(including capital endowments) fell for all firms from 47.4% of total liabilities 
(in 1963) to 25.7% (in 1971). The annual percentage, over borrowings, of 
shares, holdings and contributions has shown little exchange in recent years. 
Since the share of new venture capital has remained the same and profits 
have fallen, there has been an increase in borrowed capital to 73.6% in 1971. 
In this context it should be noted that the public undertakings have enjoyed 
a share increase in capital endowments, which rose from Lit 211 000 million 
in 1970 to Lit 597000 million in 1971. 
These funds, with shares and holdings, account for 25.6% of all the 
funds available to public undertakings in 1971. The corresponding item 
(i.e. shares and holdings) for private undertakings was 16.5%. 
In other words, the sharp increase in capital officially provided to public 
undertakings enabled them to curb their indebtedness, which fell from 59.9% 
in 1970 to 54.7% in 1971. 
A study carried by the Banca d'Italia, confined to the borrowings of 
capital goods undertakings, shows that the bank borrowing of private firms 
in its various forms accounts for about 80% of financing, while the corre-
sponding item for public undertakings is about 60%. 
In summary, the percentages of the various finance components of 
the public undertakings were as follows in 1971: 
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State provided capital 
Realization of assets 
Shareholders' contributions 
Bonds 
Medium- and long-term 
borrowing 
Short-term borrowing 
Total 
Self-financing 
Grand Total 
1965 
in Lit. 
'000 mil- % 
lion 
109.6 13.4 
12.6 1.6 
9.7 1.2 
259.8 31.8 
116.3 14.3 
54.7 6.7 
-----
562.7 69.-
253.3 31.-
-----
816.- 100.-
1966 1967 
in Lit. in Lit. 
'000 mil- % '000 mil· % 
lion lion 
57.4 7 108.4 11.7 
3.8 0.4 26.1 2.8 
64.8 7.9 6.2 0.7 
40.8 5.- 156.9 16.9 
128.1 15.5 146.9 15.9 
226.4 27.5 136.1 14.7 
----------
521.3 63.3 580.6 62.7 
301.9 36.7 345.9 37.3 
----------
823.2 100.- 926.5 100.-
1968 1969 1970 1971 
in Lit. in Lit. in Lit. in Lit. 
'000 mil- % '000 mil- % '000 mil- % '000 mil- % 
lion lion lion lion 
275.7 30.0 205.3 18.6 165.2 9.8 550.1 23 
4.5 0.5 19.2 1.8 33.7 2.- 11.- 0.4 
21.9 2.4 33.2 3.- 27.2 1.6 36.- 1.5 
100.4 10.9 131.1 11.9 -32.7 -1.9 -17.7 -0.7 
142.9 15.5 188.6 17.1 371.9 22.2 828.4 34.7 
-37.8 -4.1 26.2 2.4 631.7 37.6 535.2 22.4 
--------------------
507.6 55.2 603.6 54.8 1 197.- 71.3 1943.- 81.3 
411.4 44.8 498.3 45.2 481.2 28.7 445.7 18.7 
--------------------
919.- 100.- 1101.9 100.- 1678.2 100.- 2388.7 100.-
self-financing . . . . . . . . . 
capital provided by the Treasury. 
borrowing 
other ............ . 
23.4% 
18.5% 
54.7% 
3.4% 
More detailed information is given in the table on p. 126. However, it covers 
only State-participation undertakings, which accounts for a slight discrepancy 
with the data given above. 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Definition of a public undertaking and sources 
138. The data available for the FRG give a general picture of the public 
sector without distinction between undertakings controlled by the central 
authority (Bund) and the local authorities (Lander and municipalities). The 
figures refer neither to farming nor tp the credit, insurance and retail and 
wholesale distribution sectors. 
The main source is the CEEP. 
An annual Ministry of Finance report (Beteiligungen des Bundes, Anhang 
zum Finanzbericht) gives information on State (Bund) holdings in the industrial 
field. It describes the economic situation of the Konzerne and companies in 
which the State has majority holdings. 
In view of the considerable importance in the FRG of firms controlled 
by the local authorities, it has been decided here not to confine information 
to the firms covered by the abovementioned report. This would have given 
a very unrealistic picture of the. German public sector. 
General description 
139. The data given below show that the impact of the German public sector 
on the economy at large is limited. Nor is there any evidence that the sector 
is used to any great extent for particular purposes by the authorities, for example 
by systematic deployment for the attainment of general economic objectives: 
No overall approach has been worked out in this respect. Although there was 
talk at one time for the reorganization of federal industrial holdings (including 
the idea of establishing a public holding company), no actual measures have 
so far been adopted. 
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It should be remembered that the municipalities and the Liinder have 
holdings in public utilities (gas, water, and electricity) and transport, whereas 
the central authorities' main holdings are in industry. 
The central authorities' industrial undertakings are represented in the 
FRG by seven Konzerne in which the Bund has holdings; in 1970 they were 
as follows: 
- Volkswagenwerk AG 
- VEBAAG 
- Saarbergwerke AG 
- Salzgitter AG 
- Vereinigte Industrie-Unternehmungen AG 
(VIAG) 
- lndustrieverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH 
(IVG) 
- Deutsche lndustrieanlagen GmbH (DIAG) 
Corporate capital 
(in DM million) 
900 
825 
350 
300 
304 
50 
65 
1 The "Land" of Lower Saxony has a 20% holding. 
2 Through the special "ERP" fund. 
Numbers employed 
I 
Share of the Bund 
in corporate capital (%) 
16
' 
40.23 
74 
100 
83.56 
100 
The numbers employed in all undertakings (except credit establishments, 
insurance companies, farming and retail and wholesale trade) in which the 
authorities (Bund, Lander and municipalities) owned holdings or majority 
voting rights were 1 770000 in 1963 (8.3% of all persons in paid employment) 
and 1 500 000 in 1968 (7.4%): the decline was accounted for mainly by rational-
ization operations, affecting transport in particular. 1 More than half of these 
persons are employed in the Post Office and the Federal Railways. The figures 
include the employees of two companies, Volkswagen and VEBA, in which 
public participation is less than 50%. 
Turnover and value added 
In 1968, total turnover for public undertakings was about DM 70000 
million, accounting for 13.3% of total turnover achieved by firms in the FRG. 
In 1963, the figure had been about 13.5%. 
1 See CEEP, p. 19. 
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The share enjoyed by public undertakings is high only in the water, gas, 
electricity supply and transport sectors; in 1968 the overall turnover of these 
public undertakings was DM 17000 million, 85.1 % of total turnover in the 
relevant industries. 
The value added by public undertakings (except housing) was DM 34400 
million in 1963 and DM 43500 million in 1968, accounting for 11.8% and 
10.9% resp~ctive1y of value added for the whole German economy (except 
housing). 
Investments 
The share accounted for by public undertakings in total investment 
(except housing) of all FRG firms in 1968 was 17.6% (DM 13 000 million). 
In 1963 the corresponding figures were 17.2% and DM 10 300 million. 
For the seven industrial Konzerne (see above), the total turnover (for 
1969) was less than 5% of that for all industry. The figure for investment was 
2.5%. Numbers employed as a percentage of all persons in paid employment 
was about 1.4%. 
Financing 
(a) Self financing 
The rate of self financing by public undertakings has increased: it was 
48.73% of all funds available in 1963, and 72.74% in 1968. 
(b) External financing 
The share of capital increases in the total of funds available varies fairly 
widely: 1.43% in 1963, 13.76% in 1965 and 4.31 % in 1968. 
Other sources of finance are mainly long-term credit, which fell sharply 
from 1963 (44.79%) to 1968 (19.33%). 
As for financing in the private sector, an analysis of data published by 
the German Statistical Office! relating to joint-stock companies shows a 
self-financing rate of 77.1 % of all long-term financing facilities in 1968; the 
share of capital increases is 12.3%, and long-term credit accounted for 10.6% 
of the total. 
1 Source: Statistik des Bundesamtes, Reihe 2, 1968. U nternehmen und Arbeitsstatten; Kapital-
gesellschaften. 
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Individual industries 
140. The following information on certain industries shows shares accounted 
for by state-controlled undertakings in national production: 
Sectors 1968 1969 1970 
Aluminium 74.9% 74.5% 70.9% 
Iron ore 44.8% 44.8% 76.7%* 
Shipbuilding 36.1% 39.8% 28.1% 
Coal 16.4% 9.9% 9.5% 
Coke 11.6% 5.4% 5.7% 
Petroleum 8.5% 8.5% 8.4% 
Electric Power 6.2% 5.9% 6.3% 
Crude Iron 6.0% 10.5% 11.3% 
Crude Steel 4.9% 9.1% 9.7% 
Lignite 4.7% 5.1% 5.1% 
• The percentage increase is due to the merger of the Salzgitter AG metal-processing plants with the IIseder HUtte 
(Source: Beteiligungen des Bundes, op. cit. For shipbuilding: Commission figures). 
The figures show that state industrial undertakings have a very high stake 
in national production of only aluminium and iron ores. Imports are heavy 
in these two industries, so that the figures do not mean that the public sector 
also enjoys a large share of the market. 
Because of the criterion selected (Federal majority holding), the above 
table does not give a clear idea of the scale of the public sectors: with regard 
to electric power, the table excludes the production of the Rheinisch-West-
falisches Elektrizitatswerk AG which, with about 40% of German production, 
is the leading firm of this industry in the country but only 31.2% of whose 
corporate capital is owned by the muni~ipalities. 
Owning plural voting shares, the municipalities, nonetheless, have control 
of the company. 
Similarly, the share of public undertakings in the lignite industry is 
found to be much larger than the above table suggests (in fact, about 90%), 
if the output of electric power undertakings, particularly the R WE is counted in. 
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BELGIUM 
Definition of a public undertaking and sources 
141. The public sector has a proportionately more modest position in the 
economies of Belgium, the Netherlands and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
than in the three other Member States. So far, at least, the tendency for different 
legal types to be developed and for subsidiaries to be established-a key feature 
of the Italian and French public sectors-is unknown in Benelux. 
Hence, the definition of a public undertaking does not raise the same 
difficulties, and is indeed-perhaps-not as important as in the other three 
countries. 
By adopting the criterion of the national status of the public undertaking, 
the CEEP (which is, as indicated above, the.only source used here) has confined 
its analysis to a very small number of undertakings and other agencies: 46 for 
Belgium, 29 for the Netherlands and 6 for Luxembourg. 1 
Overall data covering local as well as national public undertakings are 
available only for Belgium. Because the series are very far from complete 
(particularly for Netherlands and Luxembourg undertakings), the brief descrip-
tion given below is useful only as general guidance. 
General description 
Numbers employed 
142. It is estimated that numbers employed by the main Belgian public under-
takings were about 170000 in 1968, rather less than 5% of all persons in paid 
employment. The figure was much the same in the two preceding years. 
Turnover and value added 
The total turnover of the main Belgian public undertakings rose from 
nearly Bfrs. 64 000 million in 1966 to Bfrs. 71 900 million in 1967 and Bfrs. 
78 900 million in 1968. The lack of statistics makes it difficult to assess accu-
rately the scale of the public sector in terms of turnover; it is safe to assume, 
however, that it accounts for about 5% of the total national turnover. 
GlOSS value added in 1956 was 5.65% of Gross National Product (without 
farming), and the percentage rose to 5.70% in 1967 and to 5.83% in 1968 
(this information includes local public undertakings; see CEEP, p. 59). 
1 For a complete list, see CEEP, page 87. 
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Investments 
The gross fixed asset formation of Belgian public undertakings was 
Bfrs. 30000 million in 1968 (as against Bfrs. 28000 million in 1967 and 
Bfrs. 24000 million in 1966),13.15% of the total (as against 12.5% of the total 
in 1967, and 11.3% in 1966). 
Financing 
Available documentation yields no useful information on this subject. 
Individual industries 
143. The public undertakings are major operators in the traditional industries 
of transport and communications. The following figures (for 1968) may be 
quoted: 55% of the persons employed in the industries concerned, 48.2% 
of value added and 75% of investment. 
The share of Belgian public undertakings is also large in electric power, 
gas and water industries: 56.3% of persons employed, 47.4 % of value added 
and 49.3% of investments. The credit, insurance, and real estate industries 
also merit mention: 12.8% of persons employed and 10.3% of value added. 
NETHERLANDS 
Definition of a public undertaking and source~ 
144. See sec. 141. 
General description 
Numbers employed 
145. There is a tendency towards a decline, which can be put at over 5% 
(information available is not complete) in the numbers employed by public 
undertakings as a proportion of the labour force. Numbers employed fell 
from 164000 in 1966 to about 154000 in 1968. 
Turnover and value added 
The turnover of Netherlands public undertakings rose from nearly 
Fl. 5900 million in 1966 to nearly F1. 8400 million in 1968. Available informa-
tion is not sufficient to provide reliable guidance on value added. 
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Investment 
Gross fixed asset formation by Netherlands public undertakings (excluding 
the financial sector) was more than Fl. 2 000 million in 1968, a figure which 
was 8.3% of the total for all undertakings (other than financial undertakings 
and farming). 
Financing 
See comment under sec. 142. 
Individual industries 
146. In the Netherlands, the share of public undertakings in transport and 
communications is very large, as it is in gas, electric power and water (which 
are wholly publicly owned through local undertakings). 
In a number of industries-particularly transport, communications and 
the financial sector-with heavy state participation, the data available are 
not sufficient for an assessment of scale in relationship with that of the private 
sector. 
LUXEMBOURG 
Definition of a public undertaking and sources 
147. See sec. 141. 
General description 
Numbers employed 
148. About 5 700 persons are employed by Luxembourg public undertakings 
out of a total number of persons in paid employment of 122000. The propor-
tion is less than 5%. 
Turnover and value added 
Between 1966 and 1968, the turnover of Luxembourg public undertakings 
rose from Lfrs. 2 340 million to Lfrs. 2 600 million, an increase of a little less 
than 12%. No information is available on the value added. 
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Investments 
Gross fixed asset formation of the six Luxembourg public undertakings 
was about Lfrs. 490 millions in 1968 (5.5% of the national total), as against 
about Lfrs. 385 million in 1967 (4.3 % of the total). 
Financing 
See comment under sec. 142. 
Individual industries 
149. No information is available to provide useful guidance on this subject. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ADJUSTMENT OF NATIONAL COMMERCIAL MONOPOLIES 
150. In 1972, the Commission continued its examination of progress being 
made in the adjustment of national commercial monopolies. It ascertained 
that, in several cases, measures of discrimination which ·it had previously 
noted 1 had not been terminated. It therefore instituted the proceedings for 
infringement of the EEC Treaty provided for in Article 169 against the French 
alcohol, basic slag and matches monopolies, and the Italian matches monopoly. 
As part of the procedure the two Governments have submitted comments. 
With regard to the alcohol monopoly, the French Government has stated that 
adjustments to the present arrangements have been prepared and should enter 
into force early in 1973. An assurance has been given that these measures will 
terminate the discriminatory effects noted by the Commission, caused by 
the discrepancy between the surcharge on the imports of certain foreign 
spirituous beverages and the due chargeable on like national products. The 
proceedings for infringement have therefore not been continued. 
The adoption of measures allowing the free import and marketing in 
France of basic slag from the other Member States, and export to these States, 
is also planned. The Commission has drawn the attention of the French 
Government to the fact that, in view of the direct applicability of Article 37, 
the monopoly arrangement cannot be allowed to h!lmp(!r free import and mar-
keting or export, even if the amendments to the laws or regulations complained 
of have not yet been implemented. The procedure is following its normal course. 
A law of 4 December 19722 terminated the import monopoly for matches 
from other Member States, and this enabled the Commission to close the 
procedure against France. ' 
The Italian Government has answered the Commission's arguments 
concerning the match monopoly with legal objections based mainly on the 
derogation provided for in Article 90(2) of the EEC Treaty for monopolies 
of a revenue-producing character. It has also emphasized the serious difficulties 
which many small- and medium-sized Italian match firms, often located in 
backward areas, would have if the Italian match market were opened. 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sees. 195 to 202. 
2 Journal Officiel de la Repuhlique Fran~aise, 5 December 1972. 
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The Commission has taken the view that the Italian Government's 
objections did not preclude an adjustment of the monopoly in accordance 
with Article 37. The procedure for infringement initiated against Italy therefore 
continues. 
151. The procedure provided for in Article 169 has also been initiated by 
the Commission against the French manufactured tobacco monopoly. The 
Commission has ascertained the SEIT A (Service d 'Emploitation Industrielle 
des Tabacs et Allumettes) is still applying measures restraining the introduction 
and distribution in France of foreign blends of manufactured tobacco, al-
though the Commission had already designated these measures as being 
discriminatory. New arrangements were also made by the French Government 
and the SEITA in June and July 1972. They include the charging of a standard 
amount for distribution expenses and a change in the manufactured tobacco 
price scales. The Commission has taken the view that these arrangements 
have special disadvantages for foreign manufacturers and are therefore dis-
criminatory. The SEIT A has agreed to adjust some of the measures challenged 
so that the infringement can be discontinued. 
The Italian manufactured tobacco monopoly has been examined once 
again by the Commission, which has asked the Italian Government to provide 
supplementary information. The Italian reply is now being studied by the 
Commission. 
152. The situation with regard to the other monopolies can be summarized 
as follows. 
The French Government has notified the Commission that measures 
are in preparation to enable the potash monopoly to be brought fully into line 
with the Treaty. The French Government commitment no longer concerns 
only the scheme for compound fertilizers containing potash, l but now also 
covers pure potash, or potassium salts. 
The Commission has been regularly examining the situation of the 
French petroleum products arrangements in the light of the requirements of 
Article 37 of the EEC Treaty taken in conjunction with other Treaty clauses. 2 
The termination of the Italian salt and cigarette paper monopolies, due 
under the fiscal reform in progress in Italy, has been put off3 because of the 
postponement of the introduction of VAT and shou)d therefore take place 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 201. 
2 See written question No. 135/71 from Mr Westerterp to the Commission concerning the 
French compulsory petrol sales cartel, and Commission reply; OJ, No. 53, 27 May 1972, 
p.2 et seq. 
3 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 201. 
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in 1973. The Commission has noted the connection made by the Italian Govern-
ment between the fiscal aspect of the problem and the adjustment of the 
monopoly, but has stressed that, pending adaptation of the measures planned, 
no obstacle should now be placed in the way of imports and marketing of the 
products in question. 
The flints monopoly ended on 21 April 1972, under a rule contained 
in the decree concerning abolition of the cigarette lighters monopoly, which 
entered into force in 197).1 
1 First Report on Competition Policy. sec. 201. 
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Part three 
The development of concentration within the Community 
138-40
1. ,Trends in international interpenetration 
and concentration movements in the Community up to 1971 
Comparison o/international operations in the EEC in 1971 
with the trend/rom 1966 to 1970 
153. The information on international operations in the EEC in 1971 has 
been obtained, as in the First report, by a systematic scrutiny of international 
acquisitions of holdings and creations of subsidiary reports in the specialized 
press. 1 Information on merger movements within the vruious member countries, 
and the quantitative data enabling ~he economic implications of the various 
operations to be ,assessed, are therefore not available. However, since no 
change has been made to the methods used for previous surveys, the patterns 
presented should reflect the actual situation fairly accurately. 
154. Table 1 shows international operations in the Community both as a 
whole and broken down by.types of operation, for'1966, 1970 and 1971. 
Between 1970 and 1971, there was again'an increase in international operations 
in the EEC. Compared with the growth rate; as an annual average, for the 
period from 1966 to 1971, the number of operations carried out between 1970 
and 1971, of whatever form, increased to a greater extent. For 1971 as compared 
with 1970, the number of purchases of holdings increased by 12.5% (against 
8.3% on average for the 1966-71' period), the number of new joint subsidiaries 
by 10.7% (against 5.2% on average), the number of new non-joint subsidiaries 
by 17.4% (againsU2.6%), and the number of operations as a whole by 15.3% 
(against 10.0%). ' 
155. In respect of types of operation, the tendency noted from 1966 to 1970 
for unilateral operations to increase has continued, i.e., the increase in the 
number of non-joint subsidiaries. The index rose from 100 in 1966 to 154 in 
1970, to reach 180 in 1971. Again iIi 1971, the increase in the number of new 
holdings was heavier (as compared with the basic year 1966, index 1971 = 145) 
and for the establishment of joint subsidiaries (as compared with the basic 
year 1966, index 1971 = 121). Bilateral operations increased by 9% from 1970 
to 1971, and multinational operations increased by as much as 27.1 %. Now, 
in comparison with the basic year 1966, the 1971 index for the multinational 
1 Firat Report on Competition Policy, sees. 217 to 242. 
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1966 
1970 
1971 
TABLE 1 
International operations in the EEC in 1966, 1970 and 1971 
Operations broken down by type 
New participations New joint New non-joint Total operations 
subsidiaries subsidiaries 
Numbc:r of I Num~ of Num~r Ofl Num~~ of Numbc:r of I Num~~ of Num~r of I Num~ of 
operabons partlCI- operabons partlCI- operabons partlCI- operauons partiCI-
pations pations pations pations 
254 535 315 959 781 781 1350 2275 
327 642 345 977 1199 1199 1871 2818 
368 741 382 954 1408 1408 2158 3 103 
Operations broken down 
by number of participants 
Unilateral I Bilateral I Multi-
operations operations lateral 
operations 
781 461 108 
1 199 576 96 
1408 628 122 
type of operation is only 113 whereas for the bilateral type it reaches 136. 
However, it would seem that this is in fact an adaptation process rather than 
a reversal of trend. This presumption is supported by the fact that, as before, 
the number of participants in international operations is declining. In 1966, 
on average, 1.69 firms were still participating in an international operation 
in the EEe (2.11 in a holding, 3.04 in the establishment of a joint subsidiary), 
whereas in 1971 this was the case with only 1.44 firms (2.01 in a holding, 
2.50 in the establishment of a joint subsidiary). 
156. The growing desire to establish non-joint subsidiaries is reflected in 
the pattern which has, on the whole, shown little change, in international 
operations broken down by type. If they are classified according to shares 
in the total of operations, the establishment of non-joint subsidiaries or uni-
lateral operations retained the lead in 1971 with a figure of 65% (as against 
58% in 1966 and 64% in 1970). They are followed by new-joint subsidiaries 
with 18% (23% in 1966 and 18% also in 1970), and new holdings with 17% 
(19% in 1966 and 18% in 1970). The share of bilateral operations fell from 
34% in 1966 to 31 % in 1970 and 29% in 1971. Multinational operations, 
after declining from 8% in 1966 to 5% in 1970, staged a modest recovery, 
to reach a figure of 6%. 
Breakdown of international operations in the EEG by regions 
157. The breakdown of international operations in the EEe into operations 
between firms from the Member countries and operations in which firms 
from non-member countries participate (see Table 2) confirms for 1971 the 
tendency, discerned for 1966-70, for firms from the member countries to 
increase operations. It is true that the share of firms from non-member countries 
in all the international operations in the EEe remained in 1971, higher at 
59%, than the share of the member countries. But, while in 1966 it was still 
1.9 times the figure for EEe internal operations, it fell to 1.7 times this fig~re 
in 1970, and to only 1.5 times in 1971. 
In comparison with the base year (1966 = 100), the index for international 
operations solely between member countries rose to 187 in 1971, while the 
index for international operations involving firms from non-member countries 
reached only 146. The increase in international activity between member 
country firms is noted for all forms of operation. 
158. Out of the total of involvements in international operations in the EEe, 
member country firms also took the largest share in 1971 (55%). But the number 
of participants fell-from 58% in 1966 to 56% in 1970. It is true that the growth 
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TABLE 2 
Regional breakdown of International operations and of the forms of operation 
in the EEC countries and in non-member countries, 1966, 1970 and 1971 
Number of operations 
Number of participations 
in the operations 
Setting up Setting Setting up Setting 
New of joint up of New of joint up of 
Year holdings subsidi- non-joint Total holdings subsidi- non-joint Total 
aries subsidi- aries subsidi-
aries aries 
EEC INMCI EEC INMCI EEC INMCI EECINMC EEC INMCI EEC INMCI EEC INMCI BEC INMC 
1966 33 67 34 66 35 65 35 65 67 33 72 28 35 65 58 42 
1970 35 65 34 66 39 61 38 62 67 33 69 31 39 61 56 44 
1971 39 61 35 65 42 58 41 59 70 30 62 38 42 58 55 45 
NB. As a percentage of each form of operation; EEC = operations solely between member country firms 
NMC = operations in which non-member country firms are involved. 
rates for the number of new non-joint subsidiaries (base index 1966 = 100, 
1971 = 215, against 161 for firms from non-member countries) and for new 
holdings (base index 1966 = 100, in 1971 = 145, comparing with 125 for non-
member country firms) are higher than for the firms from non-member coun-
tries. 
159. In the regional breakdown of international operations by type of operation 
in the various member countries, the leading place is taken for the three years 
by new non-joint subsidiaries. In the three "large" partner countries, and for 
the first time in 1971 for the Netherlands as well, new holdings were more 
numerous than the establishment of joint subsidiaries, while in Belgium and 
in Luxembourg new joint subsidiaries are more common than new holdings. 
160. Although the basic statistics are not completely reliable guide-it is 
probable that the sample covers international operations unevenly from region 
TABLE 3 
Regional distribution of international operations in the EEC 1966, 1970 and 1971 
('Yo) 
Year FRO F N B L EEC 
1966 22 19 13 16 24 6 100 
1970 24 22 12 13 22 7 100 
1971 22 24 11 12 24 7 100 
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to region-it is clear that international operations are tending to increase in 
number in France (see Table 3). Compared with the other Member States, 
France was third in 1966" second in 1970 and first in ,1971, in respect of fre-
quency of international operations. In 1966, Germany occupied the second 
place, in 1970 the first, and in 1971 the third. Belgium, which had been top of 
the table in 1966, was third in 1970, but rose again to second place in 1971.-
During these three years, the Netherlands was fourth, Italy fifth and Luxem-
bourg sixth. The 1966 = 100 index rose by 1971 to 201 for France, 179 for 
Luxembourg, 161 for Belgium, 159 for Germany, 136 for Italy, and 122 for 
the Netherlands. 
161. If an attempt is made to eliminate the impact on the figures of the diffe-
rences in size of the countries by ,weighting the number of. operations by the 
ratio between the share' of the various, member countri~s against the total 
number of firms, the result confirms an increased frequency 'of international 
operations in France. In this corrected "league table", France was still fifth 
in 1966 but second in 1971. Chronologically, Belgium retains the leadership 
and Italy still brings up the rear. Germany falls from fourth to fifth place, 
the Netherlands from third to fourth, and Luxembourg from second to third. 
162. The data available concerning the nationality of those involved in inter-
national' operations of the EEC throw light on the respective shares taken 
by firms from various non-member countries (see Table 4). In the three refer-
ence years, ,American firms were the outsiders most frrquently involved in 
international operations in the EEe. 
TABLE 4 
Shares of the various non-member countries' in the number of involvements 
in international operations in the EEC in 1966, 1970 and 1971 
Year ~EC us ' UK Switzerland OC(a) SC(b) Japan 
.. 
1966 ' 58 21 9 5 4 3 -
1970 56 18 10 7 5 3 i 
1971 55 17 10 7 5 4 2 
(a) OC '"', Other countries. 
(b). SC = Scandinavian countries. 
(%) 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
',Next in line were United Kingdom firms, Swiss firms, firms of other non-
member countries, firms of Scandinavian countries, and, in 1970 and 1971, J apa-
riese firms: From 1966 to 1971, American influence declined appreciably. On the 
other hand, the shares of the other non-member countries grew. From 1970 
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to 1971, Japanese firms stepped up their operations in Europe by 100%. 
As compared with 1966, involvements in international operations in the EEC 
were twice as frequent for Scandinavian firms, 1.9 times as frequent for Swiss 
firms, 1.7 times as frequent for firms from other non-member countries, 
1.5 times as frequent for British firms, but only 1.1 times as frequent for 
American firms. 
International operations in the EEC: breakdown by industry 
163. The metal-using industry accounted for the largest share in international 
operations in the EEC in the three reference years (see Table 5). Services came 
second in each year, and fuel and power last. Chemicals and other manu-
facturing industries were in the top half of the table, textiles and food-processing 
in the lower half. 
TABLE 5 
International operations within the EEC in 1966, 1970 and 1971: breakdown by Industry 
(%) 
Metal- Fuel Other Food 
Year using and Chemicals Textiles manufacturing proces- Services Total 
industries Power industries sing 
1966 43 3 15 6 12 3 18 100 
1970 36 1 11 6 13 7 26 100 
1971 39 1 11 5 14 5 25 100 
The highest growth rates in time for international operations were 
recorded in the food-processing industry (236 in 1971 over the base index 
of 100 for 1966) and services (1971 = 217). In the industries in which inter-
national operations expanded sharply the other manufacturing industries are 
also included (1971 = 188) and to a lesser extent also the metal-using industries 
(l971 = 147). Developments tended to mark time in chemicals (1971 = 107) 
and there was a decline in the fuel and power sector (I971 =70). 
164. Even after the number of international operations has been weighted 
by the number of firms in the industry-excluding services, however-the 
metal-using industries still take first place in 1966 and 1971 for international 
operations in the EEC, chemicals coming second on each occasion. Textiles 
are stilI fifth ahead of food processing. The other manufacturing industries 
improve their position (they were fourth in 1966, and third in 1971), but fuel 
and power shows a decline (third in 1966, fourth in 1971). 
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Summary of results 
165. An analysis of the international operations in the EEC in 1971 shows 
that the patterns and trends recorded from 1966 to 1970 in fact gathered 
strength. In particular, there was: 
(i) A sharp increase in activity in respect of international operations; 
(ii) Further progress in financial interpenetration between the countries 
(new holdings, setting-up of joint subsidiaries); 
(iii) A more and more active involvement of firms from the member countries 
in international operations in comparison with that of firms from non-
member countries; 
(iv) A definite increase in international operations in France, the country 
which had previously been less concerned in international activity; 
(v) An increase in international operations in the services sector. 
2. Concentration trends in certain Community industries 
from 1962 to 1969 
166. The table below showing concentration trends in certain Community 
industries is based on a preliminary examination of the studies carried out 
under a Commission research programmel on concentration.2 
Methods used 
167. The presentation includes only the industries in respect of which final 
reports from at least two member countries are avaihible. This means, on 
each occasion, three branches of the textiles industry and of the chemicals 
industry, two branches of the paper and paper goods industry and a subsector 
of the transport equipment construction industty. Table 6 shows their specific 
designation and the national breakdown. The studies were carried out by 
the following research institutes and experts: 
(i) Federal Republic of Germany: Kienbaum Unternehmensberatung, 
Gummersbach; 
(ii) France: G REFI of the University of Rennes, Prof. Gilles Y. Bertin; 
(iii) Italy: FIS-Divisione ATOR Consulenza Aziendale, Milan (transport 
equipment construction and chemicals); SORIS Studi economici Ricerche 
di mercato, Turin (Textiles, paper and paper goods industry); 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sees. 204 to 216. 
2 The Commission will publish the complete reports separately. 
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(iv) Netherlands: Stichting voor Economisch Onderzoek der Universiteit van 
Amsterdam, Prof. H. W. de long, A. H. Smolders; 
(v) Belgium: STUDIA VZWD Brussels 
TABLE 6 
Studies processed for the concentration analysis 
Industries 
(NICE nomenclature) 
23 Manufacture of textiles 
232 Manufacture and processing of textile materials on wool 
machinery x x x x 
233 Manufacture and processing of textile materials on cotton 
machinery x x x x 
237 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted goods x x x x 
--
38 Manufacture of transport equipment 
385.1 Manufacture of motorcycles, cycles and power-assisted 
cycles Xl x X X 
- ----
27 Paper industry and manufacture of paper products 
271 Manufacture of puJp, paper and paperboard x x x 
272 Processing of paper and paperboard, etc. x x x 
- ----
31 Chemical industry 
313.1 Specialized manufacture of pharmaceutical products in 
bulk or put up in wrapping x x x 
313.2 Manufacture of photographic products x x x 
313.5 Manufacture of cleaning and maintenance products 
(waxes, polishes, metal polishes, etc.) x x x 
1 In Germany. the industry was subdivided into cycles on the one hand and motorcycles and power-assisted cycles 
on the other. 
168. This report cannot include details of the peculiar features and individual 
trends in each industry in the various countries and data for all the economic 
aspects studied. For one thing, the usual practical difficulties arose in making 
comparisons between one country and another and between one industry 
and another which prevented certain variables from being compared at Euro-
pean level. 
Secondly, the data chosen on the number of firms, numbers employed 
and turnover supply an adequate basis for a description of the state and trend 
of concentration. The number of variables included, is, however, widened. 
for analysis of the processes, in order to provide examples (see sec. 185). 
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TABLE 7 
The number of firms and their development in certain industries 
and certain Community countries and industries in 1962, 1966 and 1969 
23 Manufacture of textiles 
G F I B 
Industries 
(NICE Year 
abSolutel1962= 100 labSolutel1962= 100 labSolutel1962= 100 labSolutel1962= 100 nomenclature) 
232 1962 441 100 1008 100 1470 100 162 100 
Wool 1966 333 76 886 88 1551 106 156 96 
1969 292 66 750 75 1620 110 144 89 
233 1962 474 100 1048 100 644 100 345 100 
Cotton 1966 435 92 920 88 592 92 310 99 
1969 380 80 522 50 560 87 264 77 
237 1962 1388 100 1240 100 1180 100 420 100 
Knitted· and 
crocheted goods 1966 1168 84 976 79 1 301 110 427 102 
1969 1 100 79 888 72 1664 141 400 95 
38 Manufacture of transport equipment 
Industries G F I N 
385.1 1962 47 100 380 100 ' 72 100 19 100 
Cycles 1966 39 83 270 71 75 104 17 89 
1969 31 66 251 66 77 107 15 79 
Motorcycles 1962 7 100 
Power-assisted 
cycles 1966 5 71 
1969 5 71 
27 Paper industry and manufacture of paper products 
Industries G F 
271 1962 253 ·100 280 100 598 100 
Manufacture of 1966 226 89 247 88 559 94 
pulp, paper'and 1969 191 76 203 73 532 89 
paperboard 
272 1962 1346 100 1470 100 700 100 
Processing of 1966 1 183 87 1288 88 700 100 
paper and 1969 1120 82 1350 92 700 100 
paperboard, etc. 
(Table continues on p. 150) 
REP. COMPo 1972 149 
31 Chemical industry (Table 7 cont.) 
Industries I Year N B 
313.1 1962 653 100 26 100 87 100 
Pharmaceutical 1966 638 98 27 104 78 90 
products 1969 539 83 25 96 75 86 
313.2 1962 2 100 3 100 1 100 
Photographic 1966 2 100 3 100 1 100 
products 1969 2 100 3 100 1 100 
313.5 1962 -
-
2 100 16 100 
Cleaning and 1966 - - 2 100 16 100 
maintenance 1969 - - 2 100 16 100 
products 
-.. -
- : no data available. 
169. A careful selection must be made among the concentration indices 
calculated. Quite apart from the qualitative factors involved in any concentra-
tion process, there is no index which takes sufficient account of all the quantita-
tively ascertainable data, and consequently any more detailed empirical 
analysis of concentration always requires the calculation of differing concentra-
tion indices. Three have been used in the presentation of this summary: 
(a) The Herfindahl-Hirschman indices for the general description of the 
degree of concentration of an industry; 
(b) Concentration rates to determine the percentages which the four or 
eight largest firms account for in employment and in the turnover of 
the industries; 
(c) The Linda indices weighted in relation to the number of the largest 
firms in an industry with a view to determining the deviations from size 
equilibrium among these firms. 
Changes in the number of firms 
170. The number and size of firms are relevant to the degree of economic 
concentration of an industry. A decline in the number of firms and/or faster 
growth by the big firms than by the small firms will entail growing concentra-
tion. 
171. Table 7 shows the number of firms for the industries chosen, for 1962 
(Netherlands 1963), 1966 and 1969 and changes over the period (1962 = 100). 
Of the 31 cases, six maintained the same number of firms throughout the 
three reference years, four had already had so small a number of firms that 
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a further decline was unlikely, given the very high degree of concentration 
(photographic products industry in Belgium with one firm, in Italy with two, 
in the Netherlands with three, and cleaning and maintenance products industry 
in the Netherlands with two firms). The other two cases are based on estimates 
(paper industry and manufacture of paper products in Italy and cleaning 
and maintenance products in Belgium). Of the 31 cases studied only three 
showed a steady increase in the number of firms from 1962 to 1969 (knitted 
and crocheted goods, wool and motorcycles, cycles and power-assisted cycles 
in Italy). In 19 cases there is a steady decline in the number of units, and in 
three cases the decline appears only in the years 1962 and 1969. 
172. Apart from differences of structure from industry to industry among 
those chosen in the various countries, the general table illustrating changes 
in the numbers of firms reflects a generally growing process of concentration 
in the Community from 1962 to 1969. 
173. The absolute figures on the number of firms in Table 7 cannot easily 
be compared country by country and industry by industry, because they are 
based on differing demarcation criteria. They concern: 
(i) In Germany, firms employing 10 persons and more for textiles and paper, 
and firms employing 50 persons and more for transport equipment 
manufacture; 
(ii) In France, all firms in all cases; 
(iii) In Italy, all firms except those manufacturing knitted and crocheted 
goods and the estimates for the paper and paper products industry (10 
persons employed and more). The data concerning the number of firms 
in the Italian cleaning and maintenance products industry could not 
be obtained; 
(iv) In Belgium, all firms in all industries, the figures for the cleaning and 
maintenance products industry being estimates; 
(v) In the Netherlands, in all cases firms employing 50 persons and more. 
In accordance with the definition established by the Statistical Office of 
the European Communities (SOEC), a firm is defined as "the smallest legally 
independent unit ... having a separate balance sheet". 1 The firms manufac-
turing more than one product are assigned to the industry corresponding to 
their main product or products. 
1 Statistical Office of the European Communities, General Nomenclature of economic actIvI-
ties In the European Communities-NACE 1970, Luxembourg 1970. 
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Changes in the degree of concentration 
174. Since the degree of concentration of an industry depends not only on 
the number of firms but also on their differences of size, concentration yard-
sticks covering both factors must be used. The 'Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
allows of this "overall" measurement. The greater the number of firins in an 
industry and the smaller the difference of size between the firms, the lower 
the degree of concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. 
The highest figure the index can reach is 1 000 (monopoly). 
175. For the industries selected, Table 8 gives the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
indices calculated on the basis of numbers employed and turnover. The number 
of firms in the various industries and countries has not been lecorded in a 
uniform way. Moreover, the differences of size of the member countries affect 
the number of firms operating there. Industry by industry and country by 
country comparisons of the degree of concentration based on Herfindahl-
Hirschman indices given in the table would therefore reflect not only the 
genuine facts concerning concentration but also discrepancies in the way 
the data had been recorded and in the siies of the countries. Nonetheless, 
reliable conclusions can be arrived at concerning concentration trends within 
the industries. 
176. Among the industries on which adequate information is available in 
the various countries (31 cases) and in which the number of competitors is 
not already very low (motorcycles, cycles and power-assisted cycles inGermany, 
photographic products in Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium, cleaning and 
maintenance products in the Netherlands), only four-all of them in Italy-
show a decline in concentration as calculated on the basis of numbers employed 
and turnover (wool, knitted and crocheted goods, cycle industry, paper industry 
and manufacture of paper products). Despite the differences from country 
to country and from industry to industry, an empirical examination of the 
sample does therefore reveal a definite tendency for concentration to increase 
in the Community over the period 1962 to 1969. Indeed, a comparison of 
, growth rates in the two periods 1962 to 1966 and 1966 to 1969 shows 'clearly 
that concentration growth is gathering momentum. ' 
177. Study of the trend of concentration in terms of numbers employed and 
turnover during the reference period shows that only in the paper and paper 
products manufacturing industry in Italy was there a discrepancy between 
the chronological rates of these two variables. Concentration calculated on 
the basis of numbers employed fell slightly, while concentration calculateq 
on the basis of turnover showed an increase. 
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TABLE 8 \ .. 
Concentration In the Community industries and countries In 1962, 
1966 and 1969 (Herflndahl-Hirschman indices) 
23 Manufacture of textiles 
G F I B 
.. ' 
Industries 
(NICE Year 
nomenclature) Numbers Turnover Numbers Turnover Numbers Turnover Numbers Turnover 
employed employed employed . employed . , 
232 1962 - 9 18 - 21 19. 27 .35 . 
Wool 1966 12 10 17 - 15 17 38 44 
1969 15 14 19 - 12 14 40 47 
233 1962 - 14 7 - 8 9 15 14 
Cotton 1966 13 15 6 - 9 10 25 '. 18 
1969 22 20 8" - 12 .. ;13 45 59 
237 1962 - 8 4 - 4 7 5 6 
Knitted and 1966 10 11 6 - 3 5 6 7 
crocheted goods 1969 12 16 6 - 3 4 8 ;. 10 
. "." 
38 Manufacture of transport equipment 
Industries I Year. I G· F 
385.1 1962 64 69 . 115 - 316 276 91 ' 101 
Cycles 1966 91 87 121 - 232 216 121 151 
1969 149 120 132 - 257 245 157 i~3" 
., . , ! . ' " 
.. 
"11 . 
Motorcycles 1962 341, 316 
Powe~-assisted 1966 306 275 
" 
cycles 1969 309 297 ,'" 
, 
, , 
" 
27, Paper industry and manufacture of paper products 
" ' 
Industries 1 Year 1 G I' F N .. I 
.. 1962 
,. 
14 24' , 271 26 45 - 21 
Manufacture of 1966 23 53 . 14 - 23 25 
pulp, paper and 1969 32 68 16 - 20 2S 
paperboard ,: 
272. 1962 14 22 2 4 8 , , 
Processing' of 1966 14 24 3 
-
3 6' '. " 
paper and ' 1969 17 29 4 - 3 5 
paperboard, etc. 
" 
(Table continues pn:p. 154) 
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31 Chemical industry (Table 8 cont.) 
Industries Year N B 
313.1 1962 24 25 152 108 46 46 
Pharmaceutical 1966 21 24 138 115 102 103 
products 1969 27 35 173 142 83 83 
313.2 1962 . . .. 581 431 .. . . 
Photographic 1966 .. . . 615 534 .. .. 
products 1969 .. .. 644 635 .. . . 
313.5 1962 - - .. .. - 81 
Cleaning and 1966 - - .. .. 135 134 
maintenance 1969 - - .. .. 209 164 
products 
-: No data available 
.. : Impossible to calculate for logical reasons 
Where, in a given industry, concentration calculated on the basis of 
turnover exceeds concentration calculated on the basis of numbers employed, 
it is clear that the larger firms are achieving a greater turnover per person 
employed than the smaller ones. A problem to be studied as the programme 
goes forward is whether rationalization and automation are the factors generally 
enabling big firms to substitute capital for labour more extensively than small 
firms. In the 22 comparable cases, there are 12 cases of fuller concentration 
related to turnover in 1962, 1966 and 1969 (wool in Belgium, cotton in Italy, 
knitted and crocheted goods in Germany, Italy and Belgium, cycles in the 
Netherlands, paper manufacture and processing in Germany and Italy, pharma-
ceutical products in Italy and Belgium). In 5 cases, concentration on the basis 
of numbers employed is stronger than concentration on the basis of turnover 
(wool in Germany, cycles in Italy, motorcycles and power-assisted cycles in 
Germany, pharmaceutical and photographic products in the Netherlands). 
In the 5 remaining industries, concentration measured by numbers employed 
and concentration measured by turnover involve changes of position in the 
statistical comparison. 
Industry to industry and country to country differences in the degree 
of concentration in 1969 
178. The rates of concentration supply information at a particular point in 
time and place on the degree and status of concentration. For the industries 
studied, they show the percentages of persons employed and of turnover in 
the four or eight largest firms (Table 9). Though quite clear, the indices allow 
of only an approximate description of the actual status of concentration, 
since they reflect neither the number nor the breakdown by size of the remaining 
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TABLE 9 
Share of employment and turnover accounted for by the four or eight largest firms 
in certain Community industries and countries In 1962, 1966 and 1969 (rate of concentration) 
23 Manufacture of textiles 
G F I B 
Industries 
(NICE Year 
nomenclature) Numbers I Turnover I Numbers I Turnover I Numbers I Turnover I Numbers I Turnover 
employed employed employed employed 
4 g 4 8 4 g 4 8 4 8 4 8 4 ~ I~ ~ 
-
1- -1--1-
232 1962 - - - - 20 29 - - 23 28 22 28 26 39 30 44 
Wool 1966 IS 25 13 22 21 29 - - 19 24 21 26 31 47 33 49 
1969 18 29 15 25 20 29 
- -
17 22 18 24 32 48 34 51 
233 1962 - - - - 13 19 - - 11 18 13 21 19 26 18 25 
Cotton 1966 17 28 19 32 14 20 - - 11 19 13 20 25 33 21 29 
1969 23 37 17 30 15 22 - - 14 23 15 25 28 35 32 39 
237 1962 - - - - 11 19 - - 4 6 7 10 9 14 10 15 
Knitted and 1966 16 24 21 31 13 19 - - 3 5 6 9 9 15 10 16 
crocheted 
goods 1969 17 27 20 31 14 22 - - 3 6 6 9 11 19 13 22 
38 Manufacture and transport equipment 
Industries G F N 
385.1 1962 46 S5 45 54 62 75 - - 72 82 70 82 lSI I- 58 -Cycles 1966 55 69 54 67 63 76 - - 65 77 63 77 61 - 75 -
1969 66 77 63 78 63 75 - - 66 77 65 79 71 - 78 -
Motorcycles 1962 94 .. 99 .. 
Power-
assisted 1966 99 .. 99 .. 
cycles 1969 98 .. 98 .. 
27 Paper industry and manufacture of paper products 
Industries I Y car I G F N 
271 1962 23 37 30 43 20 30 - - 20 29 25 35 
Manufacture of 1966 23 34 34 47 19 29 - - 22 32 24 36 
pulp, paper and 1969 26 37 40 54 20 31 - I- 22 32 23 37 
paperboard 
272 1962 18 21 20 26 7 13 - - 6 10 12 19 
Processing of 1966 18 22 24 29 6 11 
- -
5 8 9 16 
paper and 1969 20 25 28 34 8 14 - - 5 8 8 15 
paperboard, etc. 
(Table continues on p. 156.) 
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31 Chemical industries (Table 9 cont.) 
Industries I Year I I . B 
313.1 1962 24 31 26 36 73 87 .57 76 34 52 34 521 
Pharmaceutical 1966 22 30 25 34 69 83 59 81 47 65 47 65 
products 1969 28 37 32 43 74 
-
72 - 43 64 43 64 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
-- -- - -- -- --
313.21 1962 98 
" 
97 .. 74 .. 59 .. 100 .. 100 . . 
Photographic 1966 98 
" 
98 .. 77 
· . 
70 .. 100 .. 100 . . 
products 1969 98 .. 98 .. 79 .. 78 .. 100 .. 100 . . 
315.5 1962 - - - - · . · . . . . . 45 52 45 64 
Cleaning and 1966 - -
- - · . · . . . .. 
66 84 66 83 
maintenance 1969 - -
- - · . · . . . .. 
84 98 74 89 
products 
1 Share of the largest firm in each case. 
- : no data available. .. Impossible to calculate for logical reasons. 
units of the industry concerned. Nevertheless, the rates of concentration 
calculated fully confirm the table showing the trend from 1962 to 1969 and the 
relationship between concentration measured by numbers employed and 
concentration measured by turnover. 
179. It is in fact because of their methodological ~hortcomings that the con-
centration rates do not raise to the same extent as the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
indices the difficulties referred to in connection with the collecting of data 
in the various industries and in the various countries. On the basis of the 
example of the percentages 'of persons employed in the four largest firms, 
the industry to industry and country to country differences in the degree 'of 
concentration should therefore be studied in somewhat fuller detaiL . 
180. An analysis of the degree of concentration of the industries shows that 
processing of paper and paper board, and knitted and crocheted goods, are 
the least concentrated. These are followed by wool and cotton. Manufacture 
of pulp, paper and paperboard is in the middle, well below the pharmaceutical 
industry, which is already very concentrated. Cycles are on the lowest rung 
of the highly concentrated group. The ~eaders in this group are dearung and 
maintenance products and photographic products. 
181. In the country to country comparison, the Netherlands and Belgiu~ 
have the highest degrees of concentra~ion in the industries studied. Germany 
comes third. France is well behind and Italy, also well behind, is at the very 
bottom of the international scale of concentration in the Community. 
156 REP: COMPo 1972 
TABLE 10 
Disparities between the largest firms in the Community industries and countries 
in 1962, 1966 and 1969 (weigbted Linda indices) 
23 Manufacture of textiles 
G I, ,F .. ' I I I Industries B 
(NICE Year 
nomenclature) Numbersl Turnoverl Numbersl Turnover I Numbersl Turnoverl Numbersl Turnover, 
employed ,employed employed employed" 
" I, ' 
232 1962 0.11 0.18 0.23 - 0.37 0.32 0.23 0.25, 
Wool 1966 0.17 0.14 0.21 - ,0.34 ' Q.32: 0.23 0.25; 
1969 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.24 0.25' 
233 1962 - - 0.14 - 0.14 0.13 0.32 0.33 
Cotton 1966 - 0.15 0.14 - 0.12 0.13 0.36 0.36 
1969 0.27 0.24 0.14 
-
0.14 0.16 0.61 0.72 
237 1962 - 0.33 0.11' - 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.23 
Knitted and 1966 - 0.20 0.14 - 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 
crocheted goods 1969 - 0.33 0.45 - 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 
'. 
38 Manufacture of transport' equipment 
Industries G ", F 1 ; N 
385.1 1962 0.36 0.40 ,0.38 - 1.28 1.27 0.52 0.50 
Cycles 1966 0.42 0.41 0.39 - 1.05 1.01 0.49 0.39 
1969 0.65 0.51 0.42 - 1.28 1.20 0.63 0.50 
Motorcycles 1962 1.19 0.60 
Power-assisted 1966 0.72 0.53 
cycles 1969 0.56 0.50 
27 Paper industry and manufacture of paper products 
Industries I Year I G F 
271 1962 0.24 0.34 0.54 0~38 0.34 0.28 " 
Manufacture of 1966 0.26 0.33 0.51 0.36 0.27 0.23 
pulp, paper and 1969 0.31 0.34 0.42 0.36 0.24 0.21 
paperboard 
, . 
272 1962 0.44 0.44 0.10 - 0.34 ,0.26 
Processing of 1966 0.41 0.42 0.09 
-
0.20 0.25, 
paper and 1969 0.39 6.38 0.10' - 0.17 0.20 
paperboard, etc. 
(Table continues on p. 158.) 
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31 Chemical industries (Table 10 con'.) 
Industries I Year I N B 
313.1 1962 0.24 0.21 0.48 0.54 0.20 0.20 
Pharmaceutical 1966 0.21 0.20 0.46 0.51 0.42 0.42 
products 1969 0.21 0.20 0.63 0.45 0.36 0.36 
313.2 1962 .. .. 1.85 1.08 
· . 
. . 
Photographic 1966 .. .. 2.50 1.12 
· . 
.. 
products 1969 .. .. 3.03 2.52 
· . 
.. 
313.5 1962 - - .. .. 0.56 0.52 
Cleaning and 1966 - - .. .. 0.51 0.51 
maintenance 1969 - - .. .. ,0.46 0.45 
products 
: no data available. . . Impossible to calculate for logical reasons. 
Disparities between the largest firms and the trends 
182. For a rather fuller analysis of concentration in the industries chosen, 
it will suffice to consider the difference of size between the largest firms in 
each industry. For this purpose, the weighted Linda indices are used as gauges 
(see Table 10). 
Just as for the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the level of this index is 
determined by the differences of size and number among the firms included 
in the calculation. There is no upward limit; the downward limit is l:n (where 
n is only the number of the largest firms in an industry). The number is not 
fixed arbitrarily in advance. It is derived, for each industry, from the structure 
of the sizes noted and is taken at the point on the distribution curve from 
which disparities between the firms become smaller. Up to this point, the 
disparities between the largest firms, thus defined, are analysed. High index 
values mean wide disparities between the leading firms. 
183. A comparison for 1962 and 1969 of the data handled in the previous 
paragraphs, taking account of the number of firms, concentration based on 
numbers employed in all the industries and on the disparities between the 
largest firms, shows that of 26 comparable cases, twelve show an increase in 
concentration with at the same time a growing disparity between the largest 
firms in parallel with a decline in the number of firms (wool and cotton in 
Germany and Belgium; knitted and crocheted goods in France; cycles in 
Germany, France and the Netherlands; manufacture of pulp, paper and 
paperboard in Germany; pharmaceutical products in the Netherlands and 
Belgium; photographic products in the Netherlands). It can therefore be seen 
that in these industries, side by side with the concentration process, disparities 
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TABLE 11 
An example of the concentration process (weighted Linda indices) 
~ 23 Manufacture of textiles 
-<D-
..... 
N 
.... 
\.It 
\0 
-
I B 
Industries 
(NICE Year 
Nomenclature Numbers I Turnover I Invest- I Net I Cash Ilow I O~n I Numbers I Turnover I Invest- I Net I Casb Ilow I O~n 
employed men! profits caPItal employed men! profits capItal 
233 1962 0.14 0.13 0.22 0.88 0.24 0.18 0.33 0.33 0.49 0.58 0.48 0.50 
Cotton 1963 0.13 0.14 0.32 0.73 0.22 0.17 0.33 0.33 0.53 0.47 0.46 0.50 
1964 0.14 0.15 0.27 1.11 0.29 0.16 0.33 0.32 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.49 
1965 0.14 0.14 0.49 1.18 0.43 0.18 0.35 0.34 0.63 0.54 0.53 0.54 
1966 0.12 0.13 0.18 1.49 0.26 0.17 0.36 0.36 0.59 0.51 0.57 0.47 
1967 0.14 0.14 0.22 1.03 0.37 0.17 0.54 0.62 0.68 0.44 0.52 0.79 
1968 0.14 0.14 0.59 0.98 0.39 0.20 0.54 0.62 0.57 0.47 0.54 0.79 
1969 0.14 0.16 0.29 0.85 0.36 0.22 0.61 0.73 0.54 0.56 0.59 0.95 
-- - --- -- -
-
31 Chemical industry 
Industries I Year--I- B 
313.1 1962 0.24 0.21 0.39 0.28 0.33 0.31 0.20 0.20 0.36 0.45 0.66 0.55 
Pharma- 1963 0.22 0.22 0.36 0.27 0.32 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.61 0.43 0.50 0.32 
ceutical 1964 0.21 0.21 035 0.28 0.37 0.29 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.33 0.40 0.33 
products 1965 0.20 0.21 0.40 0.28 0.34 0.24 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.25 0.30 0.28 
1966 0.21 0.20 0.35 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.29 0.35 0.26 
1967 0.19 0.19 0.27 0.37 0.30 0.34 0.42 0.42 0.49 0.43 0.36 0.26 
1968 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.39 0.29 0.33 0.36 . 0.36 0.78 0.45 0.40 _ 0.26 
1969 0.21 0.20 0.38 0.34 0.27 0.32 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.44 0.42 0.28 
- --
(Table continues onp. 160.) 
:;:: 38 Manufacture of transport equipment 
o 
:Jl 
m 
:u 
n 
o 
~ 
:u 
-CD 
.... 
N 
Industries I Year 
385.1 1962 
Motor- 1963 
cycles, 1964 
cycles and 1965 
power 1966 
assisted 1967 
cycles 1968 
1969 
1.58 1.27 
1.38 1.28 
1.38 1.34 
1.19 1.30 
1.12 1.06 
1.12 1.05 
1.20 1.20 
1.28 1.21 
0:46 1.53 
2.20 7.51 
1.20 7.78 
0.42 1.39 
1.15 2.68 
IA5 U5 
2.33 37.86 
2.91 3.11 
(Table 1I cont.) 
N 
1.80 0.35 - - -' - - -
6.27 0.72 0.52 0.50 0.92 
-
-, 
-
4.82 0.72 0.52 0.54 0.80 -, 
- -
5.01 1.10 0.55 0.49 0;58 
- - -
1.72 0.95 0.49 0.39 1.16 - - -
8.34 0.96 0.52 0.39 0.64 -. - -
'12.50 0.96 0.57 0.45 0.99 - - -
8.01 1.03 0.68 0.50 0.56 
- - -
- -- -
between the largest firms have been widening. In four industries where there 
is an appreciable increase in concentration, the decline in the number of firms 
led to no change in disparities between the large firms (cotton in France and 
Italy; cycles in Italy; processing of paper and paperboard in France). In six 
other cases, the number of firms declined and concentration advanced as 
the disparities between the biggest firms narrowed down (wool in France; 
knitted and crocheted goods in Belgium; manufacture of pulp, paper and 
paperboard in France; processing of paper and paperboard in Germany; 
pharmaceutical products in Italy; cleaning and maintenance products in 
Belgium). 
In four cases, there was growing equilibrium between the largest firms as 
concentration within the industry diminished and where the trend in the number 
of firms is different (in Italy in the wool industry, knitted and crocheted goods, 
and manufacture and processing of paper and paperboard). 
184. As explained, in some of the industries studied, growing concentration 
tends to I!arrow down or eliminate differences of size between the leading 
firms. It may well be that this entails a temporary strengthening of competition. 
185. Other information is revealed when the study is extended to all the years 
and to all the variables used. We shall give an example of this below for three 
industries and two countries (see Table 11). 
186. A comparison of the weighted Linda indices used shows that the dispari-
ties between the largest firms differ in size according to the variables considered. 
On average, for the eight years the widest disparities are noted in investment, 
net profits and cash flow. This means that, among the big firms in the three 
industries, the largest invest more, draw higher profits and have a heavier 
cash flow than their competitors. The disparities are narrower for the own-
capital, numbers-employed and turnover variables. 
Summary of results 
187. The representativeness of the studies made is open to question. None-
theless, the results lead to the following findings: 
(i) in the Community, the degree of concentration varies widely from 
industry to industry and country to country; 
(ii) from 1962 to 1969 a process of concentration occurred in almost all 
countries and industries, and gradually gathered momentum. The number 
of competitors declined. 
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Part four 
Consumer protection 
162-4
The Heads of State or Government of the Member States and States 
joining the European Communities came out very strongly, at their Paris 
Summit Conference of 19-21 October 1972, in favour of a consumer protection 
policy, and invited the institutions to draw up, before 1 Janll;ary 1974, a social 
programme including measures to strengthen and coordinate action to protect 
consumers. The Commission intends to establish such a programme early 
in 1973. 
This direct call to embark on definite and specific measures was accom-
panied by other statements and basic agreements on other fields closely related 
to consumer interests, such as environment and the control of inflation. 
In line with the policy goals set at. the Summit, and in response to public 
opinion, the Community must give special attention to improving the con-
sumer's quality of life. The next problem is inflation control and the return to 
moderation in the upward movement of prices, so that the consumers-and 
particularly the poorest consumers-are not deprived of the benefits of econo-
mic integration. 
The Commission intends to act on the basis of these fundamental prin-
ciples with the aim of ensuring that the consumer is accorded his rightful 
place in the European integration process. 
1. Influence of the common market on the consumer 
Quality of life 
188. In its Sixth General Report on the Activities of the Communities, 1 
the Commission quoted a number of economic indicators to illustrate the 
improvement in consumers' living standards and the influence of European 
economic integration on these standards. 
However, the improvement in standards can also be measured by the 
expansion of the consumption of certain goods or services whose growth 
constitutes a contribution to the improvement of the qualitative standard of 
living. 
1 Sixth General Report on the Activities of the Communities, sec. 159. 
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These are items which could be described as "dynamic" because of the 
needs and aspirations for which they stand and the social and political choices 
they entail at national and Community level. They are substantially in line 
with the general objectives on social development on which the Community's 
third. medium-term economic policy programme1 had laid the stress, and for 
the attainment of which it had laid down Community policy principles. 
189. A closer examination of certain dynamic components of private con-
sumers' expenditure shows that spending on personal and health needs ex-
panded between 1960 and 1971 by about 3.75 times, which represents an 
average annual increase of about 11.5%, compared with an average increase 
of 9.32% of all private consumers' expenditures. In addition, the rate of 
increase of this demand component rose from 10.36% between 1969 and 1970 
to 12.21 % for 1971.2 As for the trend in health care expenditure proper, 
it is on the cards that final demand for health care will, in the longer run be 
about 20% of overall resources (public and private) allocated to this component. 
The result will be a qualitative improvement in the consumers' living standards. 
190. Expenditure on transport and communications increased by about 
3.6 times between 1960 and 1971, an average increase of 11.30%, compared 
with an average of 9.32% for all private consumers' expenditure. The rate 
of increase for this item rose from 13.9% between 1969 and 1970 to 14.92% 
for 1970/71.2 
This is a particularly important development for the consumer, since 
there seems to be a trend towards an increase in the use of collective transport 
facilities. As there is some evidence that this trend will continue, the Community 
and the public authorities should encourage this by certain technical decisions 
harmonized at European level. 
191. Expenditure on "education, entertainment and leisure" grew by about 
2.75 times between 1960 and 1971, which corresponds to an average increase 
of 9.35%, comparing with an average increase in private consumers' expen-
diture of 9.32%. This group of items also expanded by 11.18% between 1969 
and 1970, and by 8.99% between 1970 and 1971. This trend points to a more 
dynamic expansion of consumption in this area and important policy choices 
along these lines. 
192. What is discernible therefore, in the various Community countries, is 
a tendency for the allocation of resources to the main functions such as food. 
1 OJ No. L 49, 1 March 1971, p. 10. 
2 Source SOEC. 
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health, transport and communications, etc., to come closer together, which 
would seem to suggest an alignment of ways of life and a growing osmosis 
of collective desires and needs in the member countries. 
Consumer purchasing power 
193. The annual report on the economic situation of the Community! expresses 
satisfaction as to the outlook with regard to the improvement of living standards 
in the Community, but sounds a warning on inflation and the danger that 
price increases can become a matter of habit. 
For there is no doubt that the consumers-and particularly the poorest 
consumers-are those hardest hit by the steady upward movements, and in 
any case, any sharp readjustment, however necessary, to the economy would 
be expensive for them. While the upward price push for 1972 was between 
6.5% and 7.0%, the resolution of 31 October adopted by the Council of 
Ministers2 called on the Member States to curb the consumer price increase 
to 4% between December 1972 and the end of 1972. 
194. The action the Commission has endeavoured to put in hand throughout 
1972 with a view to protecting consumer purchasing power was guided by tbis 
approach. 
(a) The Commission's competition poFcy helped to throw light on certain 
reasons for price disparities for identical or similar items as between 
different member countries. Whenever such discrepancies were due to 
a restrictive practice or a market sharing agreement, the Commission 
intervened to restore normal competitive conditions and thus influenced 
the artificial upward movement of prices and the price discrepancies. 3 
For example, in 1972 several restraints having a direct impact on the 
consumer were pinpointed and eliminated. 
(i) Through market sharing and market fragmentation agreements, 
the Community's main sugar producers had succeeded in shielding 
their seIling prices to the food processing industries and to the 
consumers from the competition effect which could have derived 
from free imports. 4 
(ii) Certain practices were designed to maintain price discrepancies 
artificially within the Community for insulating materials (on the 
1 OJ No. C 133, 23 December 1972, p. 1. 
2 OJ No. C 133, 23 December 1972, p. 12. 
3 For technical reasons, the Commission has been unable to make full use of the 1971 SOEC 
survey on retail prices. This will not be the case for the 1972 survey. 
4 Industrie europeenne du sucre, sec. 28. 
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German market the price discrepancy as against the Belgian and 
the Netherlands markets could range up to 40% and more).! 
(iii) Distribution agreements prohibiting exports of gramophone records 
to another Member State made possible the maintenance in that 
State of high prices which could not be corrected by parallel imports. 2 
The Commission feels, nonetheless, that price discrepancies, other than 
those due to infringements of the Treaty's competition rules, will 'in fact 
continue within the Common Market. The discrepancies are not necessarily 
in conflict with the notion of integration of the markets. They will persist until 
certain structural differences between the markets (for example in taxation, 
consumer habits, incomes, distribution channels) have been eliminated, through 
common policies in particular (for example, on taxation) or until incomes, and 
with them living standards, have made further progress towards alignment. 
(i) In 1972 the Commission adopted two regulations on block exemption 
of certain specialization agreements and for the extension of the 
regulation concerning exemption from the ban on restrictive agree-
ments' for certain categories of exclusive dealing agreements. In the 
first case, the aim is to strengthen the competitive power of small-
and medium-sized enterprises by making it easier for them to reor-
ganize and achieve rationalization and, consequently, economies 
of scale, so that they can cut production costs and thus consumer 
prices. 3 The second regulation is also designed to serve the con-
sumers' interests, since they can gain from the advantages of ex-
clusive distribution without being cut off from better supply sources.4 
In both cases it should be possible to pass on to the consumer part 
of the firms' productivity gains. 
(ii) The maintenance of a balanced relationship between the growth 
rate of the gross domestic product and the expansion of public 
spending will also contribute to curbing inflation. The Commission 
had this aspect of its competition policy in mind when it eliminated 
State aids liable to maintain obsolete structures and when it gave 
favourable treatment to those which can play a constructive role 
in economic growth, for example through the optimum allocation 
of production factors and through the passing on of productivity 
gains to the consumer. 5 
1 Pittsburgh Coming Europe, sec. 41. 
2 WEA-Filipacchi Music SA, sec. 40. 
3 OJ No. L 292, 29 December 1972, p. 23. 
4 OJ No. L 276, 9 December 1972, p. 15. 
S Sixth General Report on the Activities 0/ the Communities, sec. 84. 
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(iii) The Commission's work on the adjustment of national commercial 
monopolies fits into this context. Some of the monopolies are more 
particularly harmful for the consumer in that they maintain outdated 
structures and artificially high prices for end products consumed in 
large' quantities. 1 
(b) Fiscal policy is also a major field in which official action can help to defend 
the consumer. 
In 1972, the Commission completed work on establishing a uniform 
basis for V AT. These arrangements ,are, of course, part of the tax har-
monization field; but in so far as they constitute a step towards bringing 
indirect taxation rates closer together they are bound to facilitate. the 
narrowing down of price discrepancies for similar products between 
the Member States and thus benefit the consumer. 
(c) To ensure retail beef and veal prices not exceeding acceptable limits 
and to help the general campaign against inflation, the Community 
suspended Common Customs Tariff duties and levies in this sector for 
the first time in June 1972 and, in October 1972 reduced bee(and veal 
duties by 50%. 
2. General information for the consumer 
195. The Commission has continued work to provide consumers with-adequate 
and objective information on their rights and means of defence. 
The ill-informed consumer, particularly those lacking resources, must 
submit to the law of the- strongest, sellers who have a range of material and 
psychological weapons sufficient to bring pressure to bear and impose choices 
in line with their interests. In this field, the Commission has continued to be 
active. It held two meetings in 1972 with consumer organizations and television, 
at which the discussion on the bases of European information for the consumer 
was .pursued. 
3. Participation in the work of international organizations 
196. The Commission maintained its active participation in the work of 
certain international organizations in the field of consumer information and 
protection. The OECD began its study of ~afety and labelling of consumer 
1 Sixth General Report on the Activities of the Communities, sec. 84. 
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products, except food and pharmaceuticals. The Council of Europe has begun 
work on door to door selling and judicial or quasi-judicial arrangements for 
safeguarding the rights of the consumer. 
4. The consumer's interests and the Commission's work 
197. As part of work on the elimination of technical obstacles to trade, the 
Commission has laid before the Council a number of proposed directives of 
great importance for the consumer. They include proposals concerning the 
first stages of preparation for sale in volume of certain pre-packaged liquids, 
the introduction of safety windows of laminated glass for motor cars, cosmetic 
products and bread. 
It is, however, true that the mere adoption of these proposed directives, 
is only a first step towards consumer protection. The Commission is well 
aware that other measures will be needed in these fields. 
For example, the proposed directive concerning the first stages of pre-
paration for sale of certain pre-packaged liquids will at some time in the future 
have to be amplified by rules concerning unit prices, and the ranges of nominal 
weights will have to be appreciably narrowed if the consumers' interests are 
really to be protected. Again, the rules in the draft directive on safety glass 
will have to be extended to windows other than the windshield. As for the 
proposed directive on cosmetics, based on the principle of a negative list, 
it will have to be amended in coming years to include a positive list of sub-
stances that may be used in cosmetics; the Commission is in full agreement 
on this point with the experts of the Member States' Governments. 
198. The Council of Ministers has adopted a number of important directives 
including directives on detergents, classification, packing and labelling of 
dangerous substances, and dangerous preparations (solvents). 
In the area of harmonization of legislation, the Commission has held its 
first meeting with experts of the Member States on unfair competition. The 
relevance of this field to consumer protection was stressed by most of the par-
ticipants. A study of the following problems was regarded as meriting priority: 
advertizing (including. problems connected with deceitful advertising and 
rules entitling consumer groups to sue in the courts), sales with bonuses and 
rebates, and, finally, indications of provenance and appellations of origin. 
199. Several Members of the European Parliament have called upon the 
Commission to improve its cooperation arrangements with consumer orga-
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nizations and to strengthen efforts to build up a consumer policy.! The Com-
mission2 had explained that the "questions affecting the consumer" department 
included at present only three A-category officials, including the head of service 
plus one official of the B-category. 
On 28 June 1972, the Commission decided, following the dissolution 
of the Consumer Contact Committee, to consult the various European orga-
nizations which had been members of this Committee and the trade union 
liaison bureau-CGT-CGIL-to place at the disposal of these organizations 
for 1973 a sum of Bfrs. 7 million enabling them to participate more actively 
in the Commission's work of concern to them, and to strengthen its consumer 
department. 
1 Written questions No. 633/71, 13 March 1972 and No. 2/72, 22 March 1972, OJ No. 63, 
15 June 1972, pp. 2 and 3. 
2 Commission reply to written question No. 200/72, 4 July 1972, OJ No. C 105, 10 October 
1972, p. 14. 
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Annex 
172-4
LIST 
of individual decisions of the' Commission and rulings of the Court of Justice and text of 
regulations and regulatory decisions of the Commission made in 1972 concerning the applica-
tion of articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty and of articles 60 and 65 of the ECSC Treaty. 
DECISIONS ON INDIVIDUAL CASES 
1. Concerning Articles 85 and 86 0/ the EEC Treaty 
Decision of 17 January 1972 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty "MAN-SAVIEM" 
Decision of 23 February 1972 on an application 
for negative clearance under Article 2 of Council 
Regulation No. 17 "Wild-Leitz" 
Decision of 9 June 1972 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the Treaty "Davidson Rubber Co." 
Decision of 9 June 1972 on an application for 
negative clearance under Article 2 of Council 
Regulation No. 17 "Raymond-Nagoya" 
Decision of 6 July 1972 on a proceeding under 
Article 86 of the Treaty "GEMA" 
Decision of 26 July 1972 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the Treaty "Fine Paper" 
Decision of 28 September 1972 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty and Article 11, 
sec. 5 of Council Regulation No. 17 "Rodenstock" 
Decision of 28 September 1972 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty and Article 11, 
sec. 5 of Council Regulation No. 17 "Misal" 
REP. COMPo 1972 
OJ No. L 31,4.2.1972, p. 29 
IP (72) 16 of 24.1.1972 
Bulletin 3-1972, Ch. I, sec. 3 
OJ No. L 61, 13.3.1972, p. 27 
IP (72) 28 of 10.2.1972 
Bulletin 4-1972, Ch. I, sec. 7 
OJ No. L 143,23.6.1972, p. 31 
IP (72) 121 of23.6.1972 
Bulletin 8-1972, Ch. I, sec. 7 
OJ No. L 143,23.6.1972, p. 39 
IP (72) 121 of 23 .6.1972 
Bulletin 8-1972, Ch. I, sec. 8 
OJ No. L 166, 24.7.1972, p. 22 
IP: none 
Bulletin 9-1972, Ch. I, sec. 11 
OJ No. L 182,10.8.1972, p. 24 
IP (72) 149 of 22.8.1972 
Bulletin 9-1972, Ch. I, sec. 13 
OJ No. L 267, 28.11.1972, p. 17 
IP:none 
Bulletin 10-1972, Ch. I, sec. 17 
OJ No. L 267, 28.11.1972, p. 20 
IP: none 
Bulletin 10-1972, Ch. I, sec. 17 
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Decision of 20 October 1972 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the Treaty "Central Heating" 
Decision of 23 November 1972 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty "Pittsburgh Corning 
Europe - Formica Belgium - Hertel" 
Decision of 14 December 1972 on a proceeding 
under Article 86 of the Treaty "ZOJA/C.S.C. -
I.C.I." 
Decision of 18 December 1972 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty "Cementregeling 
voor Nederland - 1971" 
Decision of 22 December 1972 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty "CIMBEL" 
Decision of 22 December 1972 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty "Wea-Fi/ipacchi 
Music S.A." 
Decision of 22 December 1972 on a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty "Decisions by 
G.I.S.A.-association" 
Decision of 2 January 1973 on a proceeding under 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty "European Sugar 
Industry" 
2. Concerning Article 65 0/ the ECSC Treaty 
(a) Coal 
OJ No. L 264, 23.11.1972, p. 22 
IP (72) 182 of 27 .10.1972 
Bulletin 10-1972, Ch. I, sec. 16 
OJ No. L 272, 5.12.1972, p. 35 
IP (72) 198 of 29. 11.1972 
Bulletin 11-1972, Ch. J, sec. 6 
OJ No. L 299,31.12.1972, p. 51 
IP (72) 218 of 22.12.1972 
Bulletin 12-1972, Ch. I, sec. 17 
OJ No. L 303, 31.12.1972, p. 7 
IP (72) 221 of 22.12.1972 
Bulletin 12-1972, Ch. I, sec. 14 
OJ No. L 303, 31.12.1972, p. 24 
IP (73) 3 of 3.1. 1973 
Bulletin 12-1972, Ch. I, sec. 15 
OJ No. L 303, 31.12.1972, p. 52 
IP (72) 219 of 22.12.1972 
Bulletin 12-1972, Ch. I, sec. 16 
OJNo. L 303, 31.12.1972, p. 45 
IP (73) 4 of 5.1.1973 
Bulletin 12-1972, Ch. I, sec. 18 
OJNo. L 140, 26.5.1973, p. 17 
IP (72) 216 of 18.12.1972 
Bulletin 12-1972, Ch. I, sec. 13 
Decision No. 72jI45/ECSC of 8 March 1972 OJ No. L 76 of 29. 3. 1972, p. 30 
prorogating authority of the joint sale of fuels of 
Houilleres du bassin de Lorraine and Saarberg-
werke AG by "Saarlor" 
Decision No. 72/192/ECSC of 21 April 1972 OJ No. L 112 of 14. 5. 1972, p. 22 
relating to the authorization of joint purchase of 
fuels by wholesale coal dealers in southern 
Germany by agents of the Oberrheinische Kohlen-
union Bettag, Puton und Co., Mannheim 
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(b) Steel 
Decision No. 72/153/ECSC of 22 March 1972 OINo. L 85 of 11.4.1972, p. 17 
regarding the authorization extended for the joint 
purchase of rolled steel by wholesale distributors 
of steel grouped in the company "Stahlring" and 
"Stahlring GmbH, Stahleinkaufsgesellschaft" 
Decision No. 72/413/ECSC of 9 November 1972 01 No. L 283 of 20.12.1972, p. 17 
authorizing the conclusion of an agreement 
between Hoesch Werke Hohenlimburg-Schwerte 
AG and Benteler Werke AG 
RULINGS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
Ruling (14 July 1972) in cases 
"48/69 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd 
49169 Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik 
51/69 Farbenfabriken Bayer AG 
52/69 J. R. Geigy AG 
53/69 Sandoz AG 
54/69 Societe fram;aise des matieres colorantes 
SA 
55/69 Cassella Farbwerke Mainkur AG 
56/69 Farbwerke Hoechst AG 
57/69 Azienda Colori Nazionali e Affini-ACNA 
v. Commission" 
Ruling (17 October 1972) in case 8/72: "VCH 
v. Commission" 
Ruling (14 December 1972) in case 7/72: "Boeh-
ringer v. Commission" 
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01 No. C 125, 1.12.1972, p. 17 
Bulletin 9/1972, second part, chap. IV, 
sec. 181 
OINo. C 15, 30.3.1973, p. 13 
Bulletin 10/1972, second part, chap. 
IV/CJ, sec. 259 
01 No. C 3, 5.2.1973, p. 7 
Bulletin 12-1972, second part, chap. 
IV/CJ, sec. 154 
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REGULATION (EEC) No. 2591/72 OF THE COMMISSION 
of 8 December 1972 
amending Regulation No. 67/67 /EEC of 22 March 1967 concerning application 
of article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of concerted practices1 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community, and in par-
ticular Articles 87 and 155 thereof; 
Having regard to Article 24 of Regulation 
No. 172 of 6 February 1962; 
Having regard to Regulation No. 19/65/ 
EEC3 of 2 March 1965 on the application 
of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements and concerted 
practices; 
Having regard to the Opinions delivered by 
the Advisory Committee on Restrictive 
Practices and Monopolies in accordance 
with Article 6 of Regulation No. 19/65/EEC; 
Whereas under Regulation No. 19/65/EEC 
the Commission has power to apply Ar-
ticle 85(3) of the Treaty by regulation to 
certain categories of bilateral exclusive 
dealing agreements and concerted practices 
coming within Articles 85(1); 
Whereas Commission Regulation No. 67/ 
67/EEC4 on the application of Article 85(3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of exclusive 
dealing agreements is valid only until 
31 December 1972; 
Whereas the experience gained in connection 
with Regulation No. 67/67/EEC shows that 
the rule under this Regulation whereby 
Article 85(1) of the Treaty is declared 
inapplicable to certain categories of exclu-
sive dealing agreements, subjects to the 
provisions of that Regulation, has proved 
its value. 
Whereas it is therefore expedient to extend 
the validity of Regulation No. 67/67/EEC; 
whereas it appears desirable, for the sake 
of certainty in the law, to extend the period 
of validity of the Regulation for ten years 
and so enable undertakings to plan for a 
long period ahead; 
Whereas such extension also appears un-
objectionable since under Article 7 of 
Regulation No. 19/65/EEC in conjunction 
with Article 6 of Regulation No. 67/67/EEC 
the Commission may at any time intervene 
if it finds that the agreements falling within 
the Regulation have effects that are incom-
patible with the conditions contained in 
Article 85(3) of the Treaty; 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article 1 
In Article 1(\) of Regulation No. 67/67/EEC 
the date "31 December 1982" shall be 
substituted for the date "31 December 1972". 
Article 2 
This Regulation shall enter into force on 
the day of its publication in the Official 
Journal 0/ the European Communities. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all 
Member States. 
1 OJ No. L 276,9.12.1972, p. 15. 
2 OJ No. 13,21.2.1962, p. 204/62. 
3 OJ No. 36, 6.3.1965, p. 533/65. 
4 OJ No. 57, 25.3.1967, p. 849/67. 
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REGULATION (EEC) No. 2743/72 OF THE COUNCIL 
of 19 December 1972 
amending Regulation (EEC) No. 2821/71 on the application of Article 85(3} 
of the Treaty to categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices I 
THF COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN 
CO MMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty concerning 
the Accession of new Member States to 
the European Economic Community and 
the European Atomic Energy Community, 
signed on 22 January 1972, and in particular 
Article 153 of the Act annexed thereto; 
Having regard to the proposal from the 
Commission; 
Whereas Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
2821/71 2 of 10 December 1971, on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to 
categories of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices requires amendments 
corresponding to those made to Regulation 
No. 19/65/EEC, the amendments to which 
are set out in Annex I to the Act of Accession, 
so that the agreements which, by virtue of Ac-
cession, come within the scope of Article 85 of 
the Treaty establishing the European Econ-
omic Community may benefit from exemp-
tion from the prohibition laid down in 
paragraph 1 of the said Article; 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article 1 
Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No. 2821/71 
shall be amended as follows: 
1. The following is inserted at the end of 
paragraph I: 
"A Regulation adopted pursuant to 
Article 1 may lay down that the pro-
hibition referred to in Article S5( I) of 
the Treaty shall not apply, for the period 
fixed in the same Regulation, to agree-
ments and concerted practices which 
existed at the date of accession and 
which, by virtue of accession, come 
within the scope of Article 85 and do not 
fulfil the conditions set out in Article 
85(3)." 
2. Paragraph 2 shall be supplemented by 
the following: 
"Paragraph I shall be applicable to 
those agreements and concerted practices 
which, by virtue of the accession, come 
within the scope of Article 85(1) of 
the Treaty and for which notification 
before 1 July 1973 is mandatory, in 
accordance with Articles 5 and 25 of 
Regulation No. 17, only if notification 
was given before that date." 
Article 2 
This Regulation shall enter into force upon 
accession. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all 
Member States. 
I OJ No. L 291, 28.12.1972, p. 144. 
2 OJ No. L 285, 29.12.1971, p. 46. 
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REGULATION (EEC) No. 2779/72 OF THE COMMISSION 
of 21 December 1972 
on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of 
specialisation agreements! 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community, and 
in particular Articles 87 and 155 thereof; 
Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) 
No. 2821/71 of 20 December 1971 2 on 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty 
to categories of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices; 
Having regard to the Opinions of the Ad-
visory Committee on Restrictive Practices 
and Monopolies delivered pursuant to 
Article 6 of Regulation (EEC) No. 2821/71; 
Whereas under Regulation (EEC) No. 2821/ 
71 the Commission has power to apply 
Article 85(3) of the Treaty by regulation to 
certain categories of agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices relating to specialisa-
tion, including agreements necessary for 
achieving it, which fall within Article 85(1); 
Whereas, since the adoption of such a 
Regulation would not conflict with the 
application of Regulation No. 17, the right 
of undertakings to apply in individual cases 
to the Commission for a declaration under 
Article 85(3) of the Treaty would not 
thereby be affected; 
Whereas agreements for the specialisation 
of production may fall within the prohibi-
tion contained in Article 85(1); 
Whereas agreements for 'the specialisation 
of production lead in general to an im-
provement in the production or distribution 
of goods, because the undertakings can 
concentrate on the manufacture of certain 
products, thus operate on a more rational 
basis and offer these products at more 
favourable prices; whereas it is to be an-
ticipated that, with effective competition, 
consumers will receive a fair share of the 
profit resulting therefrom; 
Whereas this Regulation must determine 
what restrictions on competition may be 
included in a specialisation agreement; 
~ OJ No. L 292, 29.12.1972, p. 23. 
OJ No. L 285,29.12.1971, p. 46. 
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whereas the restrictions on competition 
provided for in this Regulation are, in 
general, indispensable for the purpose of 
ensuring that the desired benefits accrue to 
undertakings and consumers; whereas it 
may be left to the contracting parties to 
decide which of these provisions they 
include in their agreements; 
Whereas in order to ensure that competition 
is not eliminated in respect of a substantial 
part ofthe goods in question, this Regulation 
applies only if the share of the market held 
by the participating undertakings and the 
size of the undertakings themselves do not 
exceed a specified limit; 
Whereas this Regulation should also apply 
to specialisation agreements made prior to 
its entry into force; 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article 1 
Pursuant to Article 85(3) it is hereby declared 
that, subject as provided in this Regulation, 
until 31 December 1977 Article 85(1) of the 
Treaty shall not apply to agreements where-
by, with the object of specialisation, under-
takings mutually bind themselves for the 
duration of the agreements not to manu-
facture certain products or cause them to be 
manufactured by other undertakings, 'and to 
leave it to the other contracting parties to 
manufacture such products or cause them 
to be manufactured by other undertakings. 
Article 2 
1. Apart from the obligation referred to 
in Article 1, no other restriction on com-
petition shall be imposed on the contracting 
parties save the following: 
(a) the obligation not to conclude with 
other undertakings specialisation agree-
ments relating to identical products 
or to products considered by consumers 
to be similar by reason of their charac-
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teristics, price or use, except with the 
consent of the other contracting parties; 
(b) the obligation to supply the other con-
tracting parties with the products which 
are the subject of specialisation, and in 
so doing to observe minimum standards 
of quality; 
(c) the obligation to purchase products 
which are the subject of specialisation 
solely from the other contracting parties, 
except where more favourable terms of 
purchase are available elsewhere and 
the other contracting parties are not 
prepared to offer the same terms; 
(d) the obligation to grant to the other con-
tracting parties the exclusive right to 
distribute the products which are the 
subject of specialisation so long as those 
parties do not-in particular by the 
exercise of industrial property rights or 
of other rights and measures-limit the 
opportunities, for intermediaries or con-
sumers, of purchasing the products to 
which the agreement relates from other 
dealers within the common market. 
2. Article 1 shall apply notwithstanding 
that the following obligations are imposed: 
(a) the obligation to maintain minimum 
stocks of the products which are the 
subject of specialisation and of replace-
ment parts for them; 
(b) the obligation to provide after-sale and 
guarantee services for the products which 
are the subject of specialisation. 
Article 3 
1. Article 1 shall apply only: 
(a) if the products which are the subject of 
specialisation represent in any member 
country not more than 10 per cent of the 
volume of business done in identical 
products or in products considered by 
consumers to be similar by reason of 
their characteristics, price or use; and 
(b) if the aggregate annual turnover of the 
participating undertakings does not ex-
ceed 150 million units of account. 
2. For purposes of applying paragraph 1 
the unit of account shall be that adopted in 
drawing up the budget of the Community in 
accordance with Articles 207 and 209 of the 
Treaty. 
REP. COMPo 1972 
3. Article 1 of this Regulation shall 
continue to apply notwithstanding that in 
any two consecutive financial years the share 
of the market or the turnover is greater than 
as specified in paragraph 1, provided the 
excess is not more than 10%. 
Article 4 
The aggregate turnover within the meaning 
of Article 3(1)(b) shall be calculated by 
adding together the turnover achieved during 
the last financial year in respect of all prod. 
ucts and services: 
1. by the undertakings which are parties to 
the agreement; 
2. by undertakings in respect of which the 
undertakings which are parties to the 
agreement hold: 
- at least 25% of the capital or of the 
working capital whether directly or 
indirectly; or 
- at least half the voting rights; or 
- the power to appoint at least half the 
members of the supervisory board, 
board of management' or bodies 
legally representing the undertaking; or 
- the right to manage the affairs of the 
undertaking; 
3. by undertakings which hold in an under-
taking which is a party to the agreement: 
- at least 25% of the capital or of the 
working capital whether directly or 
indirectly; or 
- at least half the voting rights; or 
- the power to appoint at least half the 
members of the supervisory board, 
board of management or bodies legally 
representing the undertaking; or 
- the right to manage the affairs of the 
undertaking. 
In calculating aggregate turnover no account 
shall be taken of dealings between the 
undertakings which are parties to the 
agreement. 
Article 5 
The Commission shall examine whether 
Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No. 2821/71 
applies in any specific case, in particular 
where there is reason to believe that rationali-
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sation is not yielding significant results or 
that consumers are not receiving a fair 
share of the resulting profit. 
Article 6 
The non-applicability of Article 85(1) 
provided for in Article 1 of this Regulation 
shall have retroactive effect from the time 
when the conditions requisite for the 
application of this Regulation were satisfied. 
In the case of agreements which, prior to 
18 January 1972, were compulsorily noti-
fiable, the time aforesaid shall not be earlier 
than the day of notification. 
Article 7 
Articles 1. to 6 of this Regulation shall apply 
by analogy to decisions by associations of 
undertakings and to concerted practices. 
Article 8 
This Regulation shall enter into force on 
1 January 1973. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all 
Member States. 
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COMMISSION DECISION 
of 22 December 1972 
amending Decision No. 30-53 of 2 May 1953 on practices prohibited by 
Article 60(1) of the Treaty in the common market for coal and steeP 
(72/440/ECSC) 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community, and 
in particular Articles 2 to 5, 60 and 63(2) 
thereof; 
Having regard to High· Authority Decision 
No. 30-53 as amended by Decision No. 19/63 
of 11 December 1963;2 
After consulting the Consultative Committee 
and the Council; 
Whereas Article 60(1) prohibits discrimina-
tory practices involving, within the common 
market, the application by one and the same 
seller of dissimilar conditions to comparable 
transactions; whereas that provision specifies 
that the practices which are prohibited may 
further be defined; whereas the High 
Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community has in Decision No. 30-53 
defined the practices which are prohibited 
under Article 60(1); 
Whereas Article 2 of Decision No. 30-53, as 
amended by Decision No. 1-54,3 provides 
that any departure from the price lists 
constitutes a discriminatory practice, unless 
the seller shows either that the transaction in 
question does not fall within the categories 
of transactions covered by the price list or 
that the prices or conditions have been 
departed from uniformly in all comparable 
transactions; 
Whereas experience has shown that under 
this definition of what constitutes a pro-
hibited discriminatory practice certain essen-
tial aspects of the prohibition are not 
covered; whereas it therefore appears 
necessary to specify further when trans-
actions are to be considered comparable and 
in what circumstances conditions are to be 
considered dissimilar; 
l OJ No. L 297, 30.12.1972, p. 39. 
2 OJ No 187, 24.12.1963, p. 2969/63. 
3 ECSC Gazette No. 1,13.1.1954, p. 217. 
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Whereas in defining comparable transactions 
full account must be taken of the protective 
aim of the prohibition against discrimina-
tion; whereas prohibition of discriminatory 
practices is intended mainly to protect 
purchases against disadvantages which may 
result from the application of different 
prices and conditions; whereas for the 
purpose of determining whether transactions 
are comparable, it is necessary to establish 
whether the position of the purchasers is 
comparable; whereas this is the case when 
they compete with one another in distribu-
ting their products or when they produce the 
same or similar goods or carry out similar 
functions in distribution; whereas, moreover, 
the prerequisite as regards comparability of 
transactions is that they involve the same 
or similar products and that such of their 
commercial features as may be considered 
of importance do not essentially differ; 
whereas transactions concluded at different 
moments of time are not to be considered 
comparable when the seller has, in the 
meantime, altered his prices and conditions 
generally and not merely on a temporary 
basis; 
Whereas as regards dissimilarity of con-
ditions, if the conditions only make appro-
priate allowance for differences in the services 
rendered or in the carrying out of trans-
actions, those conditions are not to be 
considered dissimilar; whereas where a 
seller allows periods for payment more 
favourable than those which he applies 
generally, this constitutes a: dissimilar 
condition if the advantage so allowed is not 
offset by an increase in price; 
Whereas the facts or circumstances which 
go to show that transactions are not com-
parable, or which are of importance in 
determining whether conditions are to be 
considered similar, are within the knowledge 
of the undertakings; whereas the under-
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takings must therefore be required to 
produce the relevant evidence; 
Whereas the rules on alignment on the 
lower delivered prices of other undertakings 
in the common market should be supple-
mented; whereas in cases where in accor-
dance with the rules on publication of 
prices, there exists no obligation to publish 
prices, in respect of certain products or 
individual groups of purchasers for example, 
the prices and conditions effectively applied 
by the competitor are to be taken as the 
basis for alignment; 
HAS ALiOPTED THIS DECISION: 
Article 1 
The following Articles shall be substituted 
for Article 2 of Decision No. 30-53: 
"Article 2 
I. It shall be a prohibited practice 
within the meaning of Article 60(1) of 
the Treaty for a seller to apply in the 
common market dissimilar conditions 
(Article 4) to comparable transactions 
(Article 3). 
2. The preceding paragraph shall be 
without prejudice to the application of 
Article 60(2)(b) of the Treaty and of 
decision adopted in connection therewith. 
Article 3 
I. Transactions shall be considered com-
parable within the meaning of Article 60(1) 
if 
(a) they are concluded with purchasers, 
- who compete with one another, or 
- who produce the same or similar 
goods, or 
- who carry out similar functions in 
distribution, 
(b) they involve the same or similar 
products, 
(c) in addition, their other relevant 
commercial features do not essentially 
differ. 
2. Transactions shall not be considered 
comparable within the meaning of Article 
60(1) if between the dates of their being 
agreed upon a lasting change occurred in 
the seller's prices and conditions of sale. 
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Article 4 
I. Conditions shall not be considered 
dissimilar within the meaning of Article 
60(1) of the Treaty if different conditions, 
which make appropriate allowance for 
differences in the services rendered, or in 
the carrying out of transactions, are 
applied by a seller to comparable trans-
actions. 
2. Conditions shall be considered dis-
similar if, without a corresponding 
increase in price, a seller allows periods 
for payment more favourable than those 
generally applied to comparable trans-
actions. 
Article 5 
Undertakings which allege that trans-
actions are not comparable {Article 3) or 
that conditions are not to be considered 
dissimilar (Article 4) shall, at the request 
of the Commission, set out the facts and 
circumstances which may justify this." 
Article 2 
The following shall be substituted for Article 
3 of Decision No. 30-53: 
"Article 6 
I. Where, under Article 60(2)(b) of the 
Treaty, a seller aligns his quotation on a 
competitor's price list or, in so far as there 
exists no obligation or there exists only a 
limited obligation to publish prices, on 
the prices and conditions actually applied 
by a competitor, it shall be a prohibited 
practice within the meaning of Article 
60(1) of the Treaty for him to apply 
conditions affording the purchaser a 
delivered price lower than that at which 
the purchaser could obtain the goods 
from the competitor. 
2. In calculating delivered prices account 
shall be taken of transport costs, sur-
charges or taxes borne by the purchaser, 
less rebates or drawbacks allowed him, 
in addition to the prices and conditions. 
3. Where, under the last subparagraph 
Article 60(2)(b) of the Treaty, the seller 
aligns his quotation on the conditions 
quoted by undertakings outside the 
Community, the provisions of paragraphs 
1 and 2 shall apply correspondingly. 
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4. Undertakings which allege that pur-
suant to Article 60(2)(b) they have aligned 
their quotation on a lower delivered price 
of a competitor in the common market or 
an undertaking outside the common 
market, shall, at the request of the 
Commission, show that the conditions 
for alignment had been obtained and 
that they had complied with the provisions 
of paragraphs 1 to 3 of this Article in 
calculating the price. 
The condition for alignment under the last 
subparagraph of Article 60(2)(b) is that 
alignment has been imposed by the 
effective competition of the undertaking 
outside the Community." 
Article 3 
Articles 4 and 6 of Decision No. 30-53 shall 
be deleted; Article 5 shall be renumbered 7; 
Article 7 shall be renumbered 8. 
Article 4 
1. In Article 8 of Decision No.3-53: 
- in the last sentence of paragraph 1 the 
words "or the prices" shall be inserted 
REP. COMPo 1972 
after "the price lists" and the words 
"Articles 2 to 7" shall be substituted for 
"Articles 2 to 6", 
- in paragraph 3 the words "the Com-
mission" shall be substituted for "the 
High Authority". 
2. Article 8 as so amended shall be 
renumbered 9. 
Article 5 
1. In Article 9 of Decision No. 30-53 the 
words "Articles 2 to 7" shall be substituted 
for "Articles 2 to 6". 
2. Article 9 as so amended shall be 
renumbered 10. 
Article 6 
This Decision shall enter into force on 
1 January 1973. 
The text of Decision No. 30-53 as amended 
by the Decision shall be published under 
information in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities. 
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COMMISSION DECISION 
of 22 December 1972 
amending Decision No. 31-53 on the publication of price lists and conditions of 
sale applied by undertakings in the steel industry 1 
(72/441/ECSC) 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EURO- HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: 
PEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community, and 
in particular Articles 2 to 5, 60 and 63(2) 
thereof; 
Having regard to High Authority Decision 
No. 31-53, as amended by Decision No. 20-
63 of 11 December 1963 2 ; 
After consulting the Consultative Committee; 
Whereas by Decision No. 72/4403 of 22 
December 1972 the Commission redefined 
discriminatory practices within the meaning 
of Article 60(1) of the Treaty; whereas 
undertakings are consequently enabled to 
vary their prices according to consumer 
groups without thereby infringing the 
prohibition on discriminatory practices; 
whereas in view of the state of the steel 
market it does not appear to be necessary to 
require undertakings to publish in their 
price lists the surcharges or rebates for 
individual consumer groups; whereas it 
will be sufficient that undertakings be 
required to notify the Commission thereof; 
Whereas provision should be made so that 
the Commission has power to require 
undertakings which apply such price differ-
entials to a considerable extent to publish 
them in their price lists; 
Whereas certain steel products may be 
exempted from the requirements relating to 
compulsory publication; whereas the prod-
ucts here involved are those for which the 
number of suppliers and purchasers is small, 
the position in the market being clear even 
without publication of prices; 
Whereas it appears appropriate to extend 
the time limit for the application of new 
price lists from one to two days; 
1 OJ No. L 297,30.12.1972, p. 42. 
2 OJ No. 187, 24.12.1963, p. 2972/63. 
3 OJ No. 297, 30.12.1972, p. 39. 
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Article 1 
Article 2 of Decision No. 31-53 is amended 
to read as follows: 
.. All price lists and conditions of sale 
published shall contain the following 
information: 
(a) basic prices according to category of 
products, or basic prices for each 
grade and category of products; 
(b) extras which are applied, indicating 
- extras for size and length, 
- extras for grades and quality, 
- quantity extras and rebates for each 
sample and/or for each specified 
order, 
- tolerances not liable to surcharge, 
- extras for reduced tolerances; 
- also surcharges and increases nor-
mally applied in connection with 
delivery of the various products; 
(c) place of delivery; 
(d) method of quotation; 
(e) costs in connection with method of 
shipment; 
(f) where they are applied: 
- quantity rebates granted subse-
quently in respect of quantities 
actually supplied over a period of 
not less than one year; 
- discounts, rebates, premiums or 
any other kind of benefit to dealers, 
selling agencies or users; 
(g) terms of payment; 
(h) nature and amount of taxes and other 
charges additional to the prices on the 
price lists, under the terms offered to 
purchasers; 
(i) where the conditions which apply to 
the transaction relate to the price list 
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in force on the day on which the order 
is placed and may be subject to 
revision: 
- the circumstances in which such 
revision may occur." 
Article 2 
Article 3 of Decision No. 31-53 is amended 
to read as foHows: 
"Price lists of an undertaking shall not 
contain prices for products which are not 
actually offered on the market by that 
undertaking. " 
Article 3 
Article 4 of Decision No. 31-53 is amended 
to read as follows: 
"1. (a) Price lists and conditions of sale 
shall apply not earlier than two 
clear days after they have been 
addressed to the Commission; 
(b) Sellers shall, upon request, com-
municate them to anyone. in-
terested; 
(c) The Commission may decide to 
publish such price lists and con-
ditions of sale by means of a 
special publication. 
2. Paragraph I shall apply equally to 
any amendment of price lists and con-
ditions of sale." 
Article 4 
The following Article is inserted after 
Article 4 of Decision No. 31-53: 
"Article 5 
1. U ndertakin gs in the steel industry 
need not publish in their price lists price 
differentials applied to individual con-
sumer groups. 
2. Where such differentials are applied, 
undertakings shall, however, notify them 
to the Commission. Article 4 of this 
Decision shall apply. 
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3. Where it is established that the number 
or the volume of the differentials make 
publication necessary, the Commission 
may require any undertaking in the iron 
and steel industry to publish in their 
price lists some or all of the differentials 
applied." 
Article 5 
Articles 5 and 6 of Decision No. 31-53 are 
renumbered 6 and 7 respectively. 
Article 6 
Article 7 of Decision No. 31-53 is renum-
bered 8 and is amended to read as follows: 
"Article 8 
Undertakings in the steel industry need 
not publish their prices for the following 
products: 
1. Steelmaking pig iron, 
2. Single purpose steel sections, 
3. Organically coated sheet steel (sheet 
steel plastic-coated or pre-lacquered), 
4. Second class and off-grade products, 
5. Steels of non-standard character con-
taining less than 0.6% of carbon, the 
chemical and mechanical properties 
of which are not of themselves suffi-
cient to enable comparisons to be 
made between them; 
6. Steels of like character, known as 
"physical" or "magnetic" steels, hav-
ing certain electrical and magnetic 
properties. U 
Article 7 
This Decision shall enter into force on 
1 January 1973. 
The text of Decision No. 31-53, as amended 
by this Decision, shall be published by way 
of Notice in the Official Journal 0/ the 
European Communities. 
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COMMISSION DECISION 
of 22 December 1972 
amending Decision No.4-53 on the publication of price lists and conditions of 
sale applied by undertakings in the coal and iron-ore industries 1 
(72/442/ECSC) 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community, and 
in particular Articles 2 to 5, 60 and 63(2) 
thereof; 
Having regard to High Authority Decision 
No.4-53, as amended by Decision No. 22-632 
of 11 December 1963; 
After consulting the Consultative Committee; 
Whereas by Decision No. 72/440 of 22 
December 19723 the Commission redefined 
discriminatory practices within the meaning 
of Article 60(1) of the Treaty; whereas 
undertakings are consequently enabled to 
vary their prices according to consumer 
groups without thereby infringing the 
prohibition on discriminatory practices; 
Whereas, so that the position in the market 
may be clear, undertakings should be 
required to publish their increases or re-
ductions in prices; 
Whereas quantity and loyalty bonuses are 
applied extensively in respect of coal sales; 
whereas so that the market situation be clear, 
it is appropriate that exemption from com-
pulsory publication be no longer allowed as 
regards such bonuses; 
Whereas, since relations between under-
takings in the Community steel and iron-ore 
industries are such that iron-ore is consumed 
1 OJNo. L 297,30.12.1972, p. 44. 
2 OJ No. 187,24.12.1963, p. 2975/63. 
3 OJ No. L 297,30.12.1972, p. 39. 
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almost exclusively by combined undertakings 
so that virtually no market for Community 
iron-ore exists, the provisions governing the 
publication of price lists and conditions of 
sale applied by the iron-ore industry should 
be repealed; 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: 
Article 1 
Decision No.4-53, as amended on II Decem-
ber 1963, is amended as follows: 
I.'The words "and iron-ore" are deleted 
. from the title and from Article 1(1) 
and (3). 
2. The following is added to Article 2(2): 
"(f) price increases and reductions for 
specific consumer groups; 
(g) quantity and loyalty bonuses." 
3. Article 2(3) is hereby repealed. 
4. The words "large coke and crushed coke" 
are deleted from point 2 of Article 3, 
and point 5 is deleted. 
Article 2 
This Decision shall enter into force on 
1 January 1973. 
The text of Decision No.4-53, as amended 
by this Decision, shall be published by way 
of Notice in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities. 
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COMMISSION DECISION 
of 22 December 1972 
on alignment of prices fqrsales of coal in the common market 1 
(72/443/ECSC) 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EURO· 
PEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the .Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community, and 
in particular Articles 60(2)(b) and 47 thereof; 
Having regard to Decision No. 30.53 2 of 
2 May 1953 concerning practices prohibited 
in the common market for coal and steel 
und.er Article 60(1) of the Treaty; 
Having regard to Decision No. 3.583 of 
18 March 1958 on alignment of prices for 
sales of coal in the common market; 
Having regard to the Decision of the Council 
of the European Communities of 22 January 
1972 concerning the accession of new 
Member States to the European Coal and 
Steel Community. and in particular Article 
153 of the Act annexed thereto; 
After consulting the Consultative Committee; 
Whereas, to avoid disturbances of the 
common market, Decision No. 3·58 res· 
tricted the right of undertakings to align 
prices on a price list established on another 
basing point and securing for the buyer the 
most advantageous conditions at the place 
of delivery; 
Whereas since 1958 changes have occurred 
in the common market for coal; whereas 
the restrictions on the right of alignment 
must be adapted to changed circumstances; 
whereas the accession of the United King· 
dom, Denmark and Ireland and its con· 
sequences for the coal market must be 
borne in mind; 
Whereas the rules laid down by Decision 
No. 3·58 must consequently be replaced by 
new provisions; whereas, under Article 30 
of the Act, this must be done in conformity 
with the guidelines set out in Annex II 
thereto; 
Whereas the right to align must to this end 
be confined to the price lists of undertakings 
and selling agencies which, because of the 
1 OJ No. L297, 30.12.72, p.45. 
2 ECSC Gazelle No.6, 4.5.1953, p. 109. 
3 ECSC Gazelle No. 11,29.3.1958, p. 157158. 
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volume and nature of production, are 
influential in the formation of prices in the 
common market; whereas experience since 
1958 has shown that this means undertakings 
which sell on the common market more than 
one million tons annually of hard coal or 
products obtained from hard or brown 
coal of their own production; whereas, 
moreover, undertakings who are soon to 
cease production should be taken into 
consideration; 
Whereas, furthermore, the tonnages which 
undertakings may supply under alignment 
should be limited; whereas to avoid per· 
ceptible alterations to traditional supply 
channels such limitations should be defined 
in geographical terms and for the principal 
groups of products; 
Whereas the exercise of the right to align 
presupposes that the fuels to be supplied are 
comparable to those in the price list on 
which alignment is effected; 
Whereas in order to prevent illicit under· 
quotation, undertakings are required under 
Article 3 of Decision No. 30·53 to have 
regard to all the terms of the competitor's 
price list when calculating the delivered 
price; 
Whereas, in order that delivered prices may 
be calculated accurately, undertakings must 
be required to know the exact amount of 
the transport costs; 
Whereas, to facilitate the verification of 
authorised alignments where shipping costs 
are involved, undertakings must supply the 
Commission with information on the costs 
taken into account; whereas the Commission 
may publish the shipping costs used in an 
appropriate manner for the information of all 
concerned; 
Whereas so that the scale of the transactions 
carried out by undertakings as a result of 
alignment may be assessed and so that a 
check may be kept as to whether this 
Decision is applied correctly, undertakings 
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must be required to notify the Commission 
at regular intervals of the character and 
amount of the transactions that they carry 
out under alignment; 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: 
Article 1 
1. Undertakings in the coal industry may 
use their right to align their prices on a price 
list established on another basing point and 
securing for the buyer more advantageous 
conditions at the place of delivery only in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
following Articles of this Decision. 
2. This Decision shall also apply to the 
selling agencies of undertakings in the coal 
industry within the meaning of Article 1(2) 
of Decision No. 30-53. 
Article 2 
Undertakings in the coal industry shall 
align their prices on the price lists of none 
other than the undertakings and selling 
agencies listed below: 
- Aachner Kohlenverkauf GmbH, Aachen, 
- Comptoir beige des charbons, Bruxelles, 
- Gewerkschaft Auguste-Viktoria, Marl 
i.W., 
- HouilIeres du Bassin du Centre et du 
Midi, Saint-Etienne, 
- HouilIeres du Bassin de Lorraine, Metz, 
- Houilleres du Bassin du Nord et du 
Pas-de-Calais, Douai, 
- Maatschappij Laura & Vereeniging, 
Eygelshoven, 
- Maatschappij Oranje-Nassau, Heerlen, 
- National Coal Board, London, 
- Niedersachsischer Kohlen-Verkauf 
GmbH, Hannover, 
- Rheinischer Braunkohlenbrikett-Verkauf 
GmbH, Koln, 
- Ruhrkohle AG, Essen, 
- Saarbergwerke AG, Saarbriicken, 
- Sophia-Jacoba Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH, Hiickelhoven, 
- Verkoopkantoor der Staatsmijnen, Den 
Haag. 
Article 3 
1. In each of the sales areas listed below 
the undertakings listed in Article 2 may align 
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only up to the tonnage marketed by them in 
that area during the preceding calendar year. 
The sales areas for the purposes of this 
provision shall be the following: 
(a) Great Britain and Northern Ireland; 
(b) In the Federal Republic of Germany: 
- Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, 
Hamburg and Bremen, 
- North-Rhineland-Westphalia, Rhine-
land-Pfalz and Saarland, 
- Hessen, Baden-Wiirttemberg and 
Bayern; 
(c) Belgium and Luxemburg; 
(d) In France: 
- the region to the east of and including 
the departments of Aisne, Seine et 
Marne, Loiret, Loir-et-Cher, Indre, 
Haute-Vienne, Dordogne, Lot-et-Ga-
ronne, Gers, Hautes-pyrenees, 
- all other French departments; 
(e) Italy; 
(f) The Netherlands; 
(g) Denmark; 
(h) Ireland. 
2. The tonnages referred to in paragraph 1 
shall apply separately to each of the following 
products: 
(a) Hard coal for coke production; 
(b) Hard coal for domestic and small-scale 
consumption; 
(c) Other hard coals; 
(d) Furnace coke; 
(e) Foundry coke; 
(f) Other coke; 
(g) Hard coal briquettes; 
(h) Brown coal briquettes. 
3. Upon receipt of an application setting 
out the reasons therefor the Commission 
may, in favour of certain undertakings or 
selling agencies, increase the maximum 
tonnages indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2. 
Article 4 
1. Alignment shall be permitted only if the 
undertaking is able to ascertain exactly the 
amount of the transport costs to the place of 
destination. 
2. Where transport costs are not published, 
the undertaking which is aligning shall, 
where necessary, ascertain by examining the 
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actual vouchers that the details supplied by 
the purchaser or carrier concerning the 
amount of transport costs are accurate. 
Article'5 
In calculating the delivery price at the point 
of destination, undertakings effecting align-
ment shall take account of all costs to be 
borne by the consumer such as trade sur-
charges, price correctives for ash or water 
content, quality surcharges, and other 
significant factors (e.g. graining, volatile 
matter content, heating power, sulphur 
content, coke-producing capacity). 
Article 6 
I . Coal industry undertakings shall notify 
alignments within the common market in 
which shipping costs are involved. The 
notification shall specify the level of costs 
serving as a basis for the reduction caused by 
alignment. 
2. The notification shall be made when the 
contract is concluded. It shall contain details 
of the calculation of the aligned price, 
distingUishing between loading and freight 
costs (included port fees, insurance and all 
other costs charged by the loader). 
3. The Commission shall communicate on 
demand to all undertakings concerned the 
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shipping costs notified to it; it may publish 
them in an appropriate manner. 
Article 7 
Undertakings exercising the right to align 
prices must, on 15 August and 15 February 
of each year, inform the Commission of the 
following: 
(a) The tonnages of fuel and the agreed 
delivery terms for which supply contracts 
have been concluded under alignment; 
(b) The tonnages of fuel supplied under 
alignment and on the basis of their own 
price list in each of the sales areas 
listed in Article 3(1). 
Such information shall be communicated in 
printed form in a manner to be determined 
by the Commission. 
Article 8 
This Decision shall not prevent undertakings 
from aligning their prices in accordance with 
the last subparagraph of Article 60{2) on 
conditions offered by undertakings outside 
the Community. 
Article 9 
This Decision shall enter into force on 
'1 January 1973. Decision No.3-58 is hereby 
repealed with effect from the same date. 
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